So, you are getting ready to embark on the Scale Up! Train-the-Trainer? Exciting! This can be truly life-changing for your professional career!

Before you begin, here’s a couple of points you might like to know.

Part I: Ten fast facts

1.      What is Scale Up? Scale Up! is a methodology to develop entrepreneurs, founders, angel investors, accelerators, incubators, VCs and ecosystem developers. The Scale Up! Methodology is based on 20+ years of experience supporting 1000’s of high-growth startup founders from pre-seed to post-IPO. The methodology is built on ‘working visually’, with a series of visual canvases and the visual Scale Up! kit.

2.      What’s the core idea behind Scale Up!? In Scale Up! participants form teams and compete through the Founder’s Journey, taking a company from idea to successful exit. For most people,  we do around 8-10 years in just three days.

3.      How is Scale Up! delivered? In-person or online (using Miro and Zoom)

4.      How can Scale Up! be run? Your imagination sets the only limitations; we describe seven different ways you can run Scale Up! We prefer the 3-day format, but half-day, one-day, two-day, five day or even 3-month formats are possible. It’s really up to you.

5.      How many people have been through Scale Up!? Globally, ca. 4.500 to date

6.      How many countries have Scale Up! been run so far? 50+

7.      How many expert facilitators are there? ca. 70+

8.      How many Scale Up! version are there? – Scale Up! (1.0) – Scale Up Angel! – Scale Up MENA! – Scale Up Africa Rising! – Scale Up Europe! (launching in 2026). More coming…

9.      Who developed Scale Up!? Chris Rangen and his colleague Jolene Foo-Hodne was working with Innovation Norway, the Norwegian national innovation agency on a national program. This collaboration led to the first Scale Up! back in 20218.

10. Who can run Scale Up!? Globally, anyone can learn to run Scale Up! To date, faculty, VCs, accelerator staff, coaches and consultants have all learned to run Scale Up! With a bit of training and willingness to learn, anyone can.

Part II: Two types of knowledge

The two sets of expertise you will develop For anyone running Scale Up!, there are two skillsets you need. We count these on a one to five level, from beginner to expert.

Domain knowledge Domain knowledge is how much you know about the content, the term sheets, the deal structures, the cap table math and how to bring together a 2M @4M post SAFE, with a 500.000 @3M pre equity round, while also keeping the initial angel investors happy and structuring a 12% post-round ESOP.

Domain knowledge is important. It is what you know. It is the foundation you use to teach, coach and mentor others. Everyone should strive to develop their domain knowledge.

But domain knowledge alone is not enough.

Facilitation knowledge Next, you have faciliation knowledge, or really faciliation skills. How comfortable are you with structuring programs, designing multi-stakeholder workshops and facilitating high-paced masterclasses? Can you manage large groups, in both online and in-person formats?

Can you use your voice well? Can you give instructions clearly? Can you design a workflow to keep people engaged over multiple days?

For most of us, these two sets of skills is something we work on constantly, day in and day out. You never graduate, you just keep getting better and better over time.

Part III: The five core topics you will master

Our train-the-Trainer is designed around five core topic areas. Each represents a critical piece of the puzzle every Scale Up! Expert Facilitator needs to handle with confidence.

1. Founder’s Journey From IPO dreams to the messy realities of taking a company public, you will learn to guide participants through every twist and turn. This is the backbone of Scale Up! – understanding what founders actually go through from idea to exit. Can you tell stories, of success and failure from across the Founder’s journey?

2. Term Sheets 600+ term sheets. SAFE notes. CLAs. Priced rounds. Liquidation preferences. You will learn to read, understand, and explain even the most complex investor term sheets. Did you know there is such a thing as ‘too many term sheets’? You will.

3. Cap Tables From foundational equity to Series K dilution, cap table mastery is non-negotiable. You will learn to help founders understand how their equity evolves – and how to protect it.

4. Ten Steps to Scaling Up This is where strategy meets execution. Scale up mindset. Exit planning. Equity management. ARR velocity. Team development. Market expansion. Customer discovery. Financing. Product development. Scaling with AI. Ten interconnected elements that determine whether a startup stays stuck – or scales.

5. Liquidity & Exits The ultimate question: how do you return value to investors? M&A, IPO, secondary transactions, partial liquidity – you will learn to facilitate conversations most founders have never had. Combined, these five are the core topics you need to study up on to build out your domain expertise.

Part IV: Three levels of development

Here’s the thing about becoming a Scale Up! Expert Facilitator. It’s not about reading a manual. It’s about a progression through three distinct levels.

Knowledge This is where you start. Learning the content. Understanding the frameworks. Reading term sheets. Studying cap table math. Getting fluent in the visual canvases, the Founder’s Journey, the Investor Map, the Rocketship Canvas. You are building the internal library that allows real improvisation later.

Confidence Knowledge is not enough. Confidence comes from running programs. From co-facilitating with masters. From leading a full simulation and experiencing what it feels like when things go sideways – and learning to recover. This is where the nervous system develops. Where you learn to sense what a room needs, moment to moment.

Mastery Master facilitators create unseen structure and invisible support. They make profound learning look effortless. They adapt mid-session to emerging themes without losing coherence. They know when the ‘wrong’ conversation is actually the most important one. Mastery is not perfection – it’s the hard-won ability to orchestrate genuine transformation.

Part V: What a typical Scale Up! session looks like

Here, we use a three-day format. You can of course mix and match this around to best suit your format. You can easily adapt to a one-day format, two-day or even five-day.

Day 1: The Foundations

The Welcome session kicks off with the Founder’s Journey, Investment instruments and Foundational equity. You will dive into Strategy 101, Pre-seed/seed stage dynamics, ESOP structures, Term sheets, Investor mapping, Product development and Pitch deck fundamentals.

By the end of Day 1, teams will have navigated 30+ term sheets across 2-5 rounds, managing raises from 1M – 10M at valuations of 10M – 30M. Boom cards. Bust cards. Burn rates from 10.000 – 100.000. Welcome to the founder’s reality.

Day 2: Scaling Up

Day 2 opens with a Pitch session. Now you take teams into venture territory. Sales organization. Market expansion. Long-term capital strategy. 3x Value uplift. Boards & governance. Rocketship canvases. LinkedIn positioning. Complex term sheets. SAFE conversion mechanics. Product mastery. Investor liquidity & returns. Outcome canvas analysis.

The complexity ramps up. Each team should see term sheets: 30-40. Rounds: 3-5. Raises: 20M – 100M. Valuations: 100M – 500M (and pushing toward 1BN). Boom: 10-30. Burn rate: 500.000 – 5M. This is where scaling founders separate from starting founders.

Day 3: Growth & Exit

The final day opens with an Outcome pitch. You are now in growth stage territory. Global leadership. Market expansion. Margin expansion. Investor questions and power dynamics. M&A strategies. Liquidity transactions. IPO readiness. Exit transactions.

The stakes are highest here. M&A: 0-3 deals. Term sheets: 20-40. Rounds: 1-5. Raises: 50M – 1BN. Valuations: 10M – 30M? Not anymore – we’re talking multiples higher. Boom: 10-15. Burn rate: 10M – 20M. This is where winners are made.

Part VI: Quick reads

Who attends a Scale up Program? Read it.

Who buys Scale Up? Read it.

Evolving Scale Up! Read it.

The Scale Up Angel E-mail Read it.

The four cap tables in Scale Up! Read it.

Scaling Up in MENA: The Most Common Investment Instruments Read it.

Can you run the cap table? Read it.

Scaling up in MENA! Read it.

Ten Books That Will Save You From Costly Cap Table Mistakes: A Reading List for Founders, advisors & expert facilitators Read it.

From student to master: how Enrico Maset become one of the world’s leading Scale Up Experts Read it.

Part VII: Selected case studies

How Katapult Accelerator Gets Its Startups Investor-Ready Read it here.

Scaling up in the rising Egyptian ecosystem Read it here.

Helping Madica’s pre-seed startups bridge the scaling chasm Read it here.

Scaling to exit with Dubai Future District Fund Read it here.

Bridging the Capital Chasm Read it here.

Why This Matters

Globally, over 70 people are now trained and certified to deliver Scale Up! programs. They work in 50+ countries. They’ve taken nearly 4.500 founders, investors and ecosystem builders through the journey.

As an Expert Facilitator, you will join this global community. You will gain the ability to transform how founders think, how investors evaluate, how ecosystems develop.

The best part? The journey from Learn to Run to Apply to Fly is one of the most rewarding professional development paths you can take. Each program you deliver, you get better. Each challenging term sheet negotiation you facilitate, you grow. Each breakthrough moment you witness – a founder finally understanding their cap table, an investor seeing the power dynamics differently – reminds you why this work matters.

Ready?

The Scale Up! Train-the-Trainer is not a certification you collect. It’s a capability you develop. A community you join. A journey you commit to.

From Knowledge to Confidence to Mastery. From Day 1’s foundations through Day 3’s exits. From your first nervous co-facilitation to the flow state of mastery.

Are you ready to help more founders scale?

Let’s go.

Looking forward to working with you!

Read the full story, The Fund Journey: An Emerging Manager’s Story from Kuala Lumpur to South-East Asia, Part I (years T-2 -1), Part II (years 2-5) and Part III (years 6-7).

Fund: Meridian Ventures Fund III Fund Strategy: Early-stage B2B software, AI and fintech across South-East Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) Recommendation: Invest Date: October 5th

Commitment: $5,000,000 In % of total fund size: 10% Our role with the fund: Limited Partner with Advisory Committee seat

Investment Context

Employees Pension Fund (EPF/KWSP) is evaluating a $5M commitment to Meridian Ventures Fund III as part of our emerging manager allocation within the alternative investments portfolio. This represents our first commitment to Meridian, though we have tracked the firm since Fund II.

Why Meridian Fund III:

• Malaysian-based GP aligns with our mandate to support domestic asset managers
• Strong Fund I performance (2.8x TVPI, 0.6x DPI at Year 5)
• IFC co-investment provides institutional validation
• Proven team stability through challenging early years
• Clear thesis in B2B/fintech aligned with Malaysia’s digital economy priorities

Our Due Diligence Findings:

• GP team demonstrates resilience and discipline (DataSync write-off handled well)
• Differentiated GTM value-add through Venture Partner
• Conservative fund sizing relative to opportunity
• Strong LP re-up rates from Fund I/II (>80%)
• Institutional-grade reporting and governance already in place

Analyzing Fund III with the LP Outcome Canvas

Outcome Models

1. Terrible

Scenario Description: Multiple portfolio failures due to regional economic downturn or systemic startup ecosystem collapse. Fund deploys capital but majority of companies fail to reach Series A. No meaningful exits. GP team potentially breaks up under pressure.

What would cause this:

• Severe regional recession impacting startup funding environment
• Key GP departure (key person event)
• Systematic misjudgment in investment selection
• Follow-on funding market collapse preventing portfolio companies from scaling

Metric Value

Years to 1x DPI Never

Years to Full Distribution 12+ (wind-down)

Fund Multiple 0.4x

Our Net TVPI0.4x

Our Net DPI 0.3x

Probability 5%

Our outcome: $5M invested → ~$1.5M returned over 12 years. Significant loss but limited to committed capital.

2. Disappointing

Scenario Description: Fund performs below expectations. Some exits occur but at modest valuations. Winners don’t scale as hoped. J-curve extends longer than projected. Returns below hurdle rate, no carried interest paid.

What would cause this:

• Mediocre portfolio company performance across the board
• Regional exit market remains challenging (limited strategic acquirer appetite)
• Fund I outperformance was partially luck, not fully repeatable
• Competition from larger funds compresses Meridian’s deal access

Metric Value

Years to 1x DPI Year 9

Years to Full Distribution 12

Fund Multiple 1.5x

Our Net TVPI 1.5x

Our Net DPI 1.4x

Probability 15%

Our outcome: $5M invested → ~$7M returned over 12 years. Positive but below our target returns for venture allocation. Opportunity cost versus other alternatives.

3. Performing

Scenario Description: Fund delivers solid, median-quartile returns. Portfolio construction works as planned with expected winner/loser distribution. 2-3 strong exits, several modest outcomes, typical write-off rate. GPs execute their strategy competently.

What would cause this:

• Normal portfolio distribution: 20% winners, 50% modest outcomes, 30% failures
• Regional exit environment functions adequately
• Fund I success was real but Fund III faces more competition at larger size
• Team executes well but without breakout positions

Metric Value

Years to 1x DPI Year 7

Years to Full Distribution 11

Fund Multiple 2.2x

Our Net TVPI 2.2x

Our Net DPI 2.0x

Probability 35%

Our outcome: $5M invested → ~$10M returned over 11 years. Meets our baseline expectations for emerging manager venture allocation. Acceptable risk-adjusted return.

4. Overperforming

Scenario Description: Fund outperforms expectations with strong portfolio company development. Multiple successful Series A/B raises, 3-4 meaningful exits including at least one at 10x+. DPI generation ahead of schedule. Clear Fund IV momentum.

What would cause this:

• GTM value-add genuinely accelerates portfolio company growth
• 1-2 portfolio companies achieve regional leadership positions
• Favorable exit environment with active strategic acquirers
• Strong follow-on investor interest validates portfolio quality
• Team cohesion and capability continues to strengthen

Metric Value

Years to 1x DPI Year 5

Years to Full Distribution 10

Fund Multiple 3.0x

Our Net TVPI 3.0x

Our Net DPI 2.8x

Probability 30%

Our outcome: $5M invested → ~$14M returned over 10 years. Strong performance justifying emerging manager risk. Would support increased allocation to Fund IV.

5. Market Leader

Scenario Description: Fund establishes Meridian as the definitive early-stage firm in ASEAN ex-Singapore. Multiple breakout portfolio companies. At least one potential unicorn. Strong DPI from strategic acquisitions by global tech companies. Fund III becomes a reference point for regional emerging manager success.

What would cause this:

• 1-2 portfolio companies scale to $100M+ valuations
• Major strategic exits (Google, Microsoft, Grab, Sea acquiring portfolio companies)
• Meridian brand becomes synonymous with quality SEA early-stage deals
• Fund I fully distributed at 3.5x+, validating long-term track record
• Strong global LP interest in Fund IV at $100M+

Metric Value

Years to 1x DPI Year 4

Years to Full Distribution 9

Fund Multiple 4.0x

Our Net TVPI 4.0x

Our Net DPI 3.8x

Probability 12%

Our outcome: $5M invested → ~$19M returned over 9 years. Exceptional returns. Strong relationship for preferred access to future funds. Case study for our emerging manager program.

6. Outlier

Scenario Description: Extraordinary outcome driven by a generational company in the portfolio. One investment becomes a regional or global category leader with $1B+ outcome. Fund returns driven primarily by single massive winner, similar to early Sequoia or a]16z funds with breakout companies.

What would cause this:

• Portfolio company becomes the “Grab” or “Sea” of its category
• IPO or $500M+ acquisition of lead position
• Timing alignment with massive market expansion (e.g., regional fintech infrastructure buildout)
• Everything goes right for one extraordinary founder

Metric Value

Years to 1x DPI Year 3

Years to Full Distribution 8

Fund Multiple 6.0x+

Our Net TVPI 6.0x+

Our Net DPI 5.5x+

Probability 3%

Our outcome: $5M invested → ~$27.5M+ returned over 8 years. Transformational return. Would significantly impact our alternatives portfolio performance. Extremely rare but possible given early-stage venture dynamics.

Summary Analysis

Probability-Weighted Expected Outcome

Scenario Probability Fund Multiple Weighted Multiple

Terrible 5% 0.4x 0.02x

Disappointing 15% 1.5x 0.23x

Performing 35% 2.2x 0.77x

Overperforming 30% 3.0x 0.90x

Market Leader 12% 4.0x 0.48x

Outlier 3% 6.0x 0.18x

Expected Value 100% — 2.58x

Probability-weighted expected return: 2.58x net multiple on our $5M commitment

Expected dollar return: ~$12.9M over 10-year average holding period

Risk Assessment

Downside Risk (Terrible + Disappointing scenarios): 20% probability of returns below 1.5x

Base Case (Performing): 35% probability of solid 2.2x returns meeting our venture allocation targets

Upside Potential (Overperforming + Market Leader + Outlier): 45% probability of 3.0x+ returns

Risk/Reward Assessment: Asymmetric return profile typical of venture capital. Limited downside (maximum loss = committed capital), significant upside potential. 45% probability of strong outperformance justifies the allocation.

Recommendation

INVEST $5,000,000 in Meridian Ventures Fund III

Rationale:

1. Expected returns justify risk: 2.58x probability-weighted return exceeds our 2.0x threshold for emerging manager venture allocations.

2. Downside is bounded: Even in terrible scenario, loss limited to committed capital. 80% probability of returning at least 1.5x.

3. Strategic alignment: Malaysian-domiciled GP supports our mandate. B2B/fintech thesis aligns with national digital economy priorities.

4. Institutional validation: IFC’s $8M commitment provides comfort on GP quality and governance standards.

5. Relationship value: Establishing relationship now provides access to Fund IV at larger scale if Fund III performs.

6. Portfolio fit: $5M commitment represents appropriate sizing for emerging manager allocation—meaningful enough to matter, small enough to absorb potential loss.

Conditions:

• Advisory Committee seat to maintain visibility into fund operations
• Quarterly reporting at institutional standards (already confirmed)
• Co-investment rights on deals above $2M (standard LP terms)
• MFN on any preferential terms granted to other LPs

LP Outcome Canvas by Strategy Tools. Get yours at www.strategytools.io

Read the full story, The Fund Journey: An Emerging Manager’s Story from Kuala Lumpur to South-East Asia, Part I (years T-2 -1), Part II (years 2-5) and Part III (years 6-7).

About the Author:

Christian Rangen is a strategy advisor and business school faculty. He works with ambitious ecosystem developers, innovation agencies, venture funds, national fund-of-funds and governments on building better VC firms and VC ecosystems. He runs GP Accelerators and GP Masterclasses globally.

Through the lens of Aisha Rahman, Founding Partner, Meridian Ventures With insights from: Rizal Tan, Co-Founder & General Partner And: Ahmad Ismail, CFO, PayMalaysia (Portfolio Company)

By Year 5, we had deployed most of Fund II and were generating the track record that would define our institutional future. The question was no longer whether we could survive—it was whether we could scale.

Year 6: Fund I Harvest Mode and Fund III Preparation

Fund I Portfolio Status:

Company Total Investment Status Current Value Multiple

DataSync $400K Exited (failure) $32K 0.08x

PayMalaysia $650K Series B prep $6M 9.2x

CloudSEA $700K Acquisition talks $2.5M 3.6x

SecureKL $400K EXITED $550K 1.38x

LogiTech Asia $600K Growing $1.2M 2.0x

HealthTech MY $550K Growing $1.4M 2.5x

PropTech.asia $500K Profitable $900K 1.8x

AgriTech ASEAN $350K Exited (failure) $50K 0.14x

EduScale ID $500K Series A complete $1.8M 3.6x

FinFlow $650K Series A complete $3.2M 4.9x

Year 6 Fund I Metrics:

• Portfolio value: $17.5M (8 remaining companies)

• Total distributions: $632K

• TVPI: 2.8x

• DPI: 0.13x

• Net IRR: ~32%

CloudSEA Acquisition:

In June, Year 6, CloudSEA was acquired by a regional enterprise software company for $8M. Our proceeds: $2.2M on $700K invested (3.1x).

This was our second meaningful exit and dramatically improved our DPI story.

Fund I Post-CloudSEA:

• Total distributions: $2.85M

• DPI: 0.57x

• TVPI: 3.0x

Fund III: The Institutional Leap to $50 Million

Fund III represented our transition from emerging to established manager. At $50M, we could finally access the institutional capital that had been out of reach for our first two funds. But doing so, required next level fundraising strategy.

Fundraising Strategy Canvas: Meridian Ventures Fund III ($50M)

Fund Name: Meridian Ventures Fund III Completed by: Aisha Rahman & Rizal Tan Completed date: May 5th

Content Marketing (Your key message)

Our Fund III content strategy builds on five years of thought leadership. Aisha publishes monthly insights on South-East Asian venture trends via LinkedIn and our firm blog, reaching 15,000+ followers across the region. We co-author research with FoF’s on emerging manager performance in ASEAN markets. Rizal speaks regularly at AVCJ, SuperReturn Asia, and regional LP convenings. Our quarterly LP letters have become known for transparent, detailed portfolio analysis—several prospective LPs cited these as reasons for taking initial meetings. For Fund III, we’re producing a signature report on “The Next Wave: AI Opportunities Shaping the future” to position our revised thesis.

LP Construction (200 Names vs 3000 Names)

Fund III targets 20-25 LPs with an average commitment of $2-2.5M. Our construction starts with warm relationships: 12 re-up conversations with Fund I/II LPs (targeting 80% re-up rate), plus 8 qualified new institutional prospects. We’re not casting wide—we’re going deep on LPs where we have genuine fit.

Our primary list includes: IFC and ADB (DFI mandate alignment), 4 fund-of-funds with emerging manager programs (Sarona, Speedinvest, HarbourVest, Adams Street), 3 regional pension funds beginning SEA allocations, 2 American foundations with Asia impact mandates, and 3 corporate VCs seeking regional deal flow access. Secondary list adds 15 family offices across Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Gulf.

Sequencing (Game Plan)

Pre-marketing (Months 1-3): Soft conversations with Fund I/II LPs to gauge re-up appetite and gather reference feedback. Update all materials, refresh data room, finalize Fund III terms.

First Close Target (Months 4-8): Secure anchor commitments from Jelawang Capital ($6M target) and one DFI (IFC at $8M). These two anchors unlock the rest of the raise.

Second Close (Months 9-12): Convert fund-of-funds and re-ups. Target $35M cumulative.

Final Close (Months 13-16): Complete pension fund and foundation conversations. Close at $50M.

Extended Team (Who?)

We’re not raising alone. Our extended team includes: Jim, the ex-ADB (warm introductions to DFI network), our advisory board member from a major Malaysian family office (opens doors across Gulf family offices), Jelawang Capital’s LP relations team (co-hosting events where we’re featured), our Fund II co-anchor LP who now sits on two foundation boards (direct introductions), and a placement agent for European institutional LPs only (Eaton Partners, success-fee basis).

As always, Andrew Senduk and his army of AI agents supports by presenting our GTM value-add story to LPs evaluating our portfolio support capabilities. We also brought in people like Jen Braswell and Paola Ravacchioli to guide us into the world of institutional readiness.

The biggest difference, now we have a full capital formation team, full-time. That’s a game-changer.

Timeline (6 Weeks vs 4 Years)

Target: 14-16 months from launch to final close. We’re raising institutional, so we accept longer cycles. DFIs like IFC require 6-9 months from first meeting to IC approval. Pension funds need 4-6 months minimum. We’ve built relationships with target LPs over the past 2 years specifically to compress these timelines. Fund II closed in 14 months; we’re targeting similar pace for Fund III despite larger size because our LP relationships are now mature and our track record is proven.

Amplifying LPs (Value-Add LPs)

Three LPs serve as active amplifiers for Fund III:

Jelawang Capital: As anchor, they’re actively referring us to their LP network and co-hosting a webinar on SEA emerging managers where Meridian is featured.

Grace Choo  (IFC): Beyond their commitment, IFC’s involvement signals institutional validation. We’ll reference their due diligence process and commitment in all LP conversations.

Fund I HNWI (exited founder): Now a respected angel investor, he’s made personal introductions to three family offices in his network who are exploring VC allocations.

Geography (Focus)

Primary: Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong (in-person intensive). These three cities cover 70% of our target LP base.

Secondary: Dubai (6 trips planned for Gulf family offices and sovereign-adjacent capital), Washington DC (IFC HQ, 4 trips), San Francisco (2 American foundations, 5 trips).

Tertiary: European fund-of-funds handled primarily via placement agent with 3 Rizal trips to London/Amsterdam.

We’re not trying to cover the world. Geographic focus means deeper relationships in fewer places.

Incentives (Incentives to Close)

First Close Incentive: LPs committing by first close receive most-favored-nation status on any future side letter terms and priority co-investment allocation on the first three Fund III deals.

Anchor Incentive: Jelawang Capital’s $6M anchor commitment came with a seat on our Advisory Committee and quarterly strategic calls with GPs beyond standard LP updates.

No fee discounts. We learned from Fund I that fee discounts create LP management complexity and signal desperation. Our 2/20 terms are firm. Value-add comes through access and relationships, not economics.

Summary: Why Fund III Will Close

Fund III succeeds because we’ve built the infrastructure over four years:

1. Track Record: Fund I at 2.8x TVPI with 0.6x DPI; Fund II performing at 1.6x TVPI in Year 2

2. LP Relationships: 80%+ expected re-up rate from existing LPs

3. Institutional Readiness: IFC-grade reporting, ESG frameworks, governance already in place

4. Anchor Momentum: Jelawang and IFC commitments create herd effect for remaining LPs

5. Team Coverage: All 8 GP Fundraising Team roles systematically covered

6. Geographic Discipline: Focused presence in 3 primary cities, not scattered globally

We’re not hoping to raise $50M. We have a plan to raise $50M.

The Fund III LP roster showed our journey from emerging to institutional:

LP Type Commitment

IFC (International Finance Corporation) $8M

Jelawang Capital (top-up) $6M

Fund-of-Funds (top-ups x3) $10M

Employees Provident Fund (EPF / KWSP) $5M

Regional pension fund (1) $1M

American Foundations (2) $5M

Corporate VCs / Strategics (3) $8M

Fund I/II Re-ups $7M

TOTAL $50M

IFC: The Institutional Validation

When IFC committed $8M to Fund III, it represented the culmination of a eight-year relationship.

Grace’s guidance during Fund I and II had prepared us for IFC’s due diligence process—one of the most rigorous in the industry. When the IFC team reviewed our fund, they found:

•            ESG frameworks already in place

•            LP reporting that met institutional standards

•            A governance structure that could scale

•            A track record of transparent, disciplined decision-making

•            A clear investment thesis with demonstrated execution

“Meridian had done the hard work of institutionalization before they needed to,” an IFC investment officer noted during our closing celebration. “That’s rare for emerging managers. Most try to retrofit institutional practices after they want institutional capital. Meridian built the foundation first.”

Analyzing the LP outcome scenarios for EPF / KWSP

One particularly valuable preparation was the extended masterclass we did on the LP outcome scenarios. This actually happened in Lausanne, Switzerland, where we participated in IMD’s Venture Asset Management program. Here we met Jim and Heidi, from ZKB. We got to develop and then truly practice using the LP outcome canvas. Enrique pushed us hard on this. This was truly transformative.

We did not know it at the time, but just months later we would find ourselves in exactly the same position, when the investment team at EPF/KWSP started discussing their LP outcome analysis with us. Suddenly, we realized we could hold our ground and discuss, even negotiate with them on LP outcome models. Looking back, that was probably the moment it clicked, ‘now we are truly institutionally ready’.

Read the full LP outcome analysis from EPF/KWSP here.

The 20-Month Fundraising Cadence

Fund III closed in early Year 7, meaning we had raised three funds in seven years—a new fund approximately every 20 months.

This aggressive pace was only possible because of the fundraising infrastructure we’d built:

•            LP relationships maintained continuously (not just during fundraising windows)

•            Data room always updated and ready

•            Fundraising team roles clearly defined across our small team

•            AI and automation tools accelerating LP research and outreach

•            Process-driven approach to LP conversion

Year 7: The Firm Today

By the end of Year 7, Meridian Ventures managed $85M across three funds:

Fund Size Vintage Status

Fund I $10M Year 0 Harvesting

Fund II $25M Year 2 Value Creation

Fund III $50M Year 4 Deploying

Our team had grown from 2 founders to 8 people: 2 GPs, 1 Venture Partner (Andrew Senduk), 2 Principals, 2 Associates, and 1 Operations Manager, as well as a full team of AI agents.

We’d invested in 32 companies across South-East Asia. Four exits completed. One potential unicorn in the making (PayMalaysia, now valued at $60M+ and heading toward Series C).

We were no longer emerging managers. We were an established firm with institutional credibility, consistent returns, and a platform that would outlast any individual partner. Of course, with three funds, we now need to start generating exits and DPI back to our LPs. That’s the next step of the journey.

Key Recommendations for Emerging Fund Managers in South-East Asia

Having navigated the journey from concept to $85M under management, here are the recommendations we would give to emerging managers starting today in South-East Asia:

1. Start Smaller Than You Think

Our original target of $30M for Fund I would have been impossible to raise. $10M was achievable—barely. In emerging markets, fund size credibility must be earned gradually. A successfully deployed $10M fund opens doors that no amount of pitch materials can open for a $50M first fund.

2. Understand the Economics Brutally

A 2% management fee on a $10M fund is $200,000 per year. After fund administration, legal, office, and travel, you’ll be paying yourselves poverty wages. Plan for this. Either have personal runway, alternative income sources, or extremely understanding life partners. The economics only work at scale—which means Fund II and III are not optional; they’re survival requirements.

3. Invest in Fundraising Infrastructure Early

Use the GP Fundraising Team canvas to build systematic fundraising capability, even if you’re just two people. Define who covers each role. Use AI and automation tools aggressively. Define your LP personas. Nail your LP Value proposition. Maintain your LP CRM continuously. The difference between our Fund I scramble and Fund II execution was entirely about infrastructure.

4. Leverage Ecosystem Builders

Organizations like IFC, ADB, Cradle Fund, and Jelawang Capital exist to support ecosystem development. They want emerging managers to succeed. Engage with them early—not for capital, but for guidance, connections, and credibility. Our relationships with Grace Choo  at IFC and Craig and Ian at ADB were transformative years before they led to any investment.

5. Build Value Creation Capabilities

South-East Asian founders often need more support than capital. Andrew Senduk’s GTM expertise became a genuine differentiator for our fund. Think about what operational value you can genuinely provide, and build that capability deliberately. LPs increasingly want to see portfolio support, not just deal access.

6. Accept the LP Evolution Timeline

Fund I will likely be friends, family, HNWIs, and angels. Fund II will add some early institutional elements—fund-of-funds, emerging manager programs. Fund III is when major institutional capital becomes accessible. Don’t fight this progression; plan for it. Each fund stage prepares you for the next.

7. Maintain a Fundraising Cadence

Raising a new fund every 20-24 months sounds aggressive, but it’s actually survival strategy. It keeps LP relationships warm, demonstrates traction, and builds the AUM necessary for sustainable GP economics. Start thinking about Fund II long before Fund I even closes.

8. Be Transparent About Challenges

Our first write-off was painful to communicate to LPs. But our transparent handling of that failure—and our discipline in not throwing good money after bad—built credibility that paid dividends in Fund II and III. LPs expect some failures. What they’re watching for is how you handle them.

9. Invest in Education Continuously

The Fund Manager! Masterclass transformed our approach. Strategy Tools’ LP AI platform sharpened our pitching. Industry conferences, peer networks, and continuous learning aren’t luxuries—they’re requirements for staying competitive in a rapidly evolving industry.

10. Remember It’s a 15-Year Journey

The Fund Journey Map shows a 15-year cycle from idea to final distribution. We’re only at Year 7. The hardest part—converting paper gains to actual DPI—is still ahead. This is a career commitment, not a quick path to wealth. Make sure you’re in it for the right reasons and with the right partners.

Final Reflections

Rizal’s reflection:

“Six years ago, Aisha and I were two people in a converted shophouse, maxing out credit cards and wondering if anyone would ever trust us with institutional capital. Today, we manage $85M across three funds with IFC as an LP and genuine institutional credibility. Fund I’s emerging returns aren’t the highest in the industry, but they’re solid, repeatable, and built the foundation for everything that followed. The Fund Journey Map captures the phases, but what it can’t capture is the emotional journey—the anxiety of Year 0, the relief of first close, the devastation of our first write-off, the joy of our first major exit. This business is deeply human. That’s what makes it worth doing.”

Aisha’s reflection:

“If I could give one piece of advice to emerging managers starting today in South-East Asia, it would be this: the fund journey is a marathon, not a sprint. Every phase has its challenges and rewards. Year T-2 felt impossible; Year 4 felt like vindication; Year 6 feels like we’ve just begun. Through all of it, the constants were partnership stability, LP transparency, and founder-first investing. Those principles guided every decision. They’ll guide Fund IV and beyond.”

The fund journey continues.

Read Part I (years T-2 -1), I here, and Part II here.

About the Fund Journey Map and GP Fundraising Team Canvas

The Fund Journey Map by Strategy Tools visualizes the complete 15-year lifecycle of a venture capital fund, from early idea through final distribution. It captures the key decision points, risks, and milestones that define the GP experience. Based on work with 100’s of emerging fund managers, the Fund Journey Map is designed to help emerging managers successfully navigate the full fund journey.

The GP Fundraising Team canvas identifies the eight roles that drive successful LP fundraising, from LP Researcher through LP Process & DD Guide. Both tools are part of Strategy Tools’ Venture Capital Series.

Download the Fund Journey Map, GP Fundraising Team canvas, and explore our full suite of GP accelerators and venture capital programs  at strategytools.io

Ready to start your fund journey?

Join the Fund Manager! Masterclass to learn from experienced GPs, practice with our Fund Manager simulation, and build the skills needed to launch and manage successful venture capital funds. Learn more.

This article is part of the Venture Capital Series at Strategy Tools, helping fund managers, LPs, FoFs and ecosystem builders develop better venture capital ecosystems around the world.

About the Author:

Christian Rangen is a strategy advisor and business school faculty. He works with ambitious ecosystem developers, innovation agencies, venture funds, national fund-of-funds and governments on building better VC firms and VC ecosystems. He runs GP Accelerators and GP Masterclasses globally.

A huge thanks to Scott Newton Rick Rasmussen Efe (Braimah) Barber Winnie Odhiambo Jen Braswell Paola Ravacchioli Jim Pulcrano Enrique Alvarado Hablützel Marijn Wiersma Jessica Low Jessica Espinoza Marième Diop Sanjana Raheja Rumbi Makanga for inspiring this 3-part story

Through the lens of Aisha Rahman, Founding Partner, Meridian Ventures With insights from: Rizal Tan, Co-Founder & General Partner And: Priya Nair, CEO, DataSync (Portfolio Company)

The investment period is where fund strategy meets market reality. For Meridian Ventures, Years 2-5 would test every assumption in our thesis—and force us to make decisions that would determine whether Fund I would succeed or fail. More importantly, it would teach us that building a world-class fundraising team was the key to our survival.

Year 2: Building the Portfolio

January-March: Deployment Accelerates

Year 2 began with unfinished business—we were still seeking to fill out our Fund I portfolio while simultaneously supporting our initial five investments.

The portfolio construction challenge:

Fund I targeted 12-15 investments. With $10M and roughly 30% reserved for follow-ons ($3M), we had $7M for initial investments. Average initial check: $450K-$600K.

Our investment period was 3-4 years, but best practice suggested deploying most capital in years 1-2 to allow adequate time for value creation before exits.

Target deployment pace: 4-5 investments per year in Years 1-2, slowing in Years 3-4.

Q1 investments:

Investment #6: HealthTech MY (February, Year 2) — Digital health platform connecting patients with specialists. Strong team from the Malaysian healthcare system. Complex regulatory environment, but a genuine market need. $450K investment.

Investment #7: PropTech.asia (March, Year 2) — Commercial real estate analytics. Data-driven approach to property valuation across South-East Asian markets. Two experienced founders from the real estate industry. $400K investment.

April-June: First Portfolio Challenges Emerge

By summer, reality started diverging from our investment memos.

DataSync: The early warning signs

Our first investment wasn’t developing as expected. The founding team—brilliant data scientists from Grab—struggled with go-to-market execution. Six months post-investment, they had built an impressive product with almost no customers.

Our board seat gave us visibility, but limited control. We pushed for them to hire a commercial co-founder. They resisted, believing the product would sell itself.

The VC’s dilemma:

This is where active ownership gets complicated. We had conviction in the market and product, but growing concerns about execution. Do we push harder and risk damaging the GP-founder relationship? Do we stay hands-off and hope they figure it out? Do we write more about our concerns in LP reports, potentially signaling problems prematurely?

We chose a middle path: supportive but direct feedback in board meetings, connected them with commercial advisors from our network, and documented our concerns internally while maintaining constructive external positioning.

Rizal’s perspective:

“DataSync taught us something important in Year 1: the gap between investment memo and portfolio reality. On paper, they were perfect—ex-Grab team, clear market need, technical excellence. In practice, they had a fundamental gap in commercial DNA. As investors, we could coach around the edges, but we couldn’t fix the team composition problem without their buy-in. That’s the limit of VC influence at the seed stage.”

July-December: Closing Out Year 2

More investments:

Investment #8: AgriTech ASEAN (August, Year 2) — Precision agriculture software for South-East Asian farms. Strong domain expertise from agricultural extension backgrounds. $350K investment.

Investment #9: EduScale ID (October, Year 2) — EdTech platform for corporate training, Indonesia-focused. First-time founder, but she’d been a customer of this category for years and understood the pain points intimately. $400K investment.

Investment #10: FinFlow (November, Year 2) — Subscription billing platform for regional SaaS companies. Two-time founder (previous exit to a strategic acquirer). More expensive than our typical deals—we paid a premium for founder pedigree. $550K investment.

Year 2 Summary:

Metric Value

Investments made 10 total (5 in Year 0, 5 in Year 1)

Capital deployed $4.1M (59% of initial allocation)

Portfolio value (estimated) $4.5M (modest markups)

Net IRR ~10%

TVPI 1.10x

DPI 0.0x (no distributions)

LP feedback (first annual meeting):

Our first annual LP meeting happened in November, Year 2. The feedback was mixed.

Positives: LPs liked our pace of deployment, the quality of our deal sourcing, and our transparent reporting.

Concerns: Multiple LPs questioned why we’d invested in 10 companies before having meaningful traction data from our earliest investments. Were we deploying too fast? Should we have waited to see DataSync progress before committing more capital? This was fair criticism. We defended our approach—the market window for seed deals doesn’t wait, and batch deployment is normal—but we heard the underlying anxiety.

Year 3: The J-Curve Bites Hard

January-March: Portfolio Divergence Accelerates

Year 3 revealed the brutal reality of seed-stage investing: outcomes diverge fast.

The winners emerging:

PayMalaysia signed a partnership with a major Malaysian bank, gaining access to 25,000 SME customers. Their MRR jumped from $15K to $45K in a single quarter.

CloudSEA landed their first enterprise customer and began generating real revenue. The founding team proved they could sell, not just build.

FinFlow—our expensive bet on the serial founder—launched and acquired 80 paying customers within three months. Unit economics looked strong.

The troubled middle:

LogiTech Asia was progressing but slowly. Their pilot customers liked the product but were reluctant to commit to scaled rollouts. The solo founder was burning out, handling everything herself.

SecureKL hit regulatory complexity we’d underestimated. Malaysian cybersecurity compliance required certifications that would take 12-18 months to obtain.

AgriTech ASEAN was pre-revenue and burning cash on R&D. The founders were making technical progress but had no commercial traction whatsoever.

The failures materializing:

DataSync continued its slow death march. By March, Year 3, they had signed only two customers—both small, low-ACV deals that didn’t validate the business model. Cash was running low.

The write-down conversation:

For the first time, we had to discuss portfolio write-downs with our LPs.

Our policy was to mark investments at fair value quarterly, based on either subsequent financing rounds or internal assessment. DataSync hadn’t raised follow-on capital, and our internal assessment suggested the company was worth significantly less than we’d paid.

The decision: Mark DataSync down by 50%. Our $400K investment was now carried at $200K.

This single write-down dropped our fund TVPI from 1.12x to 1.05x.

Grace Choo’s perspective (LP advisor, though not yet an investor):

“I remember Aisha calling to tell me about the DataSync write-down. She was clearly uncomfortable—admitting their first investment was struggling felt like a personal failure. But I actually gained confidence from that call. They weren’t hiding problems. They weren’t massaging valuations to look better. They were being straight about challenges. That’s exactly what I want to see from GPs.”

April-September: The Capital Crisis and Critical Decision

DataSync reaches the breaking point:

By July, DataSync had 4 months of runway remaining. The founding team came to us with two options:

Option A: Bridge financing to buy time for one more pivot attempt. They wanted $150K from existing investors to extend runway by 8-10 months.

Option B: Shut down the company, preserve remaining capital for investor return, accept failure.

This was our first major follow-on decision. The Fund Journey Map shows this moment clearly—the choice between doubling down and writing off.

The analysis:

We ran the numbers cold. DataSync had burned $500K (our $400K plus other investor capital) with almost nothing to show for it. The founding team had proven they couldn’t find early product-market fit despite multiple pivots. The market for SMB analytics was getting more competitive, not less.

A $150K bridge would increase our exposure to $550K in a company we’d already written down 50%.

Our decision: Don’t participate in the bridge. Let the company find other sources of capital or shut down.

This was painful. We liked the founders personally. We’d championed them to our LPs. Walking away felt like failure.

But the alternative was worse: good money after bad into a company that had demonstrated it couldn’t execute.

The aftermath:

DataSync couldn’t raise the bridge from other sources. In September, Year 3, they shut down and returned approximately $40K to investors. Our $400K investment became a $32K return—a 92% loss.

Priya Nair (CEO, DataSync) perspective:

“Looking back, Meridian made the right call. At the time, I was furious—I thought they were abandoning us. But we’d had 18 months to prove the model and hadn’t done it. Throwing more money at the problem wouldn’t have changed the fundamental issue: we were great at building product and terrible at selling it. I learned more from that failure than from anything else in my career. Two years later, I started a new company with a commercial co-founder from day one. That company is now doing $2M ARR. DataSync’s failure was my most important education.”

The Hard Lesson: We Need to Get Better at Fundraising

By late Year 3, with DataSync written off and the J-curve biting hard, we had a sobering realization.

“If we’re going to survive as a firm,” Rizal said one evening in our Bangsar office, “we need to raise Fund II. And we can’t go through the same scramble we did for Fund I. That nearly broke us.”

He was right. Fund I fundraising had been 18 months of desperation, cold outreach, and near-misses. We’d raised $10M through sheer determination, but we’d burned out in the process. And $10M wasn’t enough to build a sustainable management company.

We needed a systematic approach to fundraising. We needed a real fundraising team.

Building a World-Class Fundraising Team: The Game Changer

The canvas identifies eight distinct roles that drive successful LP fundraising. We didn’t have eight people—we never would for Fund II—but we deliberately covered each function:

Role Function Our Solution

LP Researcher

Leads all research on prospective LPs, fills top of funnel

Part-time analyst using ADB’s LP database and conference materials

LP Networks & Engagement

Builds deep relationships through events, conferences

Aisha – primary relationship builder through AVCJ, SuperReturn Asia

Deck, Model & Dataroom Builder

Builds and maintains all fundraising materials

Outsourced structure using Strategy Tools templates; Rizal maintained

AI & Automation

Builds automation engine to make LP process 10x faster

LP AI platform for persona practice + custom CRM workflows

GP Leadership

Overall leadership, joins and leads most LP meetings

Rizal – led all key meetings, responsible for overall LP performance

LP Closer

Takes LPs from hello to signature, strong sales focus

Split between Rizal and Aisha based on relationship warmth

LP Whisperer

Elder statesman with networks to top prospective LPs

Advisory board member from major family office + Jim, ex-ADB

LP Process & DD Guide

Guides LPs through entire process from data room to IC

Dedicated support from legal counsel + streamlined process docs

This systematic approach transformed our fundraising capability. Where Fund I had been desperate scrambling, Fund II would be organized execution.

Key changes we implemented:

1. Continuous LP engagement: We didn’t wait until we “started fundraising.” We maintained quarterly touchpoints with all Fund I LPs and prospective Fund II LPs from Year 3 onward.

2. Data room always ready: Instead of scrambling to build materials when an LP showed interest, we kept a perpetually updated data room.

3. LP persona customization: Different pitch materials for different LP types, practiced extensively using the Strategy Tools LP AI platform.

4. CRM discipline: Every LP interaction logged, follow-ups scheduled, relationship health tracked.

5. Advisory leverage: Our advisory board member opened doors we could never have opened ourselves.

The IFC Partnership: Becoming Institutional-Ready

One relationship proved transformative during our Fund II preparation: our connection to Grace Choo , Regional Lead at IFC (International Finance Corporation).

Grace had seen hundreds of emerging managers across Asia. She’d watched funds succeed and fail, scale and collapse. When we approached her in Year 3, we weren’t asking for investment (we knew our fund was too small for IFC at that stage). We were asking for guidance.

“We got immense support from Grace to understand how to evolve from Fund I to Fund II, and becoming institutional-scale ready,” I later told other emerging managers at an AVCJ panel.

Her guidance covered several critical areas:

On portfolio reporting: Institutional LPs expected quarterly reports with specific metrics. IFC had templates we could adapt.

On ESG integration: DFIs increasingly required ESG frameworks. Build these now rather than retrofit later.

On governance: Have an Advisory Committee and LP reporting structure that would scale.

On fund size: IFC typically couldn’t invest in funds under $50M, but if we performed well in Fund II, Fund III might qualify.

“Think of Fund II as your audition tape for institutional capital,” Grace advised. “Every decision you make, every report you write, every portfolio company you support—assume that institutional LPs will scrutinize all of it when you come back for Fund III.”

Andrew Senduk: Venture Partner for GTM Excellence

As our portfolio grew, we recognized a gap in our capabilities: go-to-market (GTM) execution. Many of our founders were technical experts who struggled with sales, marketing, and commercial scaling.

In Year 3, we brought on Andrew Senduk as a Venture Partner specifically to address this gap.

Andrew had spent 15 years building and scaling businesses across Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. He’d led GTM for two successful startups (one acquired, one IPO’d) and understood the unique challenges of selling across South-East Asia’s fragmented markets.

Andrew’s perspective on joining Meridian:

“What attracted me to Meridian was their recognition that early-stage investing isn’t just about picking winners—it’s about helping those winners actually win. Most seed-stage founders in South-East Asia are technical builders who’ve never sold enterprise software or scaled a consumer product across multiple countries. That’s where I could add genuine value.”

Andrew worked with six of our Fund I portfolio companies on their GTM strategies:

•            Sales process design for enterprise SaaS companies

•            Market entry strategies for regional expansion

•            Pricing and packaging optimization

•            Customer success frameworks

His involvement became a key part of our LP pitch for Fund II: we weren’t just providing capital, we were providing hands-on GTM expertise that could meaningfully accelerate our portfolio companies’ growth.

Year 4: Portfolio Maturation and Fund II Launch

Portfolio Performance at Year 4:

Company Total Investment Status Current Value Multiple

DataSync $400K Shut down $32K 0.08x

PayMalaysia $450K Series A prep $2.2M 4.9x

CloudSEA $600K Growing $1.5M 2.5x

SecureKL $400K Bridge raised $350K 0.87x

LogiTech Asia $500K Turnaround $550K 1.1x

HealthTech MY $450K Growing $650K 1.4x

PropTech.asia $400K Growing $500K 1.25x

AgriTech ASEAN $350K Struggling $200K 0.57x

EduScale ID $400K Growing $600K 1.5x

FinFlow $550K Pre-Series A $1.8M 3.3x

Year 4 Fund I Metrics:

• Total invested: $4.5M (65% of initial allocation)

• Current portfolio value: $8.4M

• TVPI: 1.55x

• DPI: 0.01x

• Net IRR: ~18%

Fund II Strategy evolution

It was a webinar in March that led to team to step back and reflect. “Our fund II is not just a replica of fund I. We need to think far more strategically”. On the webinar, the team was introduced to the Fund Strategy Canvas, developed by Strategy Tools. Carving out a full-day offsite, the team sat down to complete the Fund Strategy Canvas together.

Fund Strategy Canvas: Meridian Ventures Fund II ($25M)

Fund Name: Meridian Ventures Fund II

General Partners: Aisha Rahman & Rizal Tan

THESIS, STRATEGY

Thesis & Size

Meridian Ventures Fund II is a $25M early-stage venture capital fund investing in B2B software and fintech companies across South-East Asia, with primary focus on Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

Our thesis is built on three convictions:

First, South-East Asia’s digital economy is entering its enterprise phase. After a decade of consumer internet growth, the next wave of value creation will come from B2B infrastructure—payments, logistics software, enterprise SaaS, and vertical solutions that enable the region’s 70 million SMEs to digitize operations.

Second, the best founders in ASEAN are increasingly emerging from non-traditional backgrounds and geographies outside Singapore. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam are producing world-class technical talent with deep local market understanding. These founders are systematically overlooked by Singapore-centric VCs who rarely travel beyond Changi Airport.

Third, early-stage companies in emerging South-East Asian markets need more than capital. They need operational support—particularly in go-to-market execution, regional expansion strategy, and preparation for institutional follow-on rounds. GPs who combine capital with hands-on GTM expertise will generate superior returns.

Fund II targets $25M, representing a 2.5x step-up from our $10M Fund I. This size allows us to lead seed rounds of $500K-$1.5M while maintaining meaningful follow-on reserves for winners.

Strategy

Stage: Pre-seed to Seed, with selective Seed+ participation

Check size: $500K-$1.5M initial; up to $2M follow-on in winners

Geography: Malaysia (40%), Indonesia (35%), Vietnam/Philippines (25%)

Sectors: B2B software, fintech infrastructure, vertical SaaS, logistics tech

Target portfolio: 18-22 companies over 3-year deployment period

We invest at the earliest institutional stage—typically first or second money in after angels. Our sweet spot is technical founding teams with clear product vision but limited go-to-market experience. We help them build the commercial muscle to reach Series A.

Unfair Advantage

Our unfair advantage is the combination of three elements no other regional fund possesses:

Operator-investor team: Rizal spent 8 years building and scaling startups across Malaysia and Indonesia before becoming an investor. He’s lived the founder journey and speaks the language of operators, not just financiers.

Ground-level presence: We’re based in Kuala Lumpur, not Singapore. We travel to Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City, and Manila monthly. We see deals 6-12 months before Singapore-based funds because we’re embedded in local founder communities.

GTM value-add through Andrew Senduk: Our Venture Partner has 15 years of enterprise sales and regional expansion experience. He works directly with portfolio companies on sales process, pricing strategy, and market entry—capabilities that differentiate us from capital-only investors.

TEAM & TRACK RECORD

General Partners

Aisha Rahman, Founding Partner

12 years in venture capital and corporate development. Former Principal at a mid-sized regional VC where she led 15+ investments across ASEAN. Board experience across fintech, SaaS, and logistics companies. MBA from INSEAD. Leads fund strategy, LP relations, and serves on 6 portfolio company boards.

Rizal Tan, Co-Founder & General Partner

8 years as operator, 4 years as investor. Former VP Business Development at a Series B payments company (acquired). Founded and sold a B2B marketplace in Malaysia. Leads deal sourcing, investment decisions, and portfolio company operational support. Deep networks across Malaysian and Indonesian founder communities.

Extended Team

Andrew Senduk, Venture Partner

15 years building and scaling businesses across Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Led GTM for two successful startups (one acquired, one IPO’d). Works with portfolio companies on sales process design, regional expansion, and commercial scaling. Not full-time but engaged across 6+ portfolio companies per fund.

Two Associates: Handle deal sourcing, due diligence support, and portfolio monitoring. One based in KL, one in Jakarta.

One Operations Manager: Fund administration, LP reporting, and back-office operations.

Track Record

Fund I Performance (as of Fund II launch):

Vintage: 2023

Size: $10M

Investments: 12 companies

TVPI: 1.55x

DPI: 0.02x (one small exit)

IRR: ~18%

Notable Fund I positions: PayMalaysia (4.9x paper, Series A prep), FinFlow (3.3x paper, growing rapidly), CloudSEA (2.5x paper, acquisition discussions). One complete write-off (DataSync), demonstrating follow-on discipline.

Prior Track Record (attributable deals from previous roles):

Aisha: 4 exits from prior fund, including 2 at 3x+ returns

Rizal: Personal angel portfolio of 8 investments, 2 exits at 5x+

LP MIX

Anchor LPs

Jelawang Capital ($4M commitment)

Regional thought leader in South-East Asian venture. Their rigorous due diligence and public commitment provides institutional validation. Jelawang serves on our Advisory Committee and actively supports our LP fundraising through introductions and co-hosted events.

Sarona Asset Management ($3M commitment)

Impact-focused fund-of-funds with emerging markets mandate. Their commitment signals ESG credibility and opens doors to other impact-oriented institutional LPs.

LP Mix Structure

LP Category    Target Allocation         Rationale

Fund-of-Funds (emerging manager programs) $7M (28%) Jelawang Capital, Sarona, Speedinvest, regional FoFs with SEA mandates

Regional Family Offices $6M (24%) Re-ups from Fund I plus new Singapore/Malaysian families

Fund I Re-ups (HNWIs, angels) $5M (20%) Strong re-up rate demonstrates LP satisfaction

Fund-of-fund $4M (16%) Dubai Future District Fund, SEA-MENA-oriented allocators

Strategic / Corporate $2M (8%) Corporate VCs seeking regional deal flow

GP Commitment$1M (4%), Increased from Fund I to demonstrate alignment

Target LP count: 18-22 LPs

Average commitment: $1.1-1.4M

Minimum commitment: $250K (to maintain fund I relationships)

LP Value Add

Our LP base isn’t just capital—it’s a strategic network:

Jelawang Capital: Portfolio company introductions, co-investment on larger rounds, thought leadership association

Sarona: ESG framework guidance, impact measurement support, introductions to impact-focused follow-on investors

Fund I HNWIs (exited founders): Direct mentorship to portfolio founders, customer introductions, hiring network access

Dubai Future District Fund: Middle East expansion pathway for portfolio companies, sovereign wealth fund network

Corporate LPs: Strategic partnership and M&A optionality for portfolio companies

LP ECONOMICS

Financial Terms

Term     Fund II                Structure

Management Fee

2.0% on committed capital during investment period

2.0% on invested capital thereafter

Carried Interest 20%

Preferred Return (Hurdle) 8%

GP Commitment 4% ($1M)

Waterfall European (whole-fund)

Fund Life10 years + two 1-year extensions

Investment Period 4 years

Distribution Policy

Distributions made as exits occur, subject to:

Return of LP capital contributions first

8% preferred return to LPs

80/20 split thereafter (LP/GP)

GP catch-up provision after hurdle achieved

Fee Offsets

100% of transaction fees, monitoring fees, and director fees received by GPs from portfolio companies are offset against management fees.

LEGAL SETUP

Fund Domicile: Labuan International Business and Financial Centre (IBFC), Malaysia

Fund Structure: Labuan Limited Partnership

Rationale for Labuan:

Tax-efficient structure for regional investments

Regulatory framework designed for investment funds

Lower setup and administration costs than Singapore VCC or Cayman

Acceptable to institutional LPs including DFIs

Geographic alignment with our KL base

Fund Administrator: Apex Fund Services (Singapore)

Legal Counsel:

Fund formation: Rajah & Tann (Singapore/Malaysia)

Portfolio investments: Local counsel in each jurisdiction

Auditor: Ernst & Young (Malaysia)

Tax Considerations:

Labuan entities benefit from 3% tax on net profits or flat RM20,000

No withholding tax on distributions to non-Malaysian LPs

Tax treaties in place with most LP jurisdictions

DEALFLOW

Primary Dealflow Channels

1. Founder Networks (40% of pipeline)

Rizal’s operator background generates direct founder referrals. Portfolio company founders introduce their peers. Our reputation for being “founder-friendly” creates inbound interest from founders who’ve heard about us through the ecosystem.

2. Ecosystem Partners (30% of pipeline)

Deep relationships with Cradle Fund (Malaysia), MDEC, 500 Startups (SEA), Antler, and regional accelerators. We’re the preferred follow-on investor for several accelerator programs because we move quickly and add operational value.

3. Angel/Syndicate Networks (20% of pipeline)

Co-invest relationships with AngelCentral Malaysia, Angel Investment Network Indonesia, and individual super-angels across the region. Angels bring us deals early; we bring them access to institutional rounds.

4. Proactive Sourcing (10% of pipeline)

Associates systematically track companies emerging from regional tech hubs, monitor funding announcements, and conduct outbound outreach to promising founders.

Dealflow Expansion Strategy

For Fund II, we’re expanding dealflow through:

Quarterly “Office Hours” in Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City, and Manila

Content marketing (Aisha’s LinkedIn presence reaches 15,000+ regional followers)

Deeper accelerator relationships in Vietnam and Philippines (underserved in Fund I)

Investment Process

Stage                   Timeline                         Activities

Initial Screen                                                                                                         1 week

Partner review of deck/intro, quick pass/proceed decision First Meeting           1-2 weeks

60-minute founder meeting, both GPs attend, Deep Dive, Term sheet 1            1-3 weeks

Market analysis, reference calls, product review, Investment Committee           1 week

IC memo, partner discussion, decision, Term Sheet 2 & Close                        1-4 weeks

Final terms negotiation, legal documentation, funding                                       1-4 weeks

Total process: 2-14 weeks from first meeting to close

Decision authority: Both GPs must approve; no solo deals

PORTFOLIO & VALUE ADD

Portfolio Construction Parameter

Target Number of investments 18-22 companies

Initial check size $500K-$1.5M

Follow-on reserves 35% of fund ($8.75M)

Target ownership 8-15% at entry

Concentration limit

No single investment >12% of fund

Follow-on Strategy

We reserve 35% of the fund for follow-on investments in winners. Follow-on decisions are made based on:

Company performance against milestones

Ability to maintain meaningful ownership

Quality of incoming investors

Risk/reward at new valuation

We explicitly do NOT do pro-rata follow-ons across the portfolio. Capital is concentrated in top performers. Fund I experience: followed on in 3 of 12 companies; those 3 represent 60% of portfolio value.

Investment Decision Framework

All investments must meet threshold criteria:

Team: Technical depth + commercial potential (or willingness to add commercial talent)

Market: $500M+ addressable market in ASEAN

Timing: Clear catalyst for why now

Fit: B2B/fintech focus aligned with thesis

Valuation: Entry price supporting 10x+ return potential

Value Add: How We Support Portfolio Companies

Board Engagement

GPs take board seats on all lead investments. Active participation in strategy, hiring, and fundraising decisions. Monthly check-ins with all portfolio CEOs.

GTM Support (Andrew Senduk)

Hands-on work with portfolio companies on:

Sales process design and optimization

Pricing and packaging strategy

Enterprise sales playbook development

Regional expansion planning

Customer success frameworks

Andrew engages with 6-8 companies per fund on structured GTM programs.

Talent Network

Curated network of 200+ executives and operators across ASEAN. Direct introductions for key hires. Quarterly portfolio talent events connecting companies with candidates.

Follow-on Fundraising

Warm introductions to Series A investors (Sequoia SEA, Vertex, East Ventures, Openspace, etc.). Preparation support for institutional fundraising. Data room and pitch coaching.

Peer Network

Quarterly portfolio CEO dinners. Slack community for real-time peer support. Annual offsite bringing together all portfolio founders.

EXIT STRATEGY

Value Creation & Exit Strategy

Value Creation Focus Areas:

During Years 1-3 (building phase):

Product-market fit validation

Initial revenue traction ($100K-$500K ARR)

Team building beyond founders

Market positioning establishment

During Years 3-5 (scaling phase):

Revenue acceleration ($500K-$3M ARR)

Unit economics optimization

Geographic expansion within ASEAN

Series A/B fundraising

During Years 5-8 (exit preparation):

Path to profitability or clear growth trajectory

Strategic relationship cultivation

Board composition optimization for exit

Financial and legal housekeeping

Exit Pathways:

Exit Type            Expected % of Exits Typical Timeline

Strategic M&A (regional) 20%              Years 4-7

Strategic M&A (global)        5%             Years 5-8

Secondary sale                     10%           Years 4-6

IPO (rare at our stage)          5%            Years 7-10

Write-off                            60%              Years 2-8

Exit Preparation Process:

Starting Year 2, we work with portfolio companies to:

Identify potential strategic acquirers

Build relationships with corporate development teams

Prepare management for M&A processes

Clean up cap table and legal structure

Develop exit-ready financial reporting

Exit Experience

GP Exit Track Record:

Aisha Rahman:

4 exits at prior fund, including 2 M&A transactions she led

Managed LP distributions and exit accounting

Board member through 3 acquisition processes

Rizal Tan:

Founded and sold B2B marketplace to strategic acquirer

Personal angel portfolio: 2 exits (1 acquisition, 1 secondary)

Operator perspective on founder exit psychology

Fund I Exits (to date):

SecureKL: Acquired for $2M (1.38x return)—managed full M&A process

DataSync: Orderly wind-down with capital return—demonstrated discipline

AgriTech ASEAN: Wind-down in progress

FUND ECONOMICS

Fund Model Summary

Item     Amount

Fund Size $25,000,000

Management Fee (annual, investment period) $500,000

Management Fee (annual, post-investment period) $400,000 (on invested capital)

Total Management Fees (10-year life) $4,400,000

Available for Investment $20,600,000

Target Gross Multiple 3.0x

Target Net Multiple2.5x

Target Net IRR20%+

Management Company Economics

Annual management fee of $500K supports:

2 GP salaries (market-rate for regional VCs)

2 Associate salaries

1 Operations Manager salary

Office (KL headquarters + hot desks in SG, Jakarta)

Travel (significant—we’re on the ground across 4 countries)

Fund administration, legal, audit

LP relations and reporting

Cash Flow Reality:

Unlike Fund I (where we paid ourselves poverty wages), Fund II economics allow for sustainable GP compensation. This is critical for partnership stability and long-term firm building.

Carried Interest Distribution

Assuming 3.0x gross return ($75M exit proceeds) on $25M fund:

Distribution     Amount

Return of LP Capital  $25,000,000

8% Preferred Return to LPs $8,000,000

Remaining Proceeds $42,000,000

LP Share (80%)$33,600,000

GP Carried Interest (20%)$8,400,000

Total LP Returns: $66.6M on $25M invested (2.66x net)

GP Economics: $8.4M carried interest + ~$4.4M management fees over fund life

Working Capital

Fund II includes a modest working capital facility to bridge timing gaps between capital calls and expenses. This prevents the personal financial stress that characterized Fund I operations.

SUMMARY: WHY FUND II WILL SUCCEED

Meridian Ventures Fund II is positioned to deliver top-quartile returns because:

Proven Team: GPs with complementary skills, demonstrated partnership stability through Fund I challenges, and relevant operating experience.

Differentiated Strategy: Ground-level presence in underserved markets, combined with genuine GTM value-add through Andrew Senduk.

Strong Fund I Foundation: 1.55x TVPI with clear winners emerging, disciplined write-off decisions, and institutional-quality reporting already in place.

Right-Sized Fund: $25M is large enough to lead meaningful rounds but small enough to generate strong returns from regional exit valuations.

Institutional LP Base: Anchor commitments from Jelawang and Sarona provide validation and strategic value beyond capital.

Clear Path to Fund III: Fund II performance sets up institutional fundraise at $50M+, accessing DFI capital and achieving sustainable firm economics.

Fund II isn’t just an investment vehicle—it’s the foundation for building a permanent institution in South-East Asian venture capital.

Fund II Fundraising Begins

By mid-Year 3, we formally launched Fund II fundraising with a $25M target—2.5x our Fund I size.

The LP composition evolved significantly from Fund I:

LP Type Commitment

Jelawang Capital (anchor) $4M

Sarona Asset Management $3M

Dubai Future District Fund $2.5M

Speedinvest Emerging Manager Program $2M

Regional Fund-of-Funds (2) $5M

Fund I Re-ups (Family Offices, HNWIs) $6M

New HNWIs and Angels $2.5M

TOTAL $25M

Jelawang Capital: A Thought Leader Partnership

Among our Fund II LPs, Jelawang Capital stood out not just for their commitment size but for their role in the ecosystem.

Jelawang had established themselves as thought leaders in South-East Asian venture, publishing research on emerging manager performance, hosting convenings for GPs and LPs, and advocating for ecosystem development across the region.

Their due diligence process was rigorous—more intensive than any other LP we’d encountered. But that rigor came with genuine partnership. Once they committed, they became active supporters of our firm, making introductions to other LPs, providing feedback on our portfolio strategy, and including us in their thought leadership events.

“Having Jelawang as an anchor LP gave us credibility that we couldn’t have purchased at any price,” Rizal later reflected. “When other LPs saw that Jelawang had done deep due diligence and committed, it reduced their perceived risk in backing us.”

Fund II closed in 14 months—4 months faster than Fund I. The difference was our systematic fundraising approach. We had LP coverage across every major category. We had materials ready. We had a process. We weren’t scrambling; we were executing.

Year 5: Fund II Deployment and Fund I Value Creation

Fund II First Investments:

With $25M to deploy, Fund II allowed us to write larger checks ($500K-$1.5M) and target slightly later-stage opportunities (seed+ to Series A).

Fund II investments (Year 5):

•            Investment #1-3: Three seed rounds averaging $800K

•            Investment #4-5: Two Series A participations averaging $1.2M

•            Total deployed Year 5: $5.2M (21% of fund)

Fund I Portfolio Events:

PayMalaysia closes Series A (October, Year 5): $5M round led by Jungle Ventures, a top-tier regional VC. Our follow-on: $200K to partially maintain position. PayMalaysia was now valued at $18M; our position worth approximately $3.5M on $650K invested (5.4x).

SecureKL acquired (November, Year 5): In a surprise development, SecureKL was acquired by a regional cybersecurity company for $2M. Our $400K investment returned $550K—a modest positive outcome (1.38x) after years of struggle. First actual exit and DPI generation!

AgriTech ASEAN shuts down (December, Year 5): After 3+ years with no commercial traction, AgriTech’s board and founders decided to wind down the company. Our $350K investment returned approximately $50K from remaining cash. Second complete write-off.

Year 5 Fund I Metrics:

• Total invested: $5.2M (75% of initial allocation)

• Current portfolio value: $11.5M

• Distributions (DPI): $600K (SecureKL exit + DataSync wind-down + AgriTech wind-down)

• TVPI: 2.15x

• DPI: 0.12x

• Net IRR: ~26%

Key Takeaways from Part II

For fund managers in their investment period:

1. The J-curve is real and painful. Years 2-5 will feel like failure even when you’re building a successful portfolio. Communicate this to your LPs early and often.

2. Portfolio mortality is normal. Expect 30-80% of seed investments to fail completely. The key is limiting exposure to losers while maximizing exposure to winners.

3. Follow-on decisions define returns. Our Fund I returns were driven by concentrated follow-on in PayMalaysia and FinFlow. Spray-and-pray follow-on destroys returns.

4. First exit matters more than its size. SecureKL’s 1.38x return was modest, but generating actual DPI established our credibility for Fund II.

5. Build your fundraising team before Fund II. Use the GP Fundraising Team canvas to systematically cover all eight roles, even with a small team.

6. Fund II timing is strategic. Starting Fund II in Year 3-5, before Fund I exits, is standard practice. LPs understand the cycle.

Grace Choo’s final perspective on Part II:

“By Year 5, I’d moved from cautious optimism to genuine confidence in Meridian. They’d made hard decisions, communicated transparently, and generated reasonable paper returns. More importantly, they’d maintained partnership stability through challenging years. Fund II felt like a natural evolution, not a leap of faith. I told them we’d be interested in exploring a Fund III commitment if they could reach $50M.”

Read part III: Value Creation, Fund III, and Institutional Arrival (Years 6-7).

If you have not already read it, check out part I, the early years.

Written by Christian Rangen, advisor to VC funds, Fund-of-funds, faculty,

Written through the lens of Aisha Rahman, Founding Partner, Meridian Ventures With insights from: Rizal Tan, Co-Founder & General Partner, Meridian Ventures-

The people and companies are largely fictional for the purpose of this article, based on the Fund Journey Map and GP Fundraising Team canvas by Chris Rangen, Strategy Tools.

Read parts II and III.

Part I: From Idea to First Close (T-2 to Year 1)

The journey from “we should start a fund” to actually managing institutional capital is longer, harder, and more humbling than almost any first-time fund manager expects. Here’s how one South-East Asian emerging manager navigated those critical early years—and learned the hard way that fundraising requires a completely different skill set than investing.

It’s 11:47 PM in Kuala Lumpur, and I’m staring at a spreadsheet that makes no sense. We’ve been working on our fund concept for eighteen months now, and I still can’t articulate why a family office would trust us with $2 million when we’ve never managed a fund before.

Rizal is asleep on the couch in our tiny shared office—a converted shophouse in Bangsar that we’re renting month-to-month because we can’t commit to a lease until we know if this fund will actually happen.

That was Year T-1. Six years later, we would be managing $85 million across three funds—Fund I ($10M), Fund II ($25M), and Fund III ($50M)—having raised a new fund every 20 months on average. We would establish ourselves as one of South-East Asia’s most consistent emerging-stage performers and a genuine thought leader in the region’s venture ecosystem.

But in that moment? I genuinely didn’t know if we’d make it past first close.

This is the story of our fund journey—the real one, not the polished version we tell at conferences. If you’re an emerging manager in South-East Asia, or thinking about becoming one, pay attention to the ecosystem builders who helped us along the way. And pay close attention to our fundraising evolution—because that’s what ultimately made the difference between survival and success.

Year T-2: The Idea Takes Shape

The Spark

Rizal and I met at a fintech conference in Singapore in 2017. He was running business development for a Series B payments company backed by Golden Gate Ventures; I was a principal at a mid-sized regional VC that was, frankly, underperforming.

Over teh tarik at a mamak in Petaling Jaya, we complained about the same things: VCs who didn’t understand founders. Decision-making processes that took months. Partners who’d never built anything themselves. The disconnect between what South-East Asian founders needed and what most regional funds delivered.

“We should start our own fund,” Rizal said, half-joking.

“We should,” I replied, not joking at all.

That conversation planted a seed that would consume the next three years of our lives.

The Reality Check

Starting a fund isn’t like starting a company. You can’t bootstrap it. You can’t build an MVP and iterate. You need LP commitment before you can do anything—and LP commitment doesn’t flow to people without track records.

We spent the first six months of Year T-2 doing what I now call “the reality audit.”

Market Opportunity Assessment: We mapped the South-East Asian early-stage landscape, with particular focus on Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. What we found was both encouraging and terrifying. Encouraging: a genuine gap existed for founder-friendly, operationally-focused pre-seed and seed investors in the $200K-$1M range. Singapore had become expensive for startups, and regional founders needed alternatives that understood local markets. Terrifying: at least 30 other groups were circling the same opportunity, and several established Singapore VCs were beginning to look downstream.

The Malaysian Ecosystem Landscape: Early in our research, we discovered the critical role of Cradle Fund in Malaysia’s startup ecosystem. Cradle had been nurturing early-stage companies since 2003, providing grants and coaching that created the very dealflow we hoped to invest in. Understanding Cradle’s portfolio became essential to our thesis—many of our future portfolio companies would be Cradle alumni. We also mapped the roles of MDEC, MaGIC, and various state-level initiatives. South-East Asia’s venture ecosystem wasn’t just Singapore anymore.

Team Capabilities Audit: Between us, we had twelve years of relevant experience. Rizal had operator credibility from his startup years and deep fintech knowledge. I had investment experience, but as a principal, not a decision-maker. Neither of us had carried interest (the profit share that defines GP economics). Neither of us had ever raised institutional capital.

Investment Thesis Development: This is where most emerging managers fail first. They have a vague idea—“we invest in great founders”—but no differentiated thesis that answers the question every LP will ask: Why you? Why now? Why this strategy?

We spent three months developing our initial thesis. Early-stage generalist tech across South-East Asia, with initial focus on Malaysia and Indonesia, concentrating on B2B software and fintech, with a contrarian bet on founders from non-traditional backgrounds who were overlooked by establishment VCs. Check sizes of $200K-$800K, targeting 12-15 investments over a three-year deployment period.

The Honest Assessment: By the end of Year T-2, we had a thesis we believed in, complementary skills, and genuine founder networks from our previous roles. What we didn’t have: LP relationships, a track record as GPs, or any idea how to actually raise a fund.

The Fund Manager! Masterclass: A Turning Point

In late Year T-2, we made a decision that would fundamentally change our trajectory: we enrolled in the Fund Manager! Masterclass run by Strategy Tools.

“It blew our minds,” Rizal later told other emerging managers. “We thought we understood venture capital because we’d worked in the industry. The Masterclass showed us we didn’t understand the first thing about running a VC firm; and definitely not about delivering net DPI back to LPs.”

The Masterclass covered fund economics, LP prospecting, portfolio construction, value creation and DPI in ways that academic programs never touched. But the real value was the simulation component—practicing LP pitches, running investment committee discussions, and navigating the inevitable cash flow crunches that plague emerging managers. It was intense, but incredible.

We left the Masterclass with a completely revised approach:

•            Our fund target dropped from $30M (too ambitious for first-time managers in South-East Asia) to $10M (achievable and sustainable).

•            Our thesis sharpened around specific value-add we could provide: operational support for B2B go-to-market.

•            We understood the brutal economics of small funds—and planned accordingly.

Most importantly, we had a realistic understanding of the economic challenges ahead. The Masterclass didn’t make fundraising easy. It made us prepared for how hard it would actually be.

Key Learnings from Year T-2

Looking back, we made two critical decisions that year that shaped everything that followed.

Decision 1: We chose generalist over specialist. Many advisors told us to pick a vertical—“focus on fintech only” or “own the Malaysian SaaS space.” We resisted. Our thesis was that the best opportunities at seed stage in emerging South-East Asian markets often came from unexpected intersections. A generalist approach gave us flexibility but made our LP pitch harder. We’d need to defend that choice hundreds of times.

Decision 2: We committed to doing this together or not at all. Rizal had a standing offer to return to his old company as VP of Strategy. I had recruiters calling about partner-track roles at larger regional funds. We agreed: if we hadn’t reached first close within two years, we’d both move on. That deadline created urgency but also alignment.

Year T-1: The Fundraising Education Begins

(And it was a very hard school)

January-March: Building the Foundation

Year T-2 started with a sobering realization: we knew nothing about LP fundraising.

I’d spent years helping portfolio companies raise capital from VCs. The dynamic there is relatively straightforward—founders pitch investors who make decisions in weeks. LP fundraising is an entirely different animal.

The first quarter was pure education:

We read every book on fund formation we could find. We attended two LP conferences as observers (paying full tickets we couldn’t afford). We cold-called fifteen fund managers who’d raised first-time funds in South-East Asia, asking them to share their experiences. Most were incredibly helpful.

What we learned was humbling:

The average first-time fund takes 18-24 months to raise. Many take longer. Most never close at all. In fact, 75% of all GP teams give up before their coveted first close. LPs receive hundreds of fund pitches per year and invest in perhaps 2-3% of them. First-time managers face a structural disadvantage: LPs prefer to re-up with existing managers rather than take risk on unproven GPs.

Grace Choo’s perspective (Regional Lead, IFC):

“When I look at emerging managers, I’m not just evaluating the strategy. I’m evaluating the people and their ability to survive the inevitable hard times. Most first-time funds face an existential crisis within the first three years—deal-flow problems, portfolio blowups, partnership tensions. The question is: do these GPs have the resilience and alignment to get through it together?”

April-June: Legal Setup and GP Economics

We incorporated our management company in April. This sounds simple. It wasn’t.

The legal complexity almost derailed us:

Fund structure: Labuan IBFC? Singapore VCC? Cayman Islands? Each jurisdiction had different tax implications, different regulatory requirements, different costs. We spent $25,000 on legal fees just to understand our options—money we funded personally from savings.

GP commitment: LPs expect GPs to have meaningful skin in the game, typically 1-3% of fund size. For a $10M target fund, that meant $100K-$300K of personal capital. We didn’t have that. We’d need to bootstrap it through management fee deferrals and side arrangements.

Management fee: The standard 2% management fee on a $10M fund generates $200K per year. Sounds manageable until you realize that covers salaries, office, legal, travel, fund administration, and everything else. For two GPs, the math is brutal.

The GP business model realization:

Most people outside venture don’t understand this: fund management is a terrible business until you have multiple funds under management. The economics only work at scale. A single $10M fund generates enough management fee to survive, not thrive. Real GP wealth comes from carried interest—but that only materializes 7-10 years later, and only if performance is strong.

We modeled our GP business plan obsessively that quarter. The conclusion: we’d need to launch Fund II within 2-4 years to build a sustainable management company, and we’d need Fund I to perform well enough to attract larger commitments.

Building the LP Market Map with Asian Development Bank

One of the most valuable relationships we built during Year T-2 came through an introduction to Craig Dixon and Ian Lee at the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

ADB had been increasingly active in the South-East Asian venture ecosystem, not just as investors but as ecosystem builders. Craig and Ian were leading their emerging manager support program, and they agreed to spend time with us despite our lack of track record.

“We spent three intensive sessions with the ADB team building what we called our LP Market Map for South-East Asia,” I later explained at an AVCJ conference. “This wasn’t just a list of potential investors. It was a comprehensive mapping of LP types, their typical allocation patterns, their decision timelines, and crucially, their appetite for emerging managers.”

The LP Market Map revealed several critical insights:

•            Most institutional LPs in the region had minimum check sizes of $5-10M, making them impractical for a $10M fund.

•            Family offices and high-net-worth individuals were more accessible but required different approaches.

•            Development finance institutions (DFIs) like ADB and IFC had specific mandates that we could potentially align with—but typically required larger fund sizes.

•            Fund-of-funds focused on emerging managers were starting to look at South-East Asia but had limited presence.

•            Angel networks and HNWI communities across Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia represented our most likely Fund I LP base.

July-September: LP Research and the Persona Problem

This was the quarter where we learned the most painful lesson of emerging manager life: LPs are incredibly difficult to understand, categorize, and access.

The LP universe is vast and fragmented:

Family offices (thousands of them across Asia, all different), pension funds (long decision cycles, high minimum commitments), fund-of-funds (professional allocators, very competitive), sovereign wealth funds (policy objectives, bureaucracy), corporate venture arms (strategic agendas), government programs (economic development mandates), endowments and foundations (mission alignment required), and high-net-worth individuals (relationship-driven, inconsistent).

We made every rookie mistake:

We built a target list of 550 LPs without understanding that 430 of them would never invest in a first-time $10M fund. We sent cold emails with our deck attached (never do this). We requested meetings without warm introductions (rarely works). We pitched our strategy without first understanding what each LP was looking for.

The LP persona problem:

Here’s what nobody tells emerging managers: LP motivations are incredibly diverse, and you can’t pitch the same way to all of them.

A family office investing generational wealth wants something completely different from a fund-of-funds managing institutional capital. A government development agency optimizing for economic impact has different priorities than a pension fund optimizing for risk-adjusted returns.

We wasted three months pitching features instead of benefits, strategy instead of fit.

The breakthrough moment came in August:

An experienced fund advisor told us: “Stop trying to convince LPs your fund is good. Start trying to understand which LPs your fund is good for. Ask yourself. ‘how are our customers? And why would they care?”

That shift changed everything.

We went back to our LP research and re-categorized everyone based on their likely priorities:

• Return-maximizers: Need top-quartile potential, accept higher risk, want concentrated portfolios

• Diversifiers: Want exposure to South-East Asian tech, acceptable returns, lower risk tolerance

• Strategic allocators: Have specific theses about sectors or geographies, want alignment

• Relationship investors: Invest based on people first, strategy second, need deep trust

• Mission-aligned: Prioritize impact alongside returns, want ESG integration

• Access-seekers: Want deal flow visibility, co-investment rights, portfolio company access

This framework helped us prioritize and customize. We stopped mass-pitching and started targeted outreach.

The Strategy Tools LP AI Platform: Practice Before the Real Thing

During this period, we discovered the Strategy Tools LP AI platform—a tool that allowed us to practice pitching to different LP personas before meeting them in real life.

“We found this immensely helpful,” Rizal recalled. “The platform let us practice nailing LP personas and value propositions pre-launch. We could simulate a conversation with a skeptical family office patriarch, a process-driven fund-of-funds, or a mission-focused DFI—and get feedback on how to improve our pitch for each.”

We ran through dozens of simulated LP conversations, refining our answers to the tough questions:

•            “Why should we trust first-time managers?”

•            “How will you compete against established Singapore funds?”

•            “What happens if you don’t raise enough capital?”

•            “Why Malaysia as your base?”

•            “What’s your edge in deal flow?”

October-December: First LP Meetings and Brutal Feedback

By October, we had our legal structure in place, our deck polished (we thought), and our target list refined. We started taking meetings.

The first twenty LP meetings were a massacre:

“Your track record is insufficient.” (We knew this, but hearing it repeatedly was demoralizing.)

“Your fund is too small for our minimum commitment.” ($2M minimums into a $10M fund don’t work.)

“We’re not looking at emerging managers this cycle.” (Then why did you take the meeting?)

“Your thesis sounds like every other generalist fund.” (Ouch. They weren’t wrong.)

“Come back when you have a few investments to show us.” (The classic chicken-and-egg problem.)

Grace Choo’s perspective:

“I remember meeting Aisha and Rizal for the first time in late 2018. They were clearly smart, clearly passionate, and clearly unprepared for LP diligence. Their deck was too long. Their financial projections were too optimistic. They couldn’t articulate their differentiation in under sixty seconds. But what I did see was founder-quality determination. They took our feedback seriously. When they came back three months later, the improvement was dramatic. That’s the signal I would later invest behind—not perfection, but trajectory. Of course, fund I was not a good fit for us, but these conversations did lead us into fund II a few years later.”

December reality check:

By year-end, we had met with 93 potential LPs. We had zero commitments. Not soft commitments, not verbal interest—zero. Our personal savings were running low. Rizal’s wife was expecting their first child. I had stopped paying myself entirely, living off credit cards.

We had a hard conversation that Christmas: do we continue, or do we accept that this isn’t working?

We decided to give it six more months—but we needed to change our approach fundamentally.

The Cash Flow Reality: Surviving Pre-First Close

Here’s the dirty secret of emerging manager life that nobody talks about enough: you need working capital to operate before your management company generates fee income.

Our cash flow situation in Year T-2 was brutal:

Expense Category Amount

Legal fees for fund formation: $25,000

Travel to LP meetings and conferences: $15,000

Basic operations: $18,000

Deferred salaries (we weren’t paying ourselves): $0

Total pre-revenue burn ~$58,000

We funded this through personal savings, a small loan from Rizal’s uncle, and increasingly uncomfortable credit card debt. I stopped paying myself entirely. Rizal worked a consulting gig on the side to keep his family afloat.

This is the part of fund formation that the glossy conference panels never discuss. The reality is that most emerging managers in South-East Asia are living on the edge of financial viability until first close—and many give up before they get there. The 75% failure rate for first-time GPs isn’t because they have bad strategies. It’s because they run out of money and willpower before the strategy can be proven.

Year 0: The Long Road to First Close

January-March: Repositioning and Re-engagement

The first quarter of Year T-1 was about radical honesty.

What wasn’t working:

Our pitch was generic. Our main deck was too long (28 slides—should have been 12). Our answer to “why you?” was unconvincing. Our LP targeting was scattershot. Our follow-up was inconsistent. We did not use our LP CRM well enough. We were not disciplined. We had nothing about LP value propositions. We only discovered that part later.

What we changed:

We rebuilt our deck from scratch, focused on three things: team credibility, differentiated thesis, and LP value proposition. We cut everything else.

We developed specific LP personas with tailored pitch angles:

• For successfully exited founders in the region: Emphasized deal flow access and co-investment opportunities in the next generation of South-East Asian startups

• For active business angels: Emphasized portfolio diversification and professional fund management

• For HNWIs: Emphasized regional exposure and access to venture as an asset class

• For single family offices: Emphasized our accessibility, direct GP relationship, co-investment opportunities

• For angel networks: Emphasized our systematic approach to sourcing and supporting startups they could also access

We implemented a proper CRM (finally) and started tracking every LP interaction systematically. No excuses.

Using the LP personas x VP Canvas to nail the key message

Even more importantly, we started developing and iterating on the LP Personas x Value Proposition canvas for each of our LP personas, and for every LP we engaged with. It was awkward, slow even, in the beginning, but it helped us really tune into who are LPs were and what they cared about.

The breakthrough conversation:

In February, an LP we’d met six months earlier agreed to a second meeting. This time, they engaged differently. They asked about specific portfolio company scenarios. They probed our valuation discipline. They questioned our reserves strategy.

After ninety minutes, they said: “We’re interested in a $500K commitment if you can reach first close by June.”

Conditional, yes. But it was the first real signal of momentum.

April-June: Building LP Momentum

The domino effect:

That conditional commitment changed our LP conversations overnight. We went from “no one has committed yet” to “we have strong LP interest and expect first close within months.”

The power of anchor LPs:

We learned that LP fundraising has a herd dynamic. Once one credible LP commits, others become more comfortable. The first commitment is impossibly hard; the next ones are merely very hard.

In April, we secured a second conditional commitment from a Malaysian family office—$750K. In May, contributions from two angel networks indicated $1.2M combined. By June, we had verbal commitments totaling $4.5M.

The working capital problem resolved (barely):

We solved this inelegantly: Rizal took out a personal loan against his apartment. I maxed out my credit line. We deferred our own salaries entirely. It was financially precarious and emotionally exhausting.

Some emerging managers solve this through GP seeding programs or anchor LP arrangements that include working capital provisions. We didn’t have that luxury.

July-September: Legal Documentation Marathon

With LP momentum building, we entered the documentation phase.

LPA negotiations are brutal:

The Limited Partner Agreement (LPA) is the legal document that governs everything: fee structure, carry waterfall, GP removal provisions, key person clauses, investment restrictions, reporting requirements.

Every LP wanted changes to our draft LPA. Some wanted lower fees. Some wanted specific co-investment provisions. Some wanted side letters with enhanced reporting or most-favored-nation clauses.

We spent three months in legal negotiations that cost another $40,000 in attorney fees.

Key terms we fought for:

•            Standard 2% management fee (some LPs pushed for step-downs)

•            20% carried interest with 8% hurdle and European waterfall

•            4-year investment period with possible 1-year extension

•            10-year fund life with two possible 1-year extensions

•            Key person clause covering both Rizal and me

•            GP commitment of 2% ($200K on a $10M fund—we’d figure out how to fund it through fee deferrals)

Key terms we conceded:

•            Enhanced reporting to larger LPs (quarterly portfolio reviews, annual LP meetings)

•            Co-investment rights for LPs on deals over $500K

•            Advisory committee with LP representation

October-November: Racing to First Close

By October, we had $7M in executed subscription documents. Our target was $8M for first close, which would allow us to start investing with credibility.

The final push:

We called every warm LP relationship. We accelerated meetings with anyone showing interest. We offered modest fee concessions to LPs who could commit quickly.

The November crisis:

Three weeks before our target first close date, one of our committed LPs—an HNWI representing $1M of commitments—went silent. Emails unanswered. Calls unreturned.

After a week of panic, we learned through back channels that he was going through a divorce and had frozen all discretionary investments. Our $1M was gone.

We had two weeks to find $1M or miss first close. Missing first close would signal weakness to existing LPs and potentially trigger uncommit clauses.

The scramble:

Rizal flew to Hong Kong to meet face-to-face with a family office that had expressed interest months earlier but couldn’t meet our timing. I worked the phones, reaching out to every contact who’d ever shown warmth.

In the end, a successful entrepreneur we’d met at a Cradle Fund event committed $600K, and the Hong Kong family office committed $500K contingent on meeting Rizal in person (which he’d just done).

We made first close with $8.1M—not the $10M we wanted, but enough to start.

Year 1: First Close and First Investments

December-January: Operational Reality

First close on December 15th felt like victory. The relief was physical—I slept for fourteen hours straight.

But first close isn’t the end; it’s the beginning:

Capital calls went out. Management fee income started flowing, but we were still understaffed and under-resourced. Our $8.1M fund would generate roughly $162K in annual management fees. After legal, administration, office, and basic operating costs, we had enough to pay ourselves modest salaries—and nothing more.

The capital call mechanics:

We learned that fund accounting is surprisingly complex. Capital calls need to be calculated precisely, documented properly, and communicated to LPs with adequate notice. Our fund administrator handled most of this, but we still needed to understand it.

First capital call: $2M (roughly 25% of commitments), to be deployed over the first 12-18 months plus reserves.

The Friends, Family, and Angels Reality of Fund I

For Fund I, we failed at raising any institutional capital.

Every DFI we approached said our fund was too small. Every fund-of-funds said we lacked track record. Every pension fund said their minimums exceeded our entire fund size.

We had to pivot completely. Instead of institutional capital, we built Fund I from friends, family, high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs), angels, angel networks, and two local family offices.

Fund I Final LP Roster:

LP Type Commitment

Malaysian Family Office #1 $1.5M

Hong Kong Family Office $1M

Singapore HNWI (exited founder) $1.4M

AngelCentral Malaysia network $800K

Malaysian angel syndicate $700K

Various HNWIs (6 individuals) $2.7M

Friends & family $500K

GP Commitment (deferred) $200K

Fund I Total $10M (final close)

Final close at $10M came in March of Year 1, adding another $1.9M from additional HNWIs who saw our early momentum.

Fund I Economics: The Brutal Math

Let me share the fund economics of a $10M first fund, because this is where many emerging managers miscalculate:

Item Amount

Fund Size $10,000,000

Annual Management Fee (2%) $200,000

Fund Administration & Legal -$35,000

Office & Operations -$25,000

Travel & LP Relations -$20,000

Available for Salaries $120,000

$120,000 per year for two partners. That’s $60,000 each—less than entry-level roles at banks or corporations in KL, and far less than what we’d been earning in our previous roles.

The economics only work at scale. A single $10M fund generates enough management fee to survive, not thrive. Real GP wealth comes from carried interest—but that only materializes 7-12 years later, and only if performance is strong. This is why we knew from day one that Fund I was just the foundation. We would need to launch Fund II within 2-4 years to build a sustainable management company.

February-June: First Investments

Investment #1: DataSync (April, Year 1)

B2B analytics software for SMEs. Two founders from Grab’s data team. Pre-product, but extraordinary clarity on the problem they were solving. We led a $600K seed round, investing $400K.

Making that first investment decision was terrifying. Every doubt I’d had during fundraising resurfaced: Are we really qualified to make this call? What if we’re wrong? What if we’re just two people who convinced some LPs to trust us and now we’re about to deploy their capital into a company that fails?

Rizal talked me off the ledge. “We did the work. We believe in the founders. We understand the market. This is literally what we raised money to do.”

He was right. We wired the money.

Investment #2: PayMalaysia (May, Year 1)

Payments infrastructure for Malaysian marketplaces. Solo founder, ex-Maybank digital banking lead. Slightly further along—had a working product and three pilot customers. We lead an $800K round alongside an angel syndicate, investing $350K.

June 30 position:

Two investments deployed. $750K invested out of $10M committed. Management fee covering operations. Team of two GPs plus one part-time analyst. We were officially in business.

July-December: Continuing Portfolio Build

Investment #3: CloudSEA (August, Year 1) — SaaS for regional SME operations. Three-person founding team from enterprise software backgrounds. Early revenue, strong NPS. We invested $500K to lead a $1M round.

Investment #4: SecureKL (October, Year 1) — Cybersecurity for Malaysian enterprises. Deep tech founding team from local universities. Pre-revenue but compelling technology. We invested $300K in a $600K round.

Investment #5: LogiTech Asia (November, Year 1) — Last-mile logistics optimization for e-commerce. Solo founder, former Lazada operations manager. Pilot agreements with two major retailers. We invested $400K to lead her seed round.

Year 1 Portfolio Snapshot:

Company Investment

Status DataSync $400K Building product, pre-revenue

PayMalaysia $350K Growing, 5 customers

CloudSEA $500K Early revenue, expanding

SecureKL $300K Pre-revenue, developing

LogiTech Asia $400K Pilot stage

Total Deployed $1.95M 19.5% of fund

Year 1 Summary

By December 31 of Year 1, we had:

•            $10M in committed capital across 14 LPs

•            5 investments made, totaling $1.95M deployed

•            A functioning (if lean) operation with 2.5 team members

•            Management fee income covering basic expenses

•            Survived

We hadn’t thrived. We were chronically under-resourced. Our LP reporting was messy. Our portfolio support was reactive rather than proactive. I was working 70-hour weeks and still falling behind.

But we had survived. And in the emerging manager game, survival is the first milestone.

Key Takeaways from Part I

For aspiring fund managers:

1. The timeline is longer than you think. Budget 2-4 years from concept to first close. We took nearly 3 years.

2. LP fundraising is its own skill set. Experience investing or operating doesn’t translate directly. Study LP motivations obsessively.

3. Work backwards from GP economics. Understand what fund size you need to build a sustainable management company. Too small = you starve. Too large for an emerging manager = you don’t close.

4. Conditional commitments unlock momentum. One credible LP commitment changes every subsequent conversation. Prioritize getting that first anchor.

5. Working capital is existential. Have a plan for how you’ll fund operations before management fees flow. This is the most common emerging manager failure point.

6. Legal costs are real. Budget $75K+ for fund formation in South-East Asia. It’s unavoidable.

7. First close isn’t final close. Keep fundraising momentum through the investment period.

Grace Choo’s final perspective on Part I:

“Aisha and Rizal nearly quit three times during their fundraising journey. I know because they told me later, after Fund I was performing well. What they didn’t realize at the time was that their struggle was evidence of their commitment, not evidence of failure. Every emerging manager I’ve backed has had moments where they questioned whether it was worth it. The ones who break through are the ones who find a way to keep going. The Fund Journey Map shows this path clearly—but living it is another matter entirely.”

Ready for part II and III? Follow Aisha and Rizal’s journey into year 2,3 and beyond.

Read part II here and part III here.

The venture capital investment process isn’t a single decision—it’s a carefully orchestrated sequence of escalating commitment, deeper understanding, and strategic alignment. From the moment a startup catches a VC’s attention to the final wire transfer, each stage serves a critical purpose in de-risking the investment and building conviction.

Let’s walk through the five key phases that define how VCs invest, using insights from the VC Investment Roadmap and real-world examples from the Italian venture ecosystem.

Phase 1: Industry Insights – Building Deep Market Intelligence

Before evaluating any single startup, elite VCs invest heavily in understanding the landscape. This isn’t about skimming industry reports—it’s about developing thesis-level insights that inform every investment decision.

The Core Work: Deeply Understand the Industry

The foundation of great investing is deep industry knowledge. Top VCs complete comprehensive landscape mapping exercises that capture:

• Long-term secular trends reshaping the market
• Key value drivers that create defensible positions
• Emerging technologies and business model innovations
• Regulatory shifts and their implications
• Competitive dynamics and consolidation patterns

Key Deliverable: Complete the Landscape Map. This living document becomes the strategic foundation for all deal evaluation in the sector.

Example: When Italian Ventures (fictive name), one of Italy’s early-stage VCs, began building their thesis around B2B SaaS in Southern Europe, they didn’t just track companies—they mapped the entire ecosystem. They analyzed why European SaaS companies trade at different multiples than US counterparts, identified gaps in infrastructure and talent, and recognized that Italian companies building for international markets from day one had fundamentally different trajectories. This deep industry understanding enabled them to spot great deals before competitors recognized their potential.

Phase 2: First Contact – Pattern Recognition at Scale

Once you understand the industry, you can quickly assess whether a startup fits your investment thesis. This phase is about efficient screening and comparative analysis.

The Essential Activities:

Analyze 6-10 Comparable Cases Great investors don’t evaluate companies in isolation. Complete the “Mapping the Deals” map to track:

• Valuation benchmarks and pricing dynamics
• Capital raised and burn rates
• Active investors and syndicate patterns
• Growth rates and unit economics
• Competitive positioning

Study the Exit Landscape Complete the Exit Canvas to understand acquisition targets, strategic buyers, IPO readiness, and partnership opportunities. Start building relationships with potential acquirers now—exit planning begins on day one.

Pro Tip: The best VCs maintain living databases of comparable transactions. When a new opportunity emerges, they can instantly contextualize the valuation, understand if the founding team is experienced relative to peers, and spot outlier metrics that signal exceptional potential or hidden risks.

Phase 3: Digging Into the Case – First Impressions Matter

You’ve identified a promising company. Now it’s time for deeper engagement while maintaining efficiency.

The Critical Steps:

Review Deck & Materials Ask for pre-meeting access to the pitch deck and data room. Review everything closely in advance. Come to the first call with informed questions, not basic clarifications. This signals respect for the founder’s time and demonstrates your preparation.

et Up Calls Run the first 1-5 calls with management. Complete the Startup Index to assess:

• Team composition and capabilities
• Product-market fit evidence
• Go-to-market strategy and execution
• Competitive advantages and moats
• Vision and strategic thinking

Italian Ventures Example: When Italian Ventures first engaged with PayX (now one of Italy’s most successful fintech unicorns before they invested), they didn’t jump straight to term sheets. They spent weeks understanding the buy-now-pay-later landscape in Southern Europe, interviewed merchants using the platform, spoke with competing solutions, and assessed the team’s ability to execute across multiple markets. Their diligence created conviction.

Decision Point: After this phase, you face a critical go/no-go decision. Most deals end here. Only those demonstrating exceptional potential proceed.

Phase 4: Deep Assessment – Building Conviction Through Analysis

For opportunities that pass initial screening, it’s time to build robust investment models and stress-test assumptions.

The Strategic Frameworks:

Capital Landscape & Funding Journey Co-develop the Funding Journey Canvas and Funding Journey Deliverables with management. Understand:

• Complete capitalization history
• Future funding requirements and milestones
• Investor syndicate composition
• Strategic capital partners vs. financial investors

Assess multiple capital strategies. Develop a deep understanding of the team’s capabilities to execute their funding journey. Will they need $5M or $50M to reach their vision? What happens if the next round doesn’t come together? How does their approach compare to successful companies in the sector?

Develop Outcome Scenarios Complete the Outcome Canvas. Take the long view on the company. Map out likely end-state outcomes and investment returns across multiple scenarios:

• Base case: The company executes reasonably well
• Bull case: Everything goes right, category leader emergence
• Bear case: Challenges emerge but value is preserved
• Downside case: What’s the floor on outcomes?

Calculate potential returns under each scenario, probability-weight them, and determine if the risk-adjusted return justifies the investment.

Italian Ventures’ Approach: For their growth stage investments, Italian Ventures models 5-7 detailed scenarios spanning different exit multiples, timelines, and dilution assumptions. They pressure-test their models against historical precedent transactions in the category. Only when multiple reasonable scenarios generate target returns do they proceed.

Decision Point: May issue a preliminary term sheet with high-level terms, signaling serious intent while preserving flexibility for deeper diligence. (Note, from term sheet to signed investment agreement, we usually see ca. 50% conversion rate. Don’t expect a term sheet to be an investment. it’s not. It’s just a stepping stone)

Phase 5: Final Decision – The DDDD Sprint

You’re convinced the opportunity is exceptional. Now it’s time to finalize terms, complete comprehensive diligence, and mobilize your network.

The Four Pillars:

DDDD – Deep Dive Due Diligence Complete the full due diligence package including:

• Legal entity structure and cap table review
• Financial statement audit and reconciliation
• Technical/product diligence (code review, security assessment)
• Market reference calls (customers, partners, former employees)
• Background checks on key executives

Work through an accelerated DD sprint. Prepare the investment memo and draft press release—writing the press release forces clarity on why this investment matters.

Secure Co-Investors Complete the Investor CRM list. Use your global network to bring in your dream team of co-investors. The best investors are additive beyond capital—they bring:

• Domain expertise and pattern recognition
• Network access and business development support
• Operational experience building similar companies
• Follow-on capital capacity for future rounds

Clear the IC Present to the investment committee. Secure approval. The best IC presentations tell a compelling story: Why this market? Why this team? Why now? What could go wrong, and how does the team mitigate those risks?

Invest Close the deal. Settle payment. Start onboarding. Now the real work begins—you’re shifting from evaluator to partner, from outside observer to aligned investor working alongside the founders to build something extraordinary.

Decision Point: Issue the full term sheet with complete terms, conditions, and governance provisions.

The Italian Context: A Maturing Ecosystem

Italy’s venture ecosystem has experienced remarkable growth, with investments reaching €2.1 billion and a 67% increase in recent years. Many firms are professionalizing the investment process and competing on the global stage.

What makes Italian VCs distinctive is their deep understanding of building from Southern Europe while scaling globally. They’ve developed expertise in helping founders navigate cross-border expansion, understand regulatory nuances across European markets, and build teams that can execute in resource-constrained environments.

Key Principles for VCs and Founders

For Venture Capitalists:

• Build industry expertise before deploying capital—deep knowledge creates conviction
• Use structured frameworks to maintain discipline across the investment process
• Invest in pattern recognition by tracking comparable transactions systematically
• Make decisions with incomplete information, but stack the odds through rigorous process
• Remember that clearing the IC is just the beginning—value creation happens post-investment

For Founders Seeking VC Investment:

• Understand that each VC interaction advances you through their process—make every touchpoint count
• Prepare materials in advance—VCs notice when you make their diligence easy
• Articulate your funding journey clearly—show you understand capital strategy
• Build relationships with potential co-investors early—VCs value founders who can help syndicate
• Ask VCs about their process—understanding their timeline helps you manage yours

The Bottom Line

The venture investment process is neither art nor science—it’s both. The best VCs combine rigorous analytical frameworks with pattern recognition and intuition developed over hundreds of evaluations. They maintain discipline through structured processes while remaining flexible enough to move quickly when conviction emerges.

Every phase serves a purpose: building industry knowledge, screening efficiently, assessing deeply, modeling outcomes rigorously, and completing comprehensive diligence. Skip a phase and you introduce risk. Execute each phase well and you dramatically improve your hit rate.

The VC Investment Roadmap provides a battle-tested framework for navigating this journey. Whether you’re a first-time fund manager in Milan or a seasoned GP in Silicon Valley, these principles endure: know your market, compare relentlessly, build conviction through analysis, stress-test assumptions, and move decisively when opportunity emerges.

Ready to upgrade your investment process?

Download the complete VC Investment Roadmap and explore our full suite of strategy tools designed for venture capital investors, startups, and innovation leaders at www.strategytools.io.

This framework is part of the Venture Capital Series by Strategy Tools—empowering VCs, founders, and ecosystem builders with visual thinking tools that drive better decision-making.

Over the coming 12 months we expect to train and certify 30-60 Scale Up Train-the-trainers. These range from accelerator managers, business school faculty, VCs and program managers at large, global entrepreneurship programs. Yet, what they all will face is the joy, the struggle and the complexity of ‘the cap table’.

Here is a short overview on the four most common cap table tools we use in Scale Up!

What is a ‘cap table’?

A capitalization table – or ‘cap table’ – is the living, breathing record of who owns what in your company. It tracks equity ownership across all shareholders, from founders and employees to angels, VCs, and convertible note holders. Think of it as the financial DNA of your startup.

At its core, a cap table shows the percentage ownership, the number of shares, and the type of securities each stakeholder holds. But it is far more than a static spreadsheet. A well-maintained cap table tells the story of your fundraising journey – every investment round, every SAFE conversion, every option grant to key hires. It reveals who has voting rights, who gets paid first in an exit, and how much dilution founders experience as they scale.

In Scale Up!, we have seen hundreds of teams wrestle with their cap tables. The ones who master it early gain a strategic advantage. The ones who treat it as an afterthought often face painful surprises down the road – discovering they have given away too much, structured deals poorly, or created complex messes that scare off sophisticated investors.

Why good cap table management matters?

Poor cap table management is one of the silent killers of startups. We have watched promising companies stumble not because their product failed or their market disappeared, but because their cap table became an unsolvable puzzle.

First, investors care deeply about cap table cleanliness. A messy cap table signals operational immaturity. When a Series A investor sees dozens of small angel investments, confusing SAFE terms, or founder equity splits that don’t make sense, they start asking harder questions. Some walk away entirely. In fact, based on our work with VCs across three continents, cap table issues rank among the top five deal-breakers in early-stage investments.

Second, cap table mistakes compound over time. That generous equity grant to your first employee? That SAFE with a low valuation cap? These decisions ripple through every subsequent round, affecting dilution, control, and exit economics. We have seen founding teams who, after three rounds of funding, own less than 20% of their company – leaving little incentive to keep building.

Third, transparency matters. A well-managed cap table builds trust with your team and investors. Everyone knows where they stand. Employees can model their option value. Investors can track their returns. Founders can make informed decisions about future raises. When we run Scale Up! sessions, the teams that maintain real-time cap table accuracy consistently outperform those who don’t – they make faster decisions, spot problems earlier, and negotiate better terms.

Finally, your cap table becomes critical during exits. Whether it is an acquisition, IPO, or secondary sale, the cap table determines who gets what. Liquidation preferences, anti-dilution clauses, and participation rights all flow from your cap table structure. Get it right, and everyone celebrates. Get it wrong, and you will watch your team’s wealth evaporate in legal fees and disputes.

What role does the cap table have in Scale Up?

In Scale Up!, the cap table isn’t just a teaching tool – it is the backbone of the entire learning experience. Everything flows through it. Every strategic decision participants make, from hiring key talent to choosing between investor offers, ultimately shows up in their cap table.

We designed Scale Up! around a simple truth: you cannot understand startup growth without understanding equity dynamics. Founders face constant trade-offs. Should they take money from that eager angel at a lower valuation, or wait for a lead investor? Should they grant 2% equity to a rockstar COO, or offer a lower package with more cash? Should they raise a large round at a high valuation, or stay lean and bootstrap longer? These questions all converge on the cap table.

Throughout the simulation, teams watch their cap table evolve in real-time. They see how their ownership percentage shrinks with each round. They feel the tension between growth capital and dilution. They experience the consequences of poor terms or ill-timed rounds. And crucially, they develop an intuition for what ‘good’ looks like – balanced ownership, clean structure, alignment with investors.

The cap table also serves as our primary performance tracking mechanism. In our leaderboard, we don’t just track revenue or valuation. We track how efficiently teams deploy capital, how well they preserve equity, and how smartly they structure their deals. The winning teams aren’t necessarily those who raise the most money – they’re the ones who reach their milestones with the least dilution.

From our experience training over 4,000 participants across accelerators, business schools, and VC programs worldwide, we have seen that mastering the cap table transforms how founders think about their business. They stop seeing fundraising as simply getting cash in the door. Instead, they start thinking strategically about capital as a tool, equity as a finite resource, and investors as long-term partners. That mindset shift is what Scale Up! is really about – and the cap table is where it happens.

Here are the four cap tables we use in Scale Up!

Pen & Paper

For smaller groups, with less experience and less time, the good ol’ pen & paper format works perfectly fine. If you are running a discovery session (3 hours) or even a full-day session, you can get far with just pen and paper.

In fact, Scale Up! was first designed for pen & paper, in the view that we learn more when seeing and writing vs. punching numbers into a spreadsheet. There is something powerful about physically writing down each equity transaction. It forces teams to slow down, discuss each decision, and truly understand what is happening to their ownership structure.

Pro:

– Easy to use – Very easy to get started – Simple to manage for both participants and facilitators – Forces intentional, slower decision-making – Great for building foundational understanding

Con:

– Gets complex after first three rounds – Converting SAFEs and CLAs is not so easy in the paper format – More manual, so it takes a lot longer – Hard to track multiple scenarios or run sensitivity analysis

When to use it:

For small groups, lower levels of pre-existing knowledge, limited time, or when introducing basic cap table concepts for the first time.

Who’s in charge:

The team. Make sure the whole team works through this format together. Go slow. Cover the basics. This collaborative approach ensures everyone understands the fundamentals before moving to more complex tools.

Facilitator view:

With small groups, it’s pretty easy to follow. You can always see the documents and paper records on the table. Increase the group size, say, to six or ten teams and it might get a bit trickier. Budget extra time for teams to catch up, and expect to do more hands-on support walking around the room. We typically recommend one facilitator per 15-20 participants when using pen & paper.

Excel 1.0 (the classic)

Almost as old as the pen & paper format in Scale Up!, the old Excel file is still fantastic to use. It was made for ‘save a local copy’, and has no cloud collaboration or shared leaderboard. It works. It’s simple, but it is also lacking a number of key features.

This version emerged from our early days working with accelerators who wanted something more scalable than paper, but didn’t yet need real-time tracking. It has proven remarkably durable – thousands of founders still use it today.

Pro:

– Easy to use – Covers basic cap table management, nothing else – People use it locally, can take it home and work on it overnight – No internet dependency – Teams can experiment without worrying about ‘breaking’ a shared file

Con:

– Facilitators have little to no insight into how it is going – Hard to follow and impossible to track the top performers – Mistakes are often left unsolved, due to only having local version – No real-time feedback or comparison with peers

When to use it:

Designed to make the pen & paper version slightly more suited for multiple rounds and later stages, it is simple and easy to use. The Excel 1.0 cap table tool is very suitable for small and large groups, at entry- and intermediate levels. Just don’t expect to be able to track performance or clean up mistakes in this format. Best for asynchronous work or when participants want to practice independently between sessions.

Who’s in charge:

The CFO

Facilitator view:

We have run 100’s of sessions with this tool, and it just works. Probably the best tool for super early stage founders who are still wrapping their heads around basic equity concepts. The lack of real-time visibility means you will need to schedule regular check-ins and be ready to troubleshoot issues retroactively rather than preventing them in real-time.

Google Sheet 1.0 (the basic)

A couple of years ago we started experimenting with a shared version, where we could track all teams in the same interface, and also teams could compare themselves in real-time.

We simply copied the excel version into a Google Sheet version (1.0), and voila, we had the basic version. Instantly, this was a hit with participants. The competitive element that emerged from the live leaderboard completely changed the energy in the room. Teams started benchmarking themselves, learning from top performers, and pushing themselves harder.

Pro:

– Same ease of use as Excel – Now in a shared format, with leaderboard – Easy to keep track of all teams, audit and correct cap math mistakes in real-time – Creates healthy competition and peer learning – Facilitators can provide targeted support based on what they see

Con:

– Not many; but a clear message that ‘this is only looking at financing’ – Not tracking ARR, revenue or basic accounting – Teams sometimes focus too much on leaderboard position vs. learning

When to use it:

In most sessions, really. Great for both entry, intermediate and more advanced users. If you have reliable internet and want to create a dynamic, competitive learning environment, this is your go-to tool.

Who’s in charge:

The CFO

Facilitator view:

Bringing the cap table from local Excel to shared Sheet is a game-changer. If there are two facilitators, one would spend ca. 10% of his / her time to just keep an eye on, do light audits and generally correct mistakes before they turned into major problems. The real-time visibility means you can spot patterns – which teams consistently make similar mistakes, which concepts need more explanation, which teams are ready for advanced challenges.

But, the feedback was clear; ‘where do we track everything else….?’ Teams wanted to see how their cap table decisions connected to their revenue growth, hiring plans, and burn rate. That insight led us to build version 2.0.

Google Sheet 2.0 (the full management dashboard)

In early 2025 we started piloting a more advanced, full scale ‘Management Dashboard’. This tool would quickly outgrow the cap table, and suddenly teams would be able to run full-scale operations, annual accounting, ARR growth, margins, Y-o-Y growth, advisors, zoo animals and exit transactions, all in the same real-time spreadsheet.

Once we saw this live, we knew we were not going back. This version represents the full Scale Up! experience – where financial strategy, operational decisions, and equity management all interconnect. Teams finally see the complete picture: how hiring that expensive VP impacts burn rate, which impacts runway, which impacts when they need to raise, which impacts dilution.

Pro:

– Comprehensive full overview across all aspects of the company – Real-time, shared with running Leaderboard – Makes it superbly easy to run the session as facilitator, offering far more depth into company financials – Reflects real-world complexity that founders actually face – Teams develop holistic strategic thinking, not just cap table mechanics

Con:

– OK, so, it is very complex. It clearly takes time to figure out, and even the best teams get parts of it wrong – It has a lot of moving parts, leaving it hard for the teams to focus on the core, cap table management – Not for beginners, as most get overwhelmed and do not understand the basic financials, never mind cap tables – Requires significantly more facilitator expertise to run well – Teams need strong collaboration and clear role division to manage effectively

When to use it:

Intermediate and advanced-level teams. Need more time. Only worth using when we have minimum one full day, preferably three days. Best for cohorts that already understand startup basics and are ready to wrestle with the messy reality of scaling a company.

Last used with:

Katapult Ocean Program, and here it worked very well. These were experienced impact-driven founders who needed to see how sustainability metrics, investor expectations, and financial performance all connected. The complexity matched their reality.

Who’s in charge:

The CFO, but all team members have dedicated working areas they own. The CEO focuses on strategy and investor relations, the CTO manages product development costs and technical hiring, the CMO tracks customer acquisition and revenue growth. This distributed ownership mirrors how real startup teams actually operate.

Facilitator view:

This is a monster to run, but once it is running it is fantastic. Due to the holistic view on each startup, the full management dashboard takes the Scale Up! experience to another level – but only if you as a facilitator can handle it. You need deep financial literacy, strong group facilitation skills, and the ability to rapidly diagnose where teams are stuck. Plan for at least two facilitators for groups larger than 20 participants. The upside? Teams leave with genuine strategic capabilities that transfer directly to their real companies.

Closing thoughts

With 30-60 new trainers coming online, there will be plenty of chances for Scale Up sessions, big and small. From classrooms to Masterclasses, we will be delivering Scale Up!, Scale Up MENA! and Scale Up Africa Rising!

But, keeping track of all things cap tables is crucial. As a future facilitator, make sure you select the cap table tool that works for you and master it. Use this guide to decide on the right tool for the job for you.

Remember: the tool itself matters far less than your ability to use it effectively. We have seen brilliant sessions run with pen & paper, and mediocre ones with the full dashboard. Your job as a facilitator is to meet participants where they are, push them appropriately, and ensure they leave understanding not just how to fill out a cap table, but why it matters.

Start simple. Master one tool completely before moving to the next. Build your confidence. And most importantly, remember that behind every cap table percentage is a real founder making real decisions about their company’s future. Our job is to help them make those decisions wisely.