Through the lens of Aisha Rahman, Founding Partner, Meridian Ventures With insights from: Rizal Tan, Co-Founder & General Partner And: Ahmad Ismail, CFO, PayMalaysia (Portfolio Company)

By Year 5, we had deployed most of Fund II and were generating the track record that would define our institutional future. The question was no longer whether we could survive—it was whether we could scale.

Year 6: Fund I Harvest Mode and Fund III Preparation

Fund I Portfolio Status:

Company Total Investment Status Current Value Multiple

DataSync $400K Exited (failure) $32K 0.08x

PayMalaysia $650K Series B prep $6M 9.2x

CloudSEA $700K Acquisition talks $2.5M 3.6x

SecureKL $400K EXITED $550K 1.38x

LogiTech Asia $600K Growing $1.2M 2.0x

HealthTech MY $550K Growing $1.4M 2.5x

PropTech.asia $500K Profitable $900K 1.8x

AgriTech ASEAN $350K Exited (failure) $50K 0.14x

EduScale ID $500K Series A complete $1.8M 3.6x

FinFlow $650K Series A complete $3.2M 4.9x

Year 6 Fund I Metrics:

• Portfolio value: $17.5M (8 remaining companies)

• Total distributions: $632K

• TVPI: 2.8x

• DPI: 0.13x

• Net IRR: ~32%

CloudSEA Acquisition:

In June, Year 6, CloudSEA was acquired by a regional enterprise software company for $8M. Our proceeds: $2.2M on $700K invested (3.1x).

This was our second meaningful exit and dramatically improved our DPI story.

Fund I Post-CloudSEA:

• Total distributions: $2.85M

• DPI: 0.57x

• TVPI: 3.0x

Fund III: The Institutional Leap to $50 Million

Fund III represented our transition from emerging to established manager. At $50M, we could finally access the institutional capital that had been out of reach for our first two funds. But doing so, required next level fundraising strategy.

Fundraising Strategy Canvas: Meridian Ventures Fund III ($50M)

Fund Name: Meridian Ventures Fund III Completed by: Aisha Rahman & Rizal Tan Completed date: May 5th

Content Marketing (Your key message)

Our Fund III content strategy builds on five years of thought leadership. Aisha publishes monthly insights on South-East Asian venture trends via LinkedIn and our firm blog, reaching 15,000+ followers across the region. We co-author research with FoF’s on emerging manager performance in ASEAN markets. Rizal speaks regularly at AVCJ, SuperReturn Asia, and regional LP convenings. Our quarterly LP letters have become known for transparent, detailed portfolio analysis—several prospective LPs cited these as reasons for taking initial meetings. For Fund III, we’re producing a signature report on “The Next Wave: AI Opportunities Shaping the future” to position our revised thesis.

LP Construction (200 Names vs 3000 Names)

Fund III targets 20-25 LPs with an average commitment of $2-2.5M. Our construction starts with warm relationships: 12 re-up conversations with Fund I/II LPs (targeting 80% re-up rate), plus 8 qualified new institutional prospects. We’re not casting wide—we’re going deep on LPs where we have genuine fit.

Our primary list includes: IFC and ADB (DFI mandate alignment), 4 fund-of-funds with emerging manager programs (Sarona, Speedinvest, HarbourVest, Adams Street), 3 regional pension funds beginning SEA allocations, 2 American foundations with Asia impact mandates, and 3 corporate VCs seeking regional deal flow access. Secondary list adds 15 family offices across Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Gulf.

Sequencing (Game Plan)

Pre-marketing (Months 1-3): Soft conversations with Fund I/II LPs to gauge re-up appetite and gather reference feedback. Update all materials, refresh data room, finalize Fund III terms.

First Close Target (Months 4-8): Secure anchor commitments from Jelawang Capital ($6M target) and one DFI (IFC at $8M). These two anchors unlock the rest of the raise.

Second Close (Months 9-12): Convert fund-of-funds and re-ups. Target $35M cumulative.

Final Close (Months 13-16): Complete pension fund and foundation conversations. Close at $50M.

Extended Team (Who?)

We’re not raising alone. Our extended team includes: Jim, the ex-ADB (warm introductions to DFI network), our advisory board member from a major Malaysian family office (opens doors across Gulf family offices), Jelawang Capital’s LP relations team (co-hosting events where we’re featured), our Fund II co-anchor LP who now sits on two foundation boards (direct introductions), and a placement agent for European institutional LPs only (Eaton Partners, success-fee basis).

As always, Andrew Senduk and his army of AI agents supports by presenting our GTM value-add story to LPs evaluating our portfolio support capabilities. We also brought in people like Jen Braswell and Paola Ravacchioli to guide us into the world of institutional readiness.

The biggest difference, now we have a full capital formation team, full-time. That’s a game-changer.

Timeline (6 Weeks vs 4 Years)

Target: 14-16 months from launch to final close. We’re raising institutional, so we accept longer cycles. DFIs like IFC require 6-9 months from first meeting to IC approval. Pension funds need 4-6 months minimum. We’ve built relationships with target LPs over the past 2 years specifically to compress these timelines. Fund II closed in 14 months; we’re targeting similar pace for Fund III despite larger size because our LP relationships are now mature and our track record is proven.

Amplifying LPs (Value-Add LPs)

Three LPs serve as active amplifiers for Fund III:

Jelawang Capital: As anchor, they’re actively referring us to their LP network and co-hosting a webinar on SEA emerging managers where Meridian is featured.

Grace Choo  (IFC): Beyond their commitment, IFC’s involvement signals institutional validation. We’ll reference their due diligence process and commitment in all LP conversations.

Fund I HNWI (exited founder): Now a respected angel investor, he’s made personal introductions to three family offices in his network who are exploring VC allocations.

Geography (Focus)

Primary: Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong (in-person intensive). These three cities cover 70% of our target LP base.

Secondary: Dubai (6 trips planned for Gulf family offices and sovereign-adjacent capital), Washington DC (IFC HQ, 4 trips), San Francisco (2 American foundations, 5 trips).

Tertiary: European fund-of-funds handled primarily via placement agent with 3 Rizal trips to London/Amsterdam.

We’re not trying to cover the world. Geographic focus means deeper relationships in fewer places.

Incentives (Incentives to Close)

First Close Incentive: LPs committing by first close receive most-favored-nation status on any future side letter terms and priority co-investment allocation on the first three Fund III deals.

Anchor Incentive: Jelawang Capital’s $6M anchor commitment came with a seat on our Advisory Committee and quarterly strategic calls with GPs beyond standard LP updates.

No fee discounts. We learned from Fund I that fee discounts create LP management complexity and signal desperation. Our 2/20 terms are firm. Value-add comes through access and relationships, not economics.

Summary: Why Fund III Will Close

Fund III succeeds because we’ve built the infrastructure over four years:

1. Track Record: Fund I at 2.8x TVPI with 0.6x DPI; Fund II performing at 1.6x TVPI in Year 2

2. LP Relationships: 80%+ expected re-up rate from existing LPs

3. Institutional Readiness: IFC-grade reporting, ESG frameworks, governance already in place

4. Anchor Momentum: Jelawang and IFC commitments create herd effect for remaining LPs

5. Team Coverage: All 8 GP Fundraising Team roles systematically covered

6. Geographic Discipline: Focused presence in 3 primary cities, not scattered globally

We’re not hoping to raise $50M. We have a plan to raise $50M.

The Fund III LP roster showed our journey from emerging to institutional:

LP Type Commitment

IFC (International Finance Corporation) $8M

Jelawang Capital (top-up) $6M

Fund-of-Funds (top-ups x3) $10M

Employees Provident Fund (EPF / KWSP) $5M

Regional pension fund (1) $1M

American Foundations (2) $5M

Corporate VCs / Strategics (3) $8M

Fund I/II Re-ups $7M

TOTAL $50M

IFC: The Institutional Validation

When IFC committed $8M to Fund III, it represented the culmination of a eight-year relationship.

Grace’s guidance during Fund I and II had prepared us for IFC’s due diligence process—one of the most rigorous in the industry. When the IFC team reviewed our fund, they found:

•            ESG frameworks already in place

•            LP reporting that met institutional standards

•            A governance structure that could scale

•            A track record of transparent, disciplined decision-making

•            A clear investment thesis with demonstrated execution

“Meridian had done the hard work of institutionalization before they needed to,” an IFC investment officer noted during our closing celebration. “That’s rare for emerging managers. Most try to retrofit institutional practices after they want institutional capital. Meridian built the foundation first.”

Analyzing the LP outcome scenarios for EPF / KWSP

One particularly valuable preparation was the extended masterclass we did on the LP outcome scenarios. This actually happened in Lausanne, Switzerland, where we participated in IMD’s Venture Asset Management program. Here we met Jim and Heidi, from ZKB. We got to develop and then truly practice using the LP outcome canvas. Enrique pushed us hard on this. This was truly transformative.

We did not know it at the time, but just months later we would find ourselves in exactly the same position, when the investment team at EPF/KWSP started discussing their LP outcome analysis with us. Suddenly, we realized we could hold our ground and discuss, even negotiate with them on LP outcome models. Looking back, that was probably the moment it clicked, ‘now we are truly institutionally ready’.

Read the full LP outcome analysis from EPF/KWSP here.

The 20-Month Fundraising Cadence

Fund III closed in early Year 7, meaning we had raised three funds in seven years—a new fund approximately every 20 months.

This aggressive pace was only possible because of the fundraising infrastructure we’d built:

•            LP relationships maintained continuously (not just during fundraising windows)

•            Data room always updated and ready

•            Fundraising team roles clearly defined across our small team

•            AI and automation tools accelerating LP research and outreach

•            Process-driven approach to LP conversion

Year 7: The Firm Today

By the end of Year 7, Meridian Ventures managed $85M across three funds:

Fund Size Vintage Status

Fund I $10M Year 0 Harvesting

Fund II $25M Year 2 Value Creation

Fund III $50M Year 4 Deploying

Our team had grown from 2 founders to 8 people: 2 GPs, 1 Venture Partner (Andrew Senduk), 2 Principals, 2 Associates, and 1 Operations Manager, as well as a full team of AI agents.

We’d invested in 32 companies across South-East Asia. Four exits completed. One potential unicorn in the making (PayMalaysia, now valued at $60M+ and heading toward Series C).

We were no longer emerging managers. We were an established firm with institutional credibility, consistent returns, and a platform that would outlast any individual partner. Of course, with three funds, we now need to start generating exits and DPI back to our LPs. That’s the next step of the journey.

Key Recommendations for Emerging Fund Managers in South-East Asia

Having navigated the journey from concept to $85M under management, here are the recommendations we would give to emerging managers starting today in South-East Asia:

1. Start Smaller Than You Think

Our original target of $30M for Fund I would have been impossible to raise. $10M was achievable—barely. In emerging markets, fund size credibility must be earned gradually. A successfully deployed $10M fund opens doors that no amount of pitch materials can open for a $50M first fund.

2. Understand the Economics Brutally

A 2% management fee on a $10M fund is $200,000 per year. After fund administration, legal, office, and travel, you’ll be paying yourselves poverty wages. Plan for this. Either have personal runway, alternative income sources, or extremely understanding life partners. The economics only work at scale—which means Fund II and III are not optional; they’re survival requirements.

3. Invest in Fundraising Infrastructure Early

Use the GP Fundraising Team canvas to build systematic fundraising capability, even if you’re just two people. Define who covers each role. Use AI and automation tools aggressively. Define your LP personas. Nail your LP Value proposition. Maintain your LP CRM continuously. The difference between our Fund I scramble and Fund II execution was entirely about infrastructure.

4. Leverage Ecosystem Builders

Organizations like IFC, ADB, Cradle Fund, and Jelawang Capital exist to support ecosystem development. They want emerging managers to succeed. Engage with them early—not for capital, but for guidance, connections, and credibility. Our relationships with Grace Choo  at IFC and Craig and Ian at ADB were transformative years before they led to any investment.

5. Build Value Creation Capabilities

South-East Asian founders often need more support than capital. Andrew Senduk’s GTM expertise became a genuine differentiator for our fund. Think about what operational value you can genuinely provide, and build that capability deliberately. LPs increasingly want to see portfolio support, not just deal access.

6. Accept the LP Evolution Timeline

Fund I will likely be friends, family, HNWIs, and angels. Fund II will add some early institutional elements—fund-of-funds, emerging manager programs. Fund III is when major institutional capital becomes accessible. Don’t fight this progression; plan for it. Each fund stage prepares you for the next.

7. Maintain a Fundraising Cadence

Raising a new fund every 20-24 months sounds aggressive, but it’s actually survival strategy. It keeps LP relationships warm, demonstrates traction, and builds the AUM necessary for sustainable GP economics. Start thinking about Fund II long before Fund I even closes.

8. Be Transparent About Challenges

Our first write-off was painful to communicate to LPs. But our transparent handling of that failure—and our discipline in not throwing good money after bad—built credibility that paid dividends in Fund II and III. LPs expect some failures. What they’re watching for is how you handle them.

9. Invest in Education Continuously

The Fund Manager! Masterclass transformed our approach. Strategy Tools’ LP AI platform sharpened our pitching. Industry conferences, peer networks, and continuous learning aren’t luxuries—they’re requirements for staying competitive in a rapidly evolving industry.

10. Remember It’s a 15-Year Journey

The Fund Journey Map shows a 15-year cycle from idea to final distribution. We’re only at Year 7. The hardest part—converting paper gains to actual DPI—is still ahead. This is a career commitment, not a quick path to wealth. Make sure you’re in it for the right reasons and with the right partners.

Final Reflections

Rizal’s reflection:

“Six years ago, Aisha and I were two people in a converted shophouse, maxing out credit cards and wondering if anyone would ever trust us with institutional capital. Today, we manage $85M across three funds with IFC as an LP and genuine institutional credibility. Fund I’s emerging returns aren’t the highest in the industry, but they’re solid, repeatable, and built the foundation for everything that followed. The Fund Journey Map captures the phases, but what it can’t capture is the emotional journey—the anxiety of Year 0, the relief of first close, the devastation of our first write-off, the joy of our first major exit. This business is deeply human. That’s what makes it worth doing.”

Aisha’s reflection:

“If I could give one piece of advice to emerging managers starting today in South-East Asia, it would be this: the fund journey is a marathon, not a sprint. Every phase has its challenges and rewards. Year T-2 felt impossible; Year 4 felt like vindication; Year 6 feels like we’ve just begun. Through all of it, the constants were partnership stability, LP transparency, and founder-first investing. Those principles guided every decision. They’ll guide Fund IV and beyond.”

The fund journey continues.

Read Part I (years T-2 -1), I here, and Part II here.

About the Fund Journey Map and GP Fundraising Team Canvas

The Fund Journey Map by Strategy Tools visualizes the complete 15-year lifecycle of a venture capital fund, from early idea through final distribution. It captures the key decision points, risks, and milestones that define the GP experience. Based on work with 100’s of emerging fund managers, the Fund Journey Map is designed to help emerging managers successfully navigate the full fund journey.

The GP Fundraising Team canvas identifies the eight roles that drive successful LP fundraising, from LP Researcher through LP Process & DD Guide. Both tools are part of Strategy Tools’ Venture Capital Series.

Download the Fund Journey Map, GP Fundraising Team canvas, and explore our full suite of GP accelerators and venture capital programs  at strategytools.io

Ready to start your fund journey?

Join the Fund Manager! Masterclass to learn from experienced GPs, practice with our Fund Manager simulation, and build the skills needed to launch and manage successful venture capital funds. Learn more.

This article is part of the Venture Capital Series at Strategy Tools, helping fund managers, LPs, FoFs and ecosystem builders develop better venture capital ecosystems around the world.

About the Author:

Christian Rangen is a strategy advisor and business school faculty. He works with ambitious ecosystem developers, innovation agencies, venture funds, national fund-of-funds and governments on building better VC firms and VC ecosystems. He runs GP Accelerators and GP Masterclasses globally.

A huge thanks to Scott Newton Rick Rasmussen Efe (Braimah) Barber Winnie Odhiambo Jen Braswell Paola Ravacchioli Jim Pulcrano Enrique Alvarado Hablützel Marijn Wiersma Jessica Low Jessica Espinoza Marième Diop Sanjana Raheja Rumbi Makanga for inspiring this 3-part story

Through the lens of Aisha Rahman, Founding Partner, Meridian Ventures With insights from: Rizal Tan, Co-Founder & General Partner And: Priya Nair, CEO, DataSync (Portfolio Company)

The investment period is where fund strategy meets market reality. For Meridian Ventures, Years 2-5 would test every assumption in our thesis—and force us to make decisions that would determine whether Fund I would succeed or fail. More importantly, it would teach us that building a world-class fundraising team was the key to our survival.

Year 2: Building the Portfolio

January-March: Deployment Accelerates

Year 2 began with unfinished business—we were still seeking to fill out our Fund I portfolio while simultaneously supporting our initial five investments.

The portfolio construction challenge:

Fund I targeted 12-15 investments. With $10M and roughly 30% reserved for follow-ons ($3M), we had $7M for initial investments. Average initial check: $450K-$600K.

Our investment period was 3-4 years, but best practice suggested deploying most capital in years 1-2 to allow adequate time for value creation before exits.

Target deployment pace: 4-5 investments per year in Years 1-2, slowing in Years 3-4.

Q1 investments:

Investment #6: HealthTech MY (February, Year 2) — Digital health platform connecting patients with specialists. Strong team from the Malaysian healthcare system. Complex regulatory environment, but a genuine market need. $450K investment.

Investment #7: PropTech.asia (March, Year 2) — Commercial real estate analytics. Data-driven approach to property valuation across South-East Asian markets. Two experienced founders from the real estate industry. $400K investment.

April-June: First Portfolio Challenges Emerge

By summer, reality started diverging from our investment memos.

DataSync: The early warning signs

Our first investment wasn’t developing as expected. The founding team—brilliant data scientists from Grab—struggled with go-to-market execution. Six months post-investment, they had built an impressive product with almost no customers.

Our board seat gave us visibility, but limited control. We pushed for them to hire a commercial co-founder. They resisted, believing the product would sell itself.

The VC’s dilemma:

This is where active ownership gets complicated. We had conviction in the market and product, but growing concerns about execution. Do we push harder and risk damaging the GP-founder relationship? Do we stay hands-off and hope they figure it out? Do we write more about our concerns in LP reports, potentially signaling problems prematurely?

We chose a middle path: supportive but direct feedback in board meetings, connected them with commercial advisors from our network, and documented our concerns internally while maintaining constructive external positioning.

Rizal’s perspective:

“DataSync taught us something important in Year 1: the gap between investment memo and portfolio reality. On paper, they were perfect—ex-Grab team, clear market need, technical excellence. In practice, they had a fundamental gap in commercial DNA. As investors, we could coach around the edges, but we couldn’t fix the team composition problem without their buy-in. That’s the limit of VC influence at the seed stage.”

July-December: Closing Out Year 2

More investments:

Investment #8: AgriTech ASEAN (August, Year 2) — Precision agriculture software for South-East Asian farms. Strong domain expertise from agricultural extension backgrounds. $350K investment.

Investment #9: EduScale ID (October, Year 2) — EdTech platform for corporate training, Indonesia-focused. First-time founder, but she’d been a customer of this category for years and understood the pain points intimately. $400K investment.

Investment #10: FinFlow (November, Year 2) — Subscription billing platform for regional SaaS companies. Two-time founder (previous exit to a strategic acquirer). More expensive than our typical deals—we paid a premium for founder pedigree. $550K investment.

Year 2 Summary:

Metric Value

Investments made 10 total (5 in Year 0, 5 in Year 1)

Capital deployed $4.1M (59% of initial allocation)

Portfolio value (estimated) $4.5M (modest markups)

Net IRR ~10%

TVPI 1.10x

DPI 0.0x (no distributions)

LP feedback (first annual meeting):

Our first annual LP meeting happened in November, Year 2. The feedback was mixed.

Positives: LPs liked our pace of deployment, the quality of our deal sourcing, and our transparent reporting.

Concerns: Multiple LPs questioned why we’d invested in 10 companies before having meaningful traction data from our earliest investments. Were we deploying too fast? Should we have waited to see DataSync progress before committing more capital? This was fair criticism. We defended our approach—the market window for seed deals doesn’t wait, and batch deployment is normal—but we heard the underlying anxiety.

Year 3: The J-Curve Bites Hard

January-March: Portfolio Divergence Accelerates

Year 3 revealed the brutal reality of seed-stage investing: outcomes diverge fast.

The winners emerging:

PayMalaysia signed a partnership with a major Malaysian bank, gaining access to 25,000 SME customers. Their MRR jumped from $15K to $45K in a single quarter.

CloudSEA landed their first enterprise customer and began generating real revenue. The founding team proved they could sell, not just build.

FinFlow—our expensive bet on the serial founder—launched and acquired 80 paying customers within three months. Unit economics looked strong.

The troubled middle:

LogiTech Asia was progressing but slowly. Their pilot customers liked the product but were reluctant to commit to scaled rollouts. The solo founder was burning out, handling everything herself.

SecureKL hit regulatory complexity we’d underestimated. Malaysian cybersecurity compliance required certifications that would take 12-18 months to obtain.

AgriTech ASEAN was pre-revenue and burning cash on R&D. The founders were making technical progress but had no commercial traction whatsoever.

The failures materializing:

DataSync continued its slow death march. By March, Year 3, they had signed only two customers—both small, low-ACV deals that didn’t validate the business model. Cash was running low.

The write-down conversation:

For the first time, we had to discuss portfolio write-downs with our LPs.

Our policy was to mark investments at fair value quarterly, based on either subsequent financing rounds or internal assessment. DataSync hadn’t raised follow-on capital, and our internal assessment suggested the company was worth significantly less than we’d paid.

The decision: Mark DataSync down by 50%. Our $400K investment was now carried at $200K.

This single write-down dropped our fund TVPI from 1.12x to 1.05x.

Grace Choo’s perspective (LP advisor, though not yet an investor):

“I remember Aisha calling to tell me about the DataSync write-down. She was clearly uncomfortable—admitting their first investment was struggling felt like a personal failure. But I actually gained confidence from that call. They weren’t hiding problems. They weren’t massaging valuations to look better. They were being straight about challenges. That’s exactly what I want to see from GPs.”

April-September: The Capital Crisis and Critical Decision

DataSync reaches the breaking point:

By July, DataSync had 4 months of runway remaining. The founding team came to us with two options:

Option A: Bridge financing to buy time for one more pivot attempt. They wanted $150K from existing investors to extend runway by 8-10 months.

Option B: Shut down the company, preserve remaining capital for investor return, accept failure.

This was our first major follow-on decision. The Fund Journey Map shows this moment clearly—the choice between doubling down and writing off.

The analysis:

We ran the numbers cold. DataSync had burned $500K (our $400K plus other investor capital) with almost nothing to show for it. The founding team had proven they couldn’t find early product-market fit despite multiple pivots. The market for SMB analytics was getting more competitive, not less.

A $150K bridge would increase our exposure to $550K in a company we’d already written down 50%.

Our decision: Don’t participate in the bridge. Let the company find other sources of capital or shut down.

This was painful. We liked the founders personally. We’d championed them to our LPs. Walking away felt like failure.

But the alternative was worse: good money after bad into a company that had demonstrated it couldn’t execute.

The aftermath:

DataSync couldn’t raise the bridge from other sources. In September, Year 3, they shut down and returned approximately $40K to investors. Our $400K investment became a $32K return—a 92% loss.

Priya Nair (CEO, DataSync) perspective:

“Looking back, Meridian made the right call. At the time, I was furious—I thought they were abandoning us. But we’d had 18 months to prove the model and hadn’t done it. Throwing more money at the problem wouldn’t have changed the fundamental issue: we were great at building product and terrible at selling it. I learned more from that failure than from anything else in my career. Two years later, I started a new company with a commercial co-founder from day one. That company is now doing $2M ARR. DataSync’s failure was my most important education.”

The Hard Lesson: We Need to Get Better at Fundraising

By late Year 3, with DataSync written off and the J-curve biting hard, we had a sobering realization.

“If we’re going to survive as a firm,” Rizal said one evening in our Bangsar office, “we need to raise Fund II. And we can’t go through the same scramble we did for Fund I. That nearly broke us.”

He was right. Fund I fundraising had been 18 months of desperation, cold outreach, and near-misses. We’d raised $10M through sheer determination, but we’d burned out in the process. And $10M wasn’t enough to build a sustainable management company.

We needed a systematic approach to fundraising. We needed a real fundraising team.

Building a World-Class Fundraising Team: The Game Changer

The canvas identifies eight distinct roles that drive successful LP fundraising. We didn’t have eight people—we never would for Fund II—but we deliberately covered each function:

Role Function Our Solution

LP Researcher

Leads all research on prospective LPs, fills top of funnel

Part-time analyst using ADB’s LP database and conference materials

LP Networks & Engagement

Builds deep relationships through events, conferences

Aisha – primary relationship builder through AVCJ, SuperReturn Asia

Deck, Model & Dataroom Builder

Builds and maintains all fundraising materials

Outsourced structure using Strategy Tools templates; Rizal maintained

AI & Automation

Builds automation engine to make LP process 10x faster

LP AI platform for persona practice + custom CRM workflows

GP Leadership

Overall leadership, joins and leads most LP meetings

Rizal – led all key meetings, responsible for overall LP performance

LP Closer

Takes LPs from hello to signature, strong sales focus

Split between Rizal and Aisha based on relationship warmth

LP Whisperer

Elder statesman with networks to top prospective LPs

Advisory board member from major family office + Jim, ex-ADB

LP Process & DD Guide

Guides LPs through entire process from data room to IC

Dedicated support from legal counsel + streamlined process docs

This systematic approach transformed our fundraising capability. Where Fund I had been desperate scrambling, Fund II would be organized execution.

Key changes we implemented:

1. Continuous LP engagement: We didn’t wait until we “started fundraising.” We maintained quarterly touchpoints with all Fund I LPs and prospective Fund II LPs from Year 3 onward.

2. Data room always ready: Instead of scrambling to build materials when an LP showed interest, we kept a perpetually updated data room.

3. LP persona customization: Different pitch materials for different LP types, practiced extensively using the Strategy Tools LP AI platform.

4. CRM discipline: Every LP interaction logged, follow-ups scheduled, relationship health tracked.

5. Advisory leverage: Our advisory board member opened doors we could never have opened ourselves.

The IFC Partnership: Becoming Institutional-Ready

One relationship proved transformative during our Fund II preparation: our connection to Grace Choo , Regional Lead at IFC (International Finance Corporation).

Grace had seen hundreds of emerging managers across Asia. She’d watched funds succeed and fail, scale and collapse. When we approached her in Year 3, we weren’t asking for investment (we knew our fund was too small for IFC at that stage). We were asking for guidance.

“We got immense support from Grace to understand how to evolve from Fund I to Fund II, and becoming institutional-scale ready,” I later told other emerging managers at an AVCJ panel.

Her guidance covered several critical areas:

On portfolio reporting: Institutional LPs expected quarterly reports with specific metrics. IFC had templates we could adapt.

On ESG integration: DFIs increasingly required ESG frameworks. Build these now rather than retrofit later.

On governance: Have an Advisory Committee and LP reporting structure that would scale.

On fund size: IFC typically couldn’t invest in funds under $50M, but if we performed well in Fund II, Fund III might qualify.

“Think of Fund II as your audition tape for institutional capital,” Grace advised. “Every decision you make, every report you write, every portfolio company you support—assume that institutional LPs will scrutinize all of it when you come back for Fund III.”

Andrew Senduk: Venture Partner for GTM Excellence

As our portfolio grew, we recognized a gap in our capabilities: go-to-market (GTM) execution. Many of our founders were technical experts who struggled with sales, marketing, and commercial scaling.

In Year 3, we brought on Andrew Senduk as a Venture Partner specifically to address this gap.

Andrew had spent 15 years building and scaling businesses across Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. He’d led GTM for two successful startups (one acquired, one IPO’d) and understood the unique challenges of selling across South-East Asia’s fragmented markets.

Andrew’s perspective on joining Meridian:

“What attracted me to Meridian was their recognition that early-stage investing isn’t just about picking winners—it’s about helping those winners actually win. Most seed-stage founders in South-East Asia are technical builders who’ve never sold enterprise software or scaled a consumer product across multiple countries. That’s where I could add genuine value.”

Andrew worked with six of our Fund I portfolio companies on their GTM strategies:

•            Sales process design for enterprise SaaS companies

•            Market entry strategies for regional expansion

•            Pricing and packaging optimization

•            Customer success frameworks

His involvement became a key part of our LP pitch for Fund II: we weren’t just providing capital, we were providing hands-on GTM expertise that could meaningfully accelerate our portfolio companies’ growth.

Year 4: Portfolio Maturation and Fund II Launch

Portfolio Performance at Year 4:

Company Total Investment Status Current Value Multiple

DataSync $400K Shut down $32K 0.08x

PayMalaysia $450K Series A prep $2.2M 4.9x

CloudSEA $600K Growing $1.5M 2.5x

SecureKL $400K Bridge raised $350K 0.87x

LogiTech Asia $500K Turnaround $550K 1.1x

HealthTech MY $450K Growing $650K 1.4x

PropTech.asia $400K Growing $500K 1.25x

AgriTech ASEAN $350K Struggling $200K 0.57x

EduScale ID $400K Growing $600K 1.5x

FinFlow $550K Pre-Series A $1.8M 3.3x

Year 4 Fund I Metrics:

• Total invested: $4.5M (65% of initial allocation)

• Current portfolio value: $8.4M

• TVPI: 1.55x

• DPI: 0.01x

• Net IRR: ~18%

Fund II Strategy evolution

It was a webinar in March that led to team to step back and reflect. “Our fund II is not just a replica of fund I. We need to think far more strategically”. On the webinar, the team was introduced to the Fund Strategy Canvas, developed by Strategy Tools. Carving out a full-day offsite, the team sat down to complete the Fund Strategy Canvas together.

Fund Strategy Canvas: Meridian Ventures Fund II ($25M)

Fund Name: Meridian Ventures Fund II

General Partners: Aisha Rahman & Rizal Tan

THESIS, STRATEGY

Thesis & Size

Meridian Ventures Fund II is a $25M early-stage venture capital fund investing in B2B software and fintech companies across South-East Asia, with primary focus on Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

Our thesis is built on three convictions:

First, South-East Asia’s digital economy is entering its enterprise phase. After a decade of consumer internet growth, the next wave of value creation will come from B2B infrastructure—payments, logistics software, enterprise SaaS, and vertical solutions that enable the region’s 70 million SMEs to digitize operations.

Second, the best founders in ASEAN are increasingly emerging from non-traditional backgrounds and geographies outside Singapore. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam are producing world-class technical talent with deep local market understanding. These founders are systematically overlooked by Singapore-centric VCs who rarely travel beyond Changi Airport.

Third, early-stage companies in emerging South-East Asian markets need more than capital. They need operational support—particularly in go-to-market execution, regional expansion strategy, and preparation for institutional follow-on rounds. GPs who combine capital with hands-on GTM expertise will generate superior returns.

Fund II targets $25M, representing a 2.5x step-up from our $10M Fund I. This size allows us to lead seed rounds of $500K-$1.5M while maintaining meaningful follow-on reserves for winners.

Strategy

Stage: Pre-seed to Seed, with selective Seed+ participation

Check size: $500K-$1.5M initial; up to $2M follow-on in winners

Geography: Malaysia (40%), Indonesia (35%), Vietnam/Philippines (25%)

Sectors: B2B software, fintech infrastructure, vertical SaaS, logistics tech

Target portfolio: 18-22 companies over 3-year deployment period

We invest at the earliest institutional stage—typically first or second money in after angels. Our sweet spot is technical founding teams with clear product vision but limited go-to-market experience. We help them build the commercial muscle to reach Series A.

Unfair Advantage

Our unfair advantage is the combination of three elements no other regional fund possesses:

Operator-investor team: Rizal spent 8 years building and scaling startups across Malaysia and Indonesia before becoming an investor. He’s lived the founder journey and speaks the language of operators, not just financiers.

Ground-level presence: We’re based in Kuala Lumpur, not Singapore. We travel to Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City, and Manila monthly. We see deals 6-12 months before Singapore-based funds because we’re embedded in local founder communities.

GTM value-add through Andrew Senduk: Our Venture Partner has 15 years of enterprise sales and regional expansion experience. He works directly with portfolio companies on sales process, pricing strategy, and market entry—capabilities that differentiate us from capital-only investors.

TEAM & TRACK RECORD

General Partners

Aisha Rahman, Founding Partner

12 years in venture capital and corporate development. Former Principal at a mid-sized regional VC where she led 15+ investments across ASEAN. Board experience across fintech, SaaS, and logistics companies. MBA from INSEAD. Leads fund strategy, LP relations, and serves on 6 portfolio company boards.

Rizal Tan, Co-Founder & General Partner

8 years as operator, 4 years as investor. Former VP Business Development at a Series B payments company (acquired). Founded and sold a B2B marketplace in Malaysia. Leads deal sourcing, investment decisions, and portfolio company operational support. Deep networks across Malaysian and Indonesian founder communities.

Extended Team

Andrew Senduk, Venture Partner

15 years building and scaling businesses across Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Led GTM for two successful startups (one acquired, one IPO’d). Works with portfolio companies on sales process design, regional expansion, and commercial scaling. Not full-time but engaged across 6+ portfolio companies per fund.

Two Associates: Handle deal sourcing, due diligence support, and portfolio monitoring. One based in KL, one in Jakarta.

One Operations Manager: Fund administration, LP reporting, and back-office operations.

Track Record

Fund I Performance (as of Fund II launch):

Vintage: 2023

Size: $10M

Investments: 12 companies

TVPI: 1.55x

DPI: 0.02x (one small exit)

IRR: ~18%

Notable Fund I positions: PayMalaysia (4.9x paper, Series A prep), FinFlow (3.3x paper, growing rapidly), CloudSEA (2.5x paper, acquisition discussions). One complete write-off (DataSync), demonstrating follow-on discipline.

Prior Track Record (attributable deals from previous roles):

Aisha: 4 exits from prior fund, including 2 at 3x+ returns

Rizal: Personal angel portfolio of 8 investments, 2 exits at 5x+

LP MIX

Anchor LPs

Jelawang Capital ($4M commitment)

Regional thought leader in South-East Asian venture. Their rigorous due diligence and public commitment provides institutional validation. Jelawang serves on our Advisory Committee and actively supports our LP fundraising through introductions and co-hosted events.

Sarona Asset Management ($3M commitment)

Impact-focused fund-of-funds with emerging markets mandate. Their commitment signals ESG credibility and opens doors to other impact-oriented institutional LPs.

LP Mix Structure

LP Category    Target Allocation         Rationale

Fund-of-Funds (emerging manager programs) $7M (28%) Jelawang Capital, Sarona, Speedinvest, regional FoFs with SEA mandates

Regional Family Offices $6M (24%) Re-ups from Fund I plus new Singapore/Malaysian families

Fund I Re-ups (HNWIs, angels) $5M (20%) Strong re-up rate demonstrates LP satisfaction

Fund-of-fund $4M (16%) Dubai Future District Fund, SEA-MENA-oriented allocators

Strategic / Corporate $2M (8%) Corporate VCs seeking regional deal flow

GP Commitment$1M (4%), Increased from Fund I to demonstrate alignment

Target LP count: 18-22 LPs

Average commitment: $1.1-1.4M

Minimum commitment: $250K (to maintain fund I relationships)

LP Value Add

Our LP base isn’t just capital—it’s a strategic network:

Jelawang Capital: Portfolio company introductions, co-investment on larger rounds, thought leadership association

Sarona: ESG framework guidance, impact measurement support, introductions to impact-focused follow-on investors

Fund I HNWIs (exited founders): Direct mentorship to portfolio founders, customer introductions, hiring network access

Dubai Future District Fund: Middle East expansion pathway for portfolio companies, sovereign wealth fund network

Corporate LPs: Strategic partnership and M&A optionality for portfolio companies

LP ECONOMICS

Financial Terms

Term     Fund II                Structure

Management Fee

2.0% on committed capital during investment period

2.0% on invested capital thereafter

Carried Interest 20%

Preferred Return (Hurdle) 8%

GP Commitment 4% ($1M)

Waterfall European (whole-fund)

Fund Life10 years + two 1-year extensions

Investment Period 4 years

Distribution Policy

Distributions made as exits occur, subject to:

Return of LP capital contributions first

8% preferred return to LPs

80/20 split thereafter (LP/GP)

GP catch-up provision after hurdle achieved

Fee Offsets

100% of transaction fees, monitoring fees, and director fees received by GPs from portfolio companies are offset against management fees.

LEGAL SETUP

Fund Domicile: Labuan International Business and Financial Centre (IBFC), Malaysia

Fund Structure: Labuan Limited Partnership

Rationale for Labuan:

Tax-efficient structure for regional investments

Regulatory framework designed for investment funds

Lower setup and administration costs than Singapore VCC or Cayman

Acceptable to institutional LPs including DFIs

Geographic alignment with our KL base

Fund Administrator: Apex Fund Services (Singapore)

Legal Counsel:

Fund formation: Rajah & Tann (Singapore/Malaysia)

Portfolio investments: Local counsel in each jurisdiction

Auditor: Ernst & Young (Malaysia)

Tax Considerations:

Labuan entities benefit from 3% tax on net profits or flat RM20,000

No withholding tax on distributions to non-Malaysian LPs

Tax treaties in place with most LP jurisdictions

DEALFLOW

Primary Dealflow Channels

1. Founder Networks (40% of pipeline)

Rizal’s operator background generates direct founder referrals. Portfolio company founders introduce their peers. Our reputation for being “founder-friendly” creates inbound interest from founders who’ve heard about us through the ecosystem.

2. Ecosystem Partners (30% of pipeline)

Deep relationships with Cradle Fund (Malaysia), MDEC, 500 Startups (SEA), Antler, and regional accelerators. We’re the preferred follow-on investor for several accelerator programs because we move quickly and add operational value.

3. Angel/Syndicate Networks (20% of pipeline)

Co-invest relationships with AngelCentral Malaysia, Angel Investment Network Indonesia, and individual super-angels across the region. Angels bring us deals early; we bring them access to institutional rounds.

4. Proactive Sourcing (10% of pipeline)

Associates systematically track companies emerging from regional tech hubs, monitor funding announcements, and conduct outbound outreach to promising founders.

Dealflow Expansion Strategy

For Fund II, we’re expanding dealflow through:

Quarterly “Office Hours” in Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City, and Manila

Content marketing (Aisha’s LinkedIn presence reaches 15,000+ regional followers)

Deeper accelerator relationships in Vietnam and Philippines (underserved in Fund I)

Investment Process

Stage                   Timeline                         Activities

Initial Screen                                                                                                         1 week

Partner review of deck/intro, quick pass/proceed decision First Meeting           1-2 weeks

60-minute founder meeting, both GPs attend, Deep Dive, Term sheet 1            1-3 weeks

Market analysis, reference calls, product review, Investment Committee           1 week

IC memo, partner discussion, decision, Term Sheet 2 & Close                        1-4 weeks

Final terms negotiation, legal documentation, funding                                       1-4 weeks

Total process: 2-14 weeks from first meeting to close

Decision authority: Both GPs must approve; no solo deals

PORTFOLIO & VALUE ADD

Portfolio Construction Parameter

Target Number of investments 18-22 companies

Initial check size $500K-$1.5M

Follow-on reserves 35% of fund ($8.75M)

Target ownership 8-15% at entry

Concentration limit

No single investment >12% of fund

Follow-on Strategy

We reserve 35% of the fund for follow-on investments in winners. Follow-on decisions are made based on:

Company performance against milestones

Ability to maintain meaningful ownership

Quality of incoming investors

Risk/reward at new valuation

We explicitly do NOT do pro-rata follow-ons across the portfolio. Capital is concentrated in top performers. Fund I experience: followed on in 3 of 12 companies; those 3 represent 60% of portfolio value.

Investment Decision Framework

All investments must meet threshold criteria:

Team: Technical depth + commercial potential (or willingness to add commercial talent)

Market: $500M+ addressable market in ASEAN

Timing: Clear catalyst for why now

Fit: B2B/fintech focus aligned with thesis

Valuation: Entry price supporting 10x+ return potential

Value Add: How We Support Portfolio Companies

Board Engagement

GPs take board seats on all lead investments. Active participation in strategy, hiring, and fundraising decisions. Monthly check-ins with all portfolio CEOs.

GTM Support (Andrew Senduk)

Hands-on work with portfolio companies on:

Sales process design and optimization

Pricing and packaging strategy

Enterprise sales playbook development

Regional expansion planning

Customer success frameworks

Andrew engages with 6-8 companies per fund on structured GTM programs.

Talent Network

Curated network of 200+ executives and operators across ASEAN. Direct introductions for key hires. Quarterly portfolio talent events connecting companies with candidates.

Follow-on Fundraising

Warm introductions to Series A investors (Sequoia SEA, Vertex, East Ventures, Openspace, etc.). Preparation support for institutional fundraising. Data room and pitch coaching.

Peer Network

Quarterly portfolio CEO dinners. Slack community for real-time peer support. Annual offsite bringing together all portfolio founders.

EXIT STRATEGY

Value Creation & Exit Strategy

Value Creation Focus Areas:

During Years 1-3 (building phase):

Product-market fit validation

Initial revenue traction ($100K-$500K ARR)

Team building beyond founders

Market positioning establishment

During Years 3-5 (scaling phase):

Revenue acceleration ($500K-$3M ARR)

Unit economics optimization

Geographic expansion within ASEAN

Series A/B fundraising

During Years 5-8 (exit preparation):

Path to profitability or clear growth trajectory

Strategic relationship cultivation

Board composition optimization for exit

Financial and legal housekeeping

Exit Pathways:

Exit Type            Expected % of Exits Typical Timeline

Strategic M&A (regional) 20%              Years 4-7

Strategic M&A (global)        5%             Years 5-8

Secondary sale                     10%           Years 4-6

IPO (rare at our stage)          5%            Years 7-10

Write-off                            60%              Years 2-8

Exit Preparation Process:

Starting Year 2, we work with portfolio companies to:

Identify potential strategic acquirers

Build relationships with corporate development teams

Prepare management for M&A processes

Clean up cap table and legal structure

Develop exit-ready financial reporting

Exit Experience

GP Exit Track Record:

Aisha Rahman:

4 exits at prior fund, including 2 M&A transactions she led

Managed LP distributions and exit accounting

Board member through 3 acquisition processes

Rizal Tan:

Founded and sold B2B marketplace to strategic acquirer

Personal angel portfolio: 2 exits (1 acquisition, 1 secondary)

Operator perspective on founder exit psychology

Fund I Exits (to date):

SecureKL: Acquired for $2M (1.38x return)—managed full M&A process

DataSync: Orderly wind-down with capital return—demonstrated discipline

AgriTech ASEAN: Wind-down in progress

FUND ECONOMICS

Fund Model Summary

Item     Amount

Fund Size $25,000,000

Management Fee (annual, investment period) $500,000

Management Fee (annual, post-investment period) $400,000 (on invested capital)

Total Management Fees (10-year life) $4,400,000

Available for Investment $20,600,000

Target Gross Multiple 3.0x

Target Net Multiple2.5x

Target Net IRR20%+

Management Company Economics

Annual management fee of $500K supports:

2 GP salaries (market-rate for regional VCs)

2 Associate salaries

1 Operations Manager salary

Office (KL headquarters + hot desks in SG, Jakarta)

Travel (significant—we’re on the ground across 4 countries)

Fund administration, legal, audit

LP relations and reporting

Cash Flow Reality:

Unlike Fund I (where we paid ourselves poverty wages), Fund II economics allow for sustainable GP compensation. This is critical for partnership stability and long-term firm building.

Carried Interest Distribution

Assuming 3.0x gross return ($75M exit proceeds) on $25M fund:

Distribution     Amount

Return of LP Capital  $25,000,000

8% Preferred Return to LPs $8,000,000

Remaining Proceeds $42,000,000

LP Share (80%)$33,600,000

GP Carried Interest (20%)$8,400,000

Total LP Returns: $66.6M on $25M invested (2.66x net)

GP Economics: $8.4M carried interest + ~$4.4M management fees over fund life

Working Capital

Fund II includes a modest working capital facility to bridge timing gaps between capital calls and expenses. This prevents the personal financial stress that characterized Fund I operations.

SUMMARY: WHY FUND II WILL SUCCEED

Meridian Ventures Fund II is positioned to deliver top-quartile returns because:

Proven Team: GPs with complementary skills, demonstrated partnership stability through Fund I challenges, and relevant operating experience.

Differentiated Strategy: Ground-level presence in underserved markets, combined with genuine GTM value-add through Andrew Senduk.

Strong Fund I Foundation: 1.55x TVPI with clear winners emerging, disciplined write-off decisions, and institutional-quality reporting already in place.

Right-Sized Fund: $25M is large enough to lead meaningful rounds but small enough to generate strong returns from regional exit valuations.

Institutional LP Base: Anchor commitments from Jelawang and Sarona provide validation and strategic value beyond capital.

Clear Path to Fund III: Fund II performance sets up institutional fundraise at $50M+, accessing DFI capital and achieving sustainable firm economics.

Fund II isn’t just an investment vehicle—it’s the foundation for building a permanent institution in South-East Asian venture capital.

Fund II Fundraising Begins

By mid-Year 3, we formally launched Fund II fundraising with a $25M target—2.5x our Fund I size.

The LP composition evolved significantly from Fund I:

LP Type Commitment

Jelawang Capital (anchor) $4M

Sarona Asset Management $3M

Dubai Future District Fund $2.5M

Speedinvest Emerging Manager Program $2M

Regional Fund-of-Funds (2) $5M

Fund I Re-ups (Family Offices, HNWIs) $6M

New HNWIs and Angels $2.5M

TOTAL $25M

Jelawang Capital: A Thought Leader Partnership

Among our Fund II LPs, Jelawang Capital stood out not just for their commitment size but for their role in the ecosystem.

Jelawang had established themselves as thought leaders in South-East Asian venture, publishing research on emerging manager performance, hosting convenings for GPs and LPs, and advocating for ecosystem development across the region.

Their due diligence process was rigorous—more intensive than any other LP we’d encountered. But that rigor came with genuine partnership. Once they committed, they became active supporters of our firm, making introductions to other LPs, providing feedback on our portfolio strategy, and including us in their thought leadership events.

“Having Jelawang as an anchor LP gave us credibility that we couldn’t have purchased at any price,” Rizal later reflected. “When other LPs saw that Jelawang had done deep due diligence and committed, it reduced their perceived risk in backing us.”

Fund II closed in 14 months—4 months faster than Fund I. The difference was our systematic fundraising approach. We had LP coverage across every major category. We had materials ready. We had a process. We weren’t scrambling; we were executing.

Year 5: Fund II Deployment and Fund I Value Creation

Fund II First Investments:

With $25M to deploy, Fund II allowed us to write larger checks ($500K-$1.5M) and target slightly later-stage opportunities (seed+ to Series A).

Fund II investments (Year 5):

•            Investment #1-3: Three seed rounds averaging $800K

•            Investment #4-5: Two Series A participations averaging $1.2M

•            Total deployed Year 5: $5.2M (21% of fund)

Fund I Portfolio Events:

PayMalaysia closes Series A (October, Year 5): $5M round led by Jungle Ventures, a top-tier regional VC. Our follow-on: $200K to partially maintain position. PayMalaysia was now valued at $18M; our position worth approximately $3.5M on $650K invested (5.4x).

SecureKL acquired (November, Year 5): In a surprise development, SecureKL was acquired by a regional cybersecurity company for $2M. Our $400K investment returned $550K—a modest positive outcome (1.38x) after years of struggle. First actual exit and DPI generation!

AgriTech ASEAN shuts down (December, Year 5): After 3+ years with no commercial traction, AgriTech’s board and founders decided to wind down the company. Our $350K investment returned approximately $50K from remaining cash. Second complete write-off.

Year 5 Fund I Metrics:

• Total invested: $5.2M (75% of initial allocation)

• Current portfolio value: $11.5M

• Distributions (DPI): $600K (SecureKL exit + DataSync wind-down + AgriTech wind-down)

• TVPI: 2.15x

• DPI: 0.12x

• Net IRR: ~26%

Key Takeaways from Part II

For fund managers in their investment period:

1. The J-curve is real and painful. Years 2-5 will feel like failure even when you’re building a successful portfolio. Communicate this to your LPs early and often.

2. Portfolio mortality is normal. Expect 30-80% of seed investments to fail completely. The key is limiting exposure to losers while maximizing exposure to winners.

3. Follow-on decisions define returns. Our Fund I returns were driven by concentrated follow-on in PayMalaysia and FinFlow. Spray-and-pray follow-on destroys returns.

4. First exit matters more than its size. SecureKL’s 1.38x return was modest, but generating actual DPI established our credibility for Fund II.

5. Build your fundraising team before Fund II. Use the GP Fundraising Team canvas to systematically cover all eight roles, even with a small team.

6. Fund II timing is strategic. Starting Fund II in Year 3-5, before Fund I exits, is standard practice. LPs understand the cycle.

Grace Choo’s final perspective on Part II:

“By Year 5, I’d moved from cautious optimism to genuine confidence in Meridian. They’d made hard decisions, communicated transparently, and generated reasonable paper returns. More importantly, they’d maintained partnership stability through challenging years. Fund II felt like a natural evolution, not a leap of faith. I told them we’d be interested in exploring a Fund III commitment if they could reach $50M.”

Read part III: Value Creation, Fund III, and Institutional Arrival (Years 6-7).

If you have not already read it, check out part I, the early years.

Written by Christian Rangen, advisor to VC funds, Fund-of-funds, faculty,

Written through the lens of Aisha Rahman, Founding Partner, Meridian Ventures With insights from: Rizal Tan, Co-Founder & General Partner, Meridian Ventures-

The people and companies are largely fictional for the purpose of this article, based on the Fund Journey Map and GP Fundraising Team canvas by Chris Rangen, Strategy Tools.

Read parts II and III.

Part I: From Idea to First Close (T-2 to Year 1)

The journey from “we should start a fund” to actually managing institutional capital is longer, harder, and more humbling than almost any first-time fund manager expects. Here’s how one South-East Asian emerging manager navigated those critical early years—and learned the hard way that fundraising requires a completely different skill set than investing.

It’s 11:47 PM in Kuala Lumpur, and I’m staring at a spreadsheet that makes no sense. We’ve been working on our fund concept for eighteen months now, and I still can’t articulate why a family office would trust us with $2 million when we’ve never managed a fund before.

Rizal is asleep on the couch in our tiny shared office—a converted shophouse in Bangsar that we’re renting month-to-month because we can’t commit to a lease until we know if this fund will actually happen.

That was Year T-1. Six years later, we would be managing $85 million across three funds—Fund I ($10M), Fund II ($25M), and Fund III ($50M)—having raised a new fund every 20 months on average. We would establish ourselves as one of South-East Asia’s most consistent emerging-stage performers and a genuine thought leader in the region’s venture ecosystem.

But in that moment? I genuinely didn’t know if we’d make it past first close.

This is the story of our fund journey—the real one, not the polished version we tell at conferences. If you’re an emerging manager in South-East Asia, or thinking about becoming one, pay attention to the ecosystem builders who helped us along the way. And pay close attention to our fundraising evolution—because that’s what ultimately made the difference between survival and success.

Year T-2: The Idea Takes Shape

The Spark

Rizal and I met at a fintech conference in Singapore in 2017. He was running business development for a Series B payments company backed by Golden Gate Ventures; I was a principal at a mid-sized regional VC that was, frankly, underperforming.

Over teh tarik at a mamak in Petaling Jaya, we complained about the same things: VCs who didn’t understand founders. Decision-making processes that took months. Partners who’d never built anything themselves. The disconnect between what South-East Asian founders needed and what most regional funds delivered.

“We should start our own fund,” Rizal said, half-joking.

“We should,” I replied, not joking at all.

That conversation planted a seed that would consume the next three years of our lives.

The Reality Check

Starting a fund isn’t like starting a company. You can’t bootstrap it. You can’t build an MVP and iterate. You need LP commitment before you can do anything—and LP commitment doesn’t flow to people without track records.

We spent the first six months of Year T-2 doing what I now call “the reality audit.”

Market Opportunity Assessment: We mapped the South-East Asian early-stage landscape, with particular focus on Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. What we found was both encouraging and terrifying. Encouraging: a genuine gap existed for founder-friendly, operationally-focused pre-seed and seed investors in the $200K-$1M range. Singapore had become expensive for startups, and regional founders needed alternatives that understood local markets. Terrifying: at least 30 other groups were circling the same opportunity, and several established Singapore VCs were beginning to look downstream.

The Malaysian Ecosystem Landscape: Early in our research, we discovered the critical role of Cradle Fund in Malaysia’s startup ecosystem. Cradle had been nurturing early-stage companies since 2003, providing grants and coaching that created the very dealflow we hoped to invest in. Understanding Cradle’s portfolio became essential to our thesis—many of our future portfolio companies would be Cradle alumni. We also mapped the roles of MDEC, MaGIC, and various state-level initiatives. South-East Asia’s venture ecosystem wasn’t just Singapore anymore.

Team Capabilities Audit: Between us, we had twelve years of relevant experience. Rizal had operator credibility from his startup years and deep fintech knowledge. I had investment experience, but as a principal, not a decision-maker. Neither of us had carried interest (the profit share that defines GP economics). Neither of us had ever raised institutional capital.

Investment Thesis Development: This is where most emerging managers fail first. They have a vague idea—“we invest in great founders”—but no differentiated thesis that answers the question every LP will ask: Why you? Why now? Why this strategy?

We spent three months developing our initial thesis. Early-stage generalist tech across South-East Asia, with initial focus on Malaysia and Indonesia, concentrating on B2B software and fintech, with a contrarian bet on founders from non-traditional backgrounds who were overlooked by establishment VCs. Check sizes of $200K-$800K, targeting 12-15 investments over a three-year deployment period.

The Honest Assessment: By the end of Year T-2, we had a thesis we believed in, complementary skills, and genuine founder networks from our previous roles. What we didn’t have: LP relationships, a track record as GPs, or any idea how to actually raise a fund.

The Fund Manager! Masterclass: A Turning Point

In late Year T-2, we made a decision that would fundamentally change our trajectory: we enrolled in the Fund Manager! Masterclass run by Strategy Tools.

“It blew our minds,” Rizal later told other emerging managers. “We thought we understood venture capital because we’d worked in the industry. The Masterclass showed us we didn’t understand the first thing about running a VC firm; and definitely not about delivering net DPI back to LPs.”

The Masterclass covered fund economics, LP prospecting, portfolio construction, value creation and DPI in ways that academic programs never touched. But the real value was the simulation component—practicing LP pitches, running investment committee discussions, and navigating the inevitable cash flow crunches that plague emerging managers. It was intense, but incredible.

We left the Masterclass with a completely revised approach:

•            Our fund target dropped from $30M (too ambitious for first-time managers in South-East Asia) to $10M (achievable and sustainable).

•            Our thesis sharpened around specific value-add we could provide: operational support for B2B go-to-market.

•            We understood the brutal economics of small funds—and planned accordingly.

Most importantly, we had a realistic understanding of the economic challenges ahead. The Masterclass didn’t make fundraising easy. It made us prepared for how hard it would actually be.

Key Learnings from Year T-2

Looking back, we made two critical decisions that year that shaped everything that followed.

Decision 1: We chose generalist over specialist. Many advisors told us to pick a vertical—“focus on fintech only” or “own the Malaysian SaaS space.” We resisted. Our thesis was that the best opportunities at seed stage in emerging South-East Asian markets often came from unexpected intersections. A generalist approach gave us flexibility but made our LP pitch harder. We’d need to defend that choice hundreds of times.

Decision 2: We committed to doing this together or not at all. Rizal had a standing offer to return to his old company as VP of Strategy. I had recruiters calling about partner-track roles at larger regional funds. We agreed: if we hadn’t reached first close within two years, we’d both move on. That deadline created urgency but also alignment.

Year T-1: The Fundraising Education Begins

(And it was a very hard school)

January-March: Building the Foundation

Year T-2 started with a sobering realization: we knew nothing about LP fundraising.

I’d spent years helping portfolio companies raise capital from VCs. The dynamic there is relatively straightforward—founders pitch investors who make decisions in weeks. LP fundraising is an entirely different animal.

The first quarter was pure education:

We read every book on fund formation we could find. We attended two LP conferences as observers (paying full tickets we couldn’t afford). We cold-called fifteen fund managers who’d raised first-time funds in South-East Asia, asking them to share their experiences. Most were incredibly helpful.

What we learned was humbling:

The average first-time fund takes 18-24 months to raise. Many take longer. Most never close at all. In fact, 75% of all GP teams give up before their coveted first close. LPs receive hundreds of fund pitches per year and invest in perhaps 2-3% of them. First-time managers face a structural disadvantage: LPs prefer to re-up with existing managers rather than take risk on unproven GPs.

Grace Choo’s perspective (Regional Lead, IFC):

“When I look at emerging managers, I’m not just evaluating the strategy. I’m evaluating the people and their ability to survive the inevitable hard times. Most first-time funds face an existential crisis within the first three years—deal-flow problems, portfolio blowups, partnership tensions. The question is: do these GPs have the resilience and alignment to get through it together?”

April-June: Legal Setup and GP Economics

We incorporated our management company in April. This sounds simple. It wasn’t.

The legal complexity almost derailed us:

Fund structure: Labuan IBFC? Singapore VCC? Cayman Islands? Each jurisdiction had different tax implications, different regulatory requirements, different costs. We spent $25,000 on legal fees just to understand our options—money we funded personally from savings.

GP commitment: LPs expect GPs to have meaningful skin in the game, typically 1-3% of fund size. For a $10M target fund, that meant $100K-$300K of personal capital. We didn’t have that. We’d need to bootstrap it through management fee deferrals and side arrangements.

Management fee: The standard 2% management fee on a $10M fund generates $200K per year. Sounds manageable until you realize that covers salaries, office, legal, travel, fund administration, and everything else. For two GPs, the math is brutal.

The GP business model realization:

Most people outside venture don’t understand this: fund management is a terrible business until you have multiple funds under management. The economics only work at scale. A single $10M fund generates enough management fee to survive, not thrive. Real GP wealth comes from carried interest—but that only materializes 7-10 years later, and only if performance is strong.

We modeled our GP business plan obsessively that quarter. The conclusion: we’d need to launch Fund II within 2-4 years to build a sustainable management company, and we’d need Fund I to perform well enough to attract larger commitments.

Building the LP Market Map with Asian Development Bank

One of the most valuable relationships we built during Year T-2 came through an introduction to Craig Dixon and Ian Lee at the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

ADB had been increasingly active in the South-East Asian venture ecosystem, not just as investors but as ecosystem builders. Craig and Ian were leading their emerging manager support program, and they agreed to spend time with us despite our lack of track record.

“We spent three intensive sessions with the ADB team building what we called our LP Market Map for South-East Asia,” I later explained at an AVCJ conference. “This wasn’t just a list of potential investors. It was a comprehensive mapping of LP types, their typical allocation patterns, their decision timelines, and crucially, their appetite for emerging managers.”

The LP Market Map revealed several critical insights:

•            Most institutional LPs in the region had minimum check sizes of $5-10M, making them impractical for a $10M fund.

•            Family offices and high-net-worth individuals were more accessible but required different approaches.

•            Development finance institutions (DFIs) like ADB and IFC had specific mandates that we could potentially align with—but typically required larger fund sizes.

•            Fund-of-funds focused on emerging managers were starting to look at South-East Asia but had limited presence.

•            Angel networks and HNWI communities across Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia represented our most likely Fund I LP base.

July-September: LP Research and the Persona Problem

This was the quarter where we learned the most painful lesson of emerging manager life: LPs are incredibly difficult to understand, categorize, and access.

The LP universe is vast and fragmented:

Family offices (thousands of them across Asia, all different), pension funds (long decision cycles, high minimum commitments), fund-of-funds (professional allocators, very competitive), sovereign wealth funds (policy objectives, bureaucracy), corporate venture arms (strategic agendas), government programs (economic development mandates), endowments and foundations (mission alignment required), and high-net-worth individuals (relationship-driven, inconsistent).

We made every rookie mistake:

We built a target list of 550 LPs without understanding that 430 of them would never invest in a first-time $10M fund. We sent cold emails with our deck attached (never do this). We requested meetings without warm introductions (rarely works). We pitched our strategy without first understanding what each LP was looking for.

The LP persona problem:

Here’s what nobody tells emerging managers: LP motivations are incredibly diverse, and you can’t pitch the same way to all of them.

A family office investing generational wealth wants something completely different from a fund-of-funds managing institutional capital. A government development agency optimizing for economic impact has different priorities than a pension fund optimizing for risk-adjusted returns.

We wasted three months pitching features instead of benefits, strategy instead of fit.

The breakthrough moment came in August:

An experienced fund advisor told us: “Stop trying to convince LPs your fund is good. Start trying to understand which LPs your fund is good for. Ask yourself. ‘how are our customers? And why would they care?”

That shift changed everything.

We went back to our LP research and re-categorized everyone based on their likely priorities:

• Return-maximizers: Need top-quartile potential, accept higher risk, want concentrated portfolios

• Diversifiers: Want exposure to South-East Asian tech, acceptable returns, lower risk tolerance

• Strategic allocators: Have specific theses about sectors or geographies, want alignment

• Relationship investors: Invest based on people first, strategy second, need deep trust

• Mission-aligned: Prioritize impact alongside returns, want ESG integration

• Access-seekers: Want deal flow visibility, co-investment rights, portfolio company access

This framework helped us prioritize and customize. We stopped mass-pitching and started targeted outreach.

The Strategy Tools LP AI Platform: Practice Before the Real Thing

During this period, we discovered the Strategy Tools LP AI platform—a tool that allowed us to practice pitching to different LP personas before meeting them in real life.

“We found this immensely helpful,” Rizal recalled. “The platform let us practice nailing LP personas and value propositions pre-launch. We could simulate a conversation with a skeptical family office patriarch, a process-driven fund-of-funds, or a mission-focused DFI—and get feedback on how to improve our pitch for each.”

We ran through dozens of simulated LP conversations, refining our answers to the tough questions:

•            “Why should we trust first-time managers?”

•            “How will you compete against established Singapore funds?”

•            “What happens if you don’t raise enough capital?”

•            “Why Malaysia as your base?”

•            “What’s your edge in deal flow?”

October-December: First LP Meetings and Brutal Feedback

By October, we had our legal structure in place, our deck polished (we thought), and our target list refined. We started taking meetings.

The first twenty LP meetings were a massacre:

“Your track record is insufficient.” (We knew this, but hearing it repeatedly was demoralizing.)

“Your fund is too small for our minimum commitment.” ($2M minimums into a $10M fund don’t work.)

“We’re not looking at emerging managers this cycle.” (Then why did you take the meeting?)

“Your thesis sounds like every other generalist fund.” (Ouch. They weren’t wrong.)

“Come back when you have a few investments to show us.” (The classic chicken-and-egg problem.)

Grace Choo’s perspective:

“I remember meeting Aisha and Rizal for the first time in late 2018. They were clearly smart, clearly passionate, and clearly unprepared for LP diligence. Their deck was too long. Their financial projections were too optimistic. They couldn’t articulate their differentiation in under sixty seconds. But what I did see was founder-quality determination. They took our feedback seriously. When they came back three months later, the improvement was dramatic. That’s the signal I would later invest behind—not perfection, but trajectory. Of course, fund I was not a good fit for us, but these conversations did lead us into fund II a few years later.”

December reality check:

By year-end, we had met with 93 potential LPs. We had zero commitments. Not soft commitments, not verbal interest—zero. Our personal savings were running low. Rizal’s wife was expecting their first child. I had stopped paying myself entirely, living off credit cards.

We had a hard conversation that Christmas: do we continue, or do we accept that this isn’t working?

We decided to give it six more months—but we needed to change our approach fundamentally.

The Cash Flow Reality: Surviving Pre-First Close

Here’s the dirty secret of emerging manager life that nobody talks about enough: you need working capital to operate before your management company generates fee income.

Our cash flow situation in Year T-2 was brutal:

Expense Category Amount

Legal fees for fund formation: $25,000

Travel to LP meetings and conferences: $15,000

Basic operations: $18,000

Deferred salaries (we weren’t paying ourselves): $0

Total pre-revenue burn ~$58,000

We funded this through personal savings, a small loan from Rizal’s uncle, and increasingly uncomfortable credit card debt. I stopped paying myself entirely. Rizal worked a consulting gig on the side to keep his family afloat.

This is the part of fund formation that the glossy conference panels never discuss. The reality is that most emerging managers in South-East Asia are living on the edge of financial viability until first close—and many give up before they get there. The 75% failure rate for first-time GPs isn’t because they have bad strategies. It’s because they run out of money and willpower before the strategy can be proven.

Year 0: The Long Road to First Close

January-March: Repositioning and Re-engagement

The first quarter of Year T-1 was about radical honesty.

What wasn’t working:

Our pitch was generic. Our main deck was too long (28 slides—should have been 12). Our answer to “why you?” was unconvincing. Our LP targeting was scattershot. Our follow-up was inconsistent. We did not use our LP CRM well enough. We were not disciplined. We had nothing about LP value propositions. We only discovered that part later.

What we changed:

We rebuilt our deck from scratch, focused on three things: team credibility, differentiated thesis, and LP value proposition. We cut everything else.

We developed specific LP personas with tailored pitch angles:

• For successfully exited founders in the region: Emphasized deal flow access and co-investment opportunities in the next generation of South-East Asian startups

• For active business angels: Emphasized portfolio diversification and professional fund management

• For HNWIs: Emphasized regional exposure and access to venture as an asset class

• For single family offices: Emphasized our accessibility, direct GP relationship, co-investment opportunities

• For angel networks: Emphasized our systematic approach to sourcing and supporting startups they could also access

We implemented a proper CRM (finally) and started tracking every LP interaction systematically. No excuses.

Using the LP personas x VP Canvas to nail the key message

Even more importantly, we started developing and iterating on the LP Personas x Value Proposition canvas for each of our LP personas, and for every LP we engaged with. It was awkward, slow even, in the beginning, but it helped us really tune into who are LPs were and what they cared about.

The breakthrough conversation:

In February, an LP we’d met six months earlier agreed to a second meeting. This time, they engaged differently. They asked about specific portfolio company scenarios. They probed our valuation discipline. They questioned our reserves strategy.

After ninety minutes, they said: “We’re interested in a $500K commitment if you can reach first close by June.”

Conditional, yes. But it was the first real signal of momentum.

April-June: Building LP Momentum

The domino effect:

That conditional commitment changed our LP conversations overnight. We went from “no one has committed yet” to “we have strong LP interest and expect first close within months.”

The power of anchor LPs:

We learned that LP fundraising has a herd dynamic. Once one credible LP commits, others become more comfortable. The first commitment is impossibly hard; the next ones are merely very hard.

In April, we secured a second conditional commitment from a Malaysian family office—$750K. In May, contributions from two angel networks indicated $1.2M combined. By June, we had verbal commitments totaling $4.5M.

The working capital problem resolved (barely):

We solved this inelegantly: Rizal took out a personal loan against his apartment. I maxed out my credit line. We deferred our own salaries entirely. It was financially precarious and emotionally exhausting.

Some emerging managers solve this through GP seeding programs or anchor LP arrangements that include working capital provisions. We didn’t have that luxury.

July-September: Legal Documentation Marathon

With LP momentum building, we entered the documentation phase.

LPA negotiations are brutal:

The Limited Partner Agreement (LPA) is the legal document that governs everything: fee structure, carry waterfall, GP removal provisions, key person clauses, investment restrictions, reporting requirements.

Every LP wanted changes to our draft LPA. Some wanted lower fees. Some wanted specific co-investment provisions. Some wanted side letters with enhanced reporting or most-favored-nation clauses.

We spent three months in legal negotiations that cost another $40,000 in attorney fees.

Key terms we fought for:

•            Standard 2% management fee (some LPs pushed for step-downs)

•            20% carried interest with 8% hurdle and European waterfall

•            4-year investment period with possible 1-year extension

•            10-year fund life with two possible 1-year extensions

•            Key person clause covering both Rizal and me

•            GP commitment of 2% ($200K on a $10M fund—we’d figure out how to fund it through fee deferrals)

Key terms we conceded:

•            Enhanced reporting to larger LPs (quarterly portfolio reviews, annual LP meetings)

•            Co-investment rights for LPs on deals over $500K

•            Advisory committee with LP representation

October-November: Racing to First Close

By October, we had $7M in executed subscription documents. Our target was $8M for first close, which would allow us to start investing with credibility.

The final push:

We called every warm LP relationship. We accelerated meetings with anyone showing interest. We offered modest fee concessions to LPs who could commit quickly.

The November crisis:

Three weeks before our target first close date, one of our committed LPs—an HNWI representing $1M of commitments—went silent. Emails unanswered. Calls unreturned.

After a week of panic, we learned through back channels that he was going through a divorce and had frozen all discretionary investments. Our $1M was gone.

We had two weeks to find $1M or miss first close. Missing first close would signal weakness to existing LPs and potentially trigger uncommit clauses.

The scramble:

Rizal flew to Hong Kong to meet face-to-face with a family office that had expressed interest months earlier but couldn’t meet our timing. I worked the phones, reaching out to every contact who’d ever shown warmth.

In the end, a successful entrepreneur we’d met at a Cradle Fund event committed $600K, and the Hong Kong family office committed $500K contingent on meeting Rizal in person (which he’d just done).

We made first close with $8.1M—not the $10M we wanted, but enough to start.

Year 1: First Close and First Investments

December-January: Operational Reality

First close on December 15th felt like victory. The relief was physical—I slept for fourteen hours straight.

But first close isn’t the end; it’s the beginning:

Capital calls went out. Management fee income started flowing, but we were still understaffed and under-resourced. Our $8.1M fund would generate roughly $162K in annual management fees. After legal, administration, office, and basic operating costs, we had enough to pay ourselves modest salaries—and nothing more.

The capital call mechanics:

We learned that fund accounting is surprisingly complex. Capital calls need to be calculated precisely, documented properly, and communicated to LPs with adequate notice. Our fund administrator handled most of this, but we still needed to understand it.

First capital call: $2M (roughly 25% of commitments), to be deployed over the first 12-18 months plus reserves.

The Friends, Family, and Angels Reality of Fund I

For Fund I, we failed at raising any institutional capital.

Every DFI we approached said our fund was too small. Every fund-of-funds said we lacked track record. Every pension fund said their minimums exceeded our entire fund size.

We had to pivot completely. Instead of institutional capital, we built Fund I from friends, family, high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs), angels, angel networks, and two local family offices.

Fund I Final LP Roster:

LP Type Commitment

Malaysian Family Office #1 $1.5M

Hong Kong Family Office $1M

Singapore HNWI (exited founder) $1.4M

AngelCentral Malaysia network $800K

Malaysian angel syndicate $700K

Various HNWIs (6 individuals) $2.7M

Friends & family $500K

GP Commitment (deferred) $200K

Fund I Total $10M (final close)

Final close at $10M came in March of Year 1, adding another $1.9M from additional HNWIs who saw our early momentum.

Fund I Economics: The Brutal Math

Let me share the fund economics of a $10M first fund, because this is where many emerging managers miscalculate:

Item Amount

Fund Size $10,000,000

Annual Management Fee (2%) $200,000

Fund Administration & Legal -$35,000

Office & Operations -$25,000

Travel & LP Relations -$20,000

Available for Salaries $120,000

$120,000 per year for two partners. That’s $60,000 each—less than entry-level roles at banks or corporations in KL, and far less than what we’d been earning in our previous roles.

The economics only work at scale. A single $10M fund generates enough management fee to survive, not thrive. Real GP wealth comes from carried interest—but that only materializes 7-12 years later, and only if performance is strong. This is why we knew from day one that Fund I was just the foundation. We would need to launch Fund II within 2-4 years to build a sustainable management company.

February-June: First Investments

Investment #1: DataSync (April, Year 1)

B2B analytics software for SMEs. Two founders from Grab’s data team. Pre-product, but extraordinary clarity on the problem they were solving. We led a $600K seed round, investing $400K.

Making that first investment decision was terrifying. Every doubt I’d had during fundraising resurfaced: Are we really qualified to make this call? What if we’re wrong? What if we’re just two people who convinced some LPs to trust us and now we’re about to deploy their capital into a company that fails?

Rizal talked me off the ledge. “We did the work. We believe in the founders. We understand the market. This is literally what we raised money to do.”

He was right. We wired the money.

Investment #2: PayMalaysia (May, Year 1)

Payments infrastructure for Malaysian marketplaces. Solo founder, ex-Maybank digital banking lead. Slightly further along—had a working product and three pilot customers. We lead an $800K round alongside an angel syndicate, investing $350K.

June 30 position:

Two investments deployed. $750K invested out of $10M committed. Management fee covering operations. Team of two GPs plus one part-time analyst. We were officially in business.

July-December: Continuing Portfolio Build

Investment #3: CloudSEA (August, Year 1) — SaaS for regional SME operations. Three-person founding team from enterprise software backgrounds. Early revenue, strong NPS. We invested $500K to lead a $1M round.

Investment #4: SecureKL (October, Year 1) — Cybersecurity for Malaysian enterprises. Deep tech founding team from local universities. Pre-revenue but compelling technology. We invested $300K in a $600K round.

Investment #5: LogiTech Asia (November, Year 1) — Last-mile logistics optimization for e-commerce. Solo founder, former Lazada operations manager. Pilot agreements with two major retailers. We invested $400K to lead her seed round.

Year 1 Portfolio Snapshot:

Company Investment

Status DataSync $400K Building product, pre-revenue

PayMalaysia $350K Growing, 5 customers

CloudSEA $500K Early revenue, expanding

SecureKL $300K Pre-revenue, developing

LogiTech Asia $400K Pilot stage

Total Deployed $1.95M 19.5% of fund

Year 1 Summary

By December 31 of Year 1, we had:

•            $10M in committed capital across 14 LPs

•            5 investments made, totaling $1.95M deployed

•            A functioning (if lean) operation with 2.5 team members

•            Management fee income covering basic expenses

•            Survived

We hadn’t thrived. We were chronically under-resourced. Our LP reporting was messy. Our portfolio support was reactive rather than proactive. I was working 70-hour weeks and still falling behind.

But we had survived. And in the emerging manager game, survival is the first milestone.

Key Takeaways from Part I

For aspiring fund managers:

1. The timeline is longer than you think. Budget 2-4 years from concept to first close. We took nearly 3 years.

2. LP fundraising is its own skill set. Experience investing or operating doesn’t translate directly. Study LP motivations obsessively.

3. Work backwards from GP economics. Understand what fund size you need to build a sustainable management company. Too small = you starve. Too large for an emerging manager = you don’t close.

4. Conditional commitments unlock momentum. One credible LP commitment changes every subsequent conversation. Prioritize getting that first anchor.

5. Working capital is existential. Have a plan for how you’ll fund operations before management fees flow. This is the most common emerging manager failure point.

6. Legal costs are real. Budget $75K+ for fund formation in South-East Asia. It’s unavoidable.

7. First close isn’t final close. Keep fundraising momentum through the investment period.

Grace Choo’s final perspective on Part I:

“Aisha and Rizal nearly quit three times during their fundraising journey. I know because they told me later, after Fund I was performing well. What they didn’t realize at the time was that their struggle was evidence of their commitment, not evidence of failure. Every emerging manager I’ve backed has had moments where they questioned whether it was worth it. The ones who break through are the ones who find a way to keep going. The Fund Journey Map shows this path clearly—but living it is another matter entirely.”

Ready for part II and III? Follow Aisha and Rizal’s journey into year 2,3 and beyond.

Read part II here and part III here.

Take, for example, this adventure I stumbled into. It all started in the most random of ways — at a bar during Oslo Innovation Week, of all places. I had no idea that an innocent conversation with Miho Tanaka, a powerhouse of entrepreneurial energy, would eventually lead to a business trip halfway across the world. And not just any trip — this was a ticket to Hokkaido Innovation Week in Japan, one of the most exotic spots on the planet.

So, I packed my board game (because who doesn’t travel with a board game?), threw in some ski boots (gotta be ready for anything), and set course for the land of the rising sun.

When I arrived, not only was my bag nowhere to be found, but I realized something else: I was in a part of the world that felt lightyears away from the West. The cultural distance was vast, and Japan’s startup scene presented challenges that were very different from what I’m used to.

But hey, that’s why we travel, right?

Japan’s Startup Scene: The Land of Contradictions

Before diving back into my personal story, let’s take a minute to understand Japan. The country is a fascinating blend of old-world traditions and cutting-edge tech. It’s home to some of the world’s largest corporations and has made some of the most significant contributions to innovation over the past century. But when it comes to startups, things are a little… complicated.

Japan’s economy, while massive, is famously conservative. The risk-taking culture that fuels Silicon Valley isn’t exactly alive and well here. In fact, the Japanese are known for their strong preference for stability — which is the opposite of what you need if you’re trying to start something from scratch. The startup scene is still maturing, and a lot of venture capitalists are hesitant to back early-stage companies, preferring more established businesses instead.

There’s also the matter of Japan’s “no-risk” mentality. Many people, particularly those in the older generation, still view failure as something to be avoided at all costs. This can create a challenging environment for entrepreneurs who need to fail fast, pivot, and try again — all things that are often part of the startup journey.

That said, things may be slowly shifting. For the first time in decades, Japan is exiting its ultra-low interest rate era — a sign that the country’s long-stagnant economy might be turning a corner. With inflation creeping in, wages rising, and the central bank finally confident enough to raise rates, there’s hope that a more dynamic economic environment could emerge. While monetary policy alone won’t fix Japan’s conservative startup culture, it might loosen the grip of risk-aversion in capital markets — nudging both investors and institutions toward a more innovation-friendly mindset.

My Own Hokkaido Adventure

Now, back to my story. Without so much as a change of underwear (thanks to my missing luggage), I rushed to the next plane. After landing in New Chitose, I hopped on a train to Sapporo, the vibrant city known for its snow, skyscrapers, and startling cleanliness. Seriously, this place is pristine. And, oh yeah, it snows like 10 meters a year. You’ve got to love a place that can pull off that much snow without breaking a sweat.

The next day, we kicked off an excursion with a group of VIPs, and suddenly, I found myself next to someone at a red light who bizarrely spoke Norwegian. “Are we heading to the same bus?” I asked. Turns out, these were the founders of TuniSea, a startup that’s turning marine invertebrates into a delicacy (yes, really). And then there was Ruben Brands of Sea02, a startup tackling one of the most critical challenges of our time: ocean carbon capture. What absolute legends. 

Three hours later, we were all in the heart of backcountry skiing bonanza Niseko , exploring traditional Japanese dining spots, visiting local distilleries, soaking in Onsen hot springs, and experiencing the legendary “Ja-pow” (that’s Japanese powder snow, for the uninitiated). It was an unforgettable experience.

The Scale-up Simulation: Making Deals, Fast

But let’s be clear — we weren’t there just to have fun. There was serious business to be done. The big day arrived for running the “Scale-up!” simulation, where we threw a group of founders, investors, and ecosystem players into a high-speed, high-stakes board simulator designed to mimic startup fundraising.

At first, things were slow. The participants were still getting used to the idea of building deals, and we were all kind of tiptoeing around the board. But soon enough, the lightbulbs went on. It became clear that if you want to survive in the startup world, you need to make deals — and you need to make them fast. The simulation started ramping up quickly as founders learned that speed was the name of the game. 
Now, I think this is an extremely interesting observation because having worked with over 200 founding teams over the years, I see this mistake over and over again; founders are not working quickly enough with the process of fundraising. Instead, they drag their feet up until they are running low on cash which is the worst time to be asking anyone for money. Also, once they finally do finish the raise they kick back and focus on more “important” issues up until they’re too low on cash again, and the whole circle starts again.
Another observation: once participants realized they could combine investor cards, they suddenly became much more creative in dealmaking. And that’s the beauty of Scale-up! You can simulate a process that would otherwise take you 3-4 years to wrap your head around. 

In any case. what was truly fascinating was how, regardless of cultural background or experience level, the participants began to recognize the value of a good deal and a sound capital strategy. The competition became fierce as everyone rushed toward startup greatness and world domination. It’s almost as if the mindset of speed and deal-making transcended borders and ecosystems — everyone was on the same page, working toward the same goal.

Closing Thoughts: Breaking Through Cultural and Entrepreneurial Barriers

Ok, so the takeways: Despite Japan’s challenges — a stifling economy, a “no-risk” culture, and a venture capital scene that might be described as “still in beta” — something magical happens when you toss all these barriers out the window and just let people play a high-speed startup simulator.As we simulated the chaotic, deal-making frenzy of startup life, it became clear that speed and capital strategy transcend culture. The moment you throw a bunch of hungry founders into the mix, let them loose on the “Scale-up!” simulator, and watch them scramble for investment rounds, the playing field levels out — and very quickly, it’s all about who can spot a good deal before the other guy does. It was like Shark Tank, except with way more caffeine, fewer sharks, and more snow.

And then, of course, there was the sheer joy of cultural exchange — you know, that beautiful moment when you can almost hear the wheels of innovation turning as we all connected over a shared love of startup chaos. Sure, my luggage was still missing (thanks for that, Japan Airlines), and I was down to the clothes I had on my back, but none of that mattered. 

Recommendations to the JP ecosystem

So what’s needed to unlock Japan’s startup potential? Three things stand out.

First, founders need to lead. As Brad Feld argues in Startup Communities, ecosystems don’t work unless entrepreneurs take charge. That means more than just building companies — it means organizing meetups, forming angel networks, getting corporates off the sidelines, nudging universities to spin out research, and fostering a culture where taking the leap is normalized. Bottom-up energy beats top-down plans every time.

Second, the capital needs to flow. Japan has no shortage of wealth, but too little of it finds its way into early-stage ventures. The government should grease the wheels with tax incentives and encourage institutional investors to take startup exposure seriously. If they want innovation, they’ll need to fund it — and fast.

Third, open the gates. Japan has a deep-rooted tradition of self-reliance and closed borders, but in startups, outsiders are often the spark. Some of the most dynamic ecosystems — from Silicon Valley to Berlin — thrive because immigrants bring hunger, fresh ideas, and a higher tolerance for risk. Japan should welcome entrepreneurial migrants and make it easier for them to start and scale companies here. Talent is global — Japan’s startup scene should be too.

A huge shoutout goes to Miho Tanaka, Kentaro Morita, Seiko Miura, and the rest of the Hokkaido Innovation Week team for pulling this off. You all somehow managed to get a bunch of diverse people in the same room, with no luggage, in a snowy wonderland, and made them believe they could solve all of Japan’s entrepreneurial challenges — one deal at a time. It was honestly a win for the ages. And let’s face it, with the high-speed, deal-making frenzy we unleashed, I think we might’ve been the real startup rocket fuel Hokkaido was looking for.

About Marcus Hølland Eikeland

Marcus is the Director of Program at LUMO Labs – a European VC who invests in deeptech solutions within health, education and climate. To date, he has had leading roles in other firms such as Katapult and Playbook 17, supporting over 150 founders in developing transformative solutions to some of the world’s most pressing challenges. Marcus also mentors at Stanford University, guiding the next generation of eco-preneurs as part of the Stanford Summer Ecopreneurial Immersion (Eco-SEI) program. He also serves on the selection committee, shaping the future of sustainable innovation at the Graduate School of Business.

Fund Manager! IMD

WHO: IMD

WHERE: Lausanne, Switzerland

DURATION: 2 days

WHY THE SIM?: Traditional VC education often lacks practical tools and frameworks that fund managers can immediately apply to real-world challenges. IMD, in partnership with Strategy Tools, piloted the Fund Manager! Simulation at their program Building Winning Portfolios to bridge this gap. The program, developed by Jim Pulcrano and Karl Schmedders, delivered hands-on training, and equipped participants with actionable tools like the LP stack, LP Prospecting Canvas and Fund Journey Map to address critical areas such as fund strategy, value creation, and exit planning.

By combining theory with practical application, the Fund Manager! experience provided participants with the skills and frameworks needed to close existing knowledge gaps, improve decision-making, and drive better fund performance in an increasingly competitive market.

OUTCOME: The 2-day Masterclass was a success, and participants left with:

• A deeper understanding of fund strategy and portfolio management.
• Practical tools and frameworks to optimize value creation.
• Actionable insights into structuring exits and improving fund performance.

Feedback highlighted the value of Strategy Tools’ frameworks in real-world applications, with participants achieving tangible improvements in their approach to fund management.

WHY IT MADE THE TOP 10 LIST: The Fund Manager! pilot at IMD marked the beginning of ST’s partnership with one of the world’s top business schools. It helped enhance VC skillsets and fostered a collaborative environment where fund managers could strategize, develop roadmaps, and tackle key challenges in the evolving VC landscape.

In 2025, IMD is running two on-campus Venture Capital Asset Management programs in collaboration with Strategy Tools. Chris, Scott, and Henrik will be back on campus in May and September. The next program starts May 8th. Read more and sign up

DELIVERY TEAM: Chris Rangen, Scott B. Newton, Henrik Amstutz 

Read the case study

Fund Manager! Falak

WHO: Falak Startups

WHERE: Cairo, Egypt

DURATION: 3 days

WHY THE SIM?: Following the success of the first VC Fund Manager Masterclass in 2022, Falak Startups, in partnership with Strategy Tools and supported by EBRD and USAID, brought back the program to build on its impact. Traditional VC training in Egypt often lacks interactivity, practical tools, and tailored learning experiences. This edition was designed to bridge those gaps by delivering a highly interactive, hands-on learning environment.

The program equipped participants with actionable frameworks to improve fund strategy, value creation, and collaboration, further strengthening the regional investment landscape and fostering a network of engaged VCs.

OUTCOME: The 3-day Masterclass was a resounding success, with significant improvements over the 2022 edition:

• Enhanced venue to match the expectations of high-calibre participants.
• More comprehensive content with expert-led sessions, practical simulations, and fireside chats.
• Strong participant engagement through team-based competitions, presentations, and interactive discussions.

Participants praised the program for its unique, immersive format, highlighting its practical value, robust networking opportunities, and high level of engagement throughout the three days.

WHY IT MADE THE TOP 10 LIST: Building on the momentum from 2022, together with Falak Startups, we delivered an even stronger edition of the VC Fund Manager Masterclass: the upgraded format, extended duration, and enriched content raised the bar for VC training in Egypt.

The overwhelmingly positive feedback underscored its impact, with participants calling for the program to be held twice a year and expanded regionally. Falak’s continued partnership with Strategy Tools has proven instrumental in equipping VCs with the tools, insights, and connections to elevate the MENA startup ecosystem.

DELIVERY TEAM: Chris Rangen, Scott B. Newton, Henrik Amstutz, and Kyrre Lemvik + our Falak Startups partners in Egypt 

Transform! Hult Ashridge

WHERE: Hult Ashridge Campus, just outside London 

DURATION: 2 days

WHY THE SIM?: Hult is using Transform! As one of the key pieces in a client-custom executive leadership development program. Transform! (financial services sector) is a perfect fit for the overall program. 

OUTCOME: Enable more strategic thinking, and more strategic leadership and expose the senior business leaders to key strategy-, leadership- and capital market topics they are not exposed to on a day-to-day basis. 

WHY IT MADE THE TOP 10 LIST: Running Transform! With senior business leaders is a truly unique experience. In just hours, we cover every angle of challenges, setbacks and surprises happening in the C-suite of a listed company.
Coming together as a team, handling the roles, and delivering on the transformation strategy, Transform truly puts people into the ‘shoes of a new management team’, putting them under the competitive pressure to lead, reinvent and transform a legacy company in the financial services sector.

Putting Transform! Into the hands of senior, experienced and ambitious business leaders is a perfect fit, with people learning at a very different pace from regular classroom lectures. 

DELIVERY TEAM: Chris Rangen 

Scale Up Angel! Tiye

WHO: Tiye Angels (Angel network) 

WHERE: Cairo, Egypt

DURATION: 2 days

WHY THE SIM?: In Egypt’s evolving angel investment ecosystem, significant gaps remain in investor education, collaboration, and understanding of critical tools and frameworks. The Scale Up! Angel Masterclass with Tiye Angels addressed these gaps by demystifying angel investing. The program equipped participants with a structured understanding of value creation, deal flow, and investment readiness while fostering a collaborative mindset often lacking in the region.

OUTCOME: The Masterclass delivered transformational outcomes:

• A 360-degree perspective on investing, shifting focus from purely entrepreneurial product creation to value creation and fundable business strategies.
• Increased confidence and ability to collaborate with other investors.
• Immediate real-world application, with Riham already implementing learnings to improve her own startup, Business Builder, while exploring new investment opportunities.

Participants praised the program’s unique ability to simplify complex VC and angel investing terminologies, creating clarity and actionable knowledge.

WHY IT MADE THE TOP 10 LIST: The Scale Up! Angel Masterclass stood out for its tangible impact on participants’ thinking, behaviour, and investment strategies. It bridged critical knowledge gaps, fostered a collaborative culture, and empowered participants to create meaningful change in the ecosystem.

Programs like this are vital to maturing the angel investing landscape in Egypt, equipping investors with tools, confidence, and collaboration to drive economic growth and innovation in the region.

DELIVERY TEAM: Chris Rangen, Henrik Amstutz, Kyrre Lemvik 

Read the case study

Scale Up! DNB

WHO: DNB Bank

WHERE: Norway

DURATION: 2 days

WHY THE SIM?: Norway’s largest bank, DNB, recognized a key challenge: startup clients were approaching the bank too late in their scale-up journeys, missing critical growth opportunities. While DNB’s advisors excelled in financial analysis, they felt like they could build on practical insights into startup financing, equity, and long-term growth strategies.

To bridge this gap, DNB partnered with Strategy Tools to deliver the Scale Up! Masterclass – a hands-on, immersive simulation guiding advisors through the founder’s journey from idea to exit. The program equipped DNB’s startup-focused team with the tools and frameworks to better understand and support scale-ups, positioning DNB as a true growth partner.

OUTCOME: The Scale Up! Masterclass had a significant impact on DNB’s advisors:

• A deeper understanding of the founder’s lifecycle, from fundraising to IPO.
• Enhanced ability to engage startups with strategic growth and financing advice.
• Improved cap table and valuation planning knowledge, enabling advisors to ask critical investor-focused questions.

Going through the simulation fostered practical, actionable skills, with advisors immediately applying insights to their client work. Participants highlighted the program’s effectiveness in transforming complex concepts into real-world solutions.

WHY IT MADE THE TOP 10 LIST: The Scale Up! Masterclass marked a turning point for DNB’s startup advisory team. By combining hands-on learning with deep insights into startup challenges, DNB advisors gained the confidence and skills to provide proactive, growth-oriented support to high-potential companies.

Key outcomes included:

• Enhanced strategic advisory for startups at critical growth stages.
• Strengthened DNB’s role as a key ecosystem enabler in Norway’s entrepreneurial landscape.
• Advisors adopting a long-term investor mindset, helping clients plan three capital rounds ahead.

The program reinforced DNB’s commitment to elevating the startup ecosystem, transforming its advisors from financial analysts into true growth partners for Norway’s founders.

DELIVERY TEAM: Chris Rangen, Henrik Amstutz, Kyrre Lemvik 

Read the case study

Scale Up! Accenture

WHO: Founders Intelligence (part of Accenture)

WHERE: London, UK

DURATION: 2 days

WHY THE SIM?: Founders Intelligence (FI), a consulting firm specializing in entrepreneurial growth, works at the intersection of startups and corporates. Despite many team members having startup experience, FI recognized a need for deeper empathy and understanding of the founder’s journey to enhance their ability to advise corporate clients.

Partnering with Strategy Tools, FI brought the Scale Up! Masterclass to London to immerse their team in the complexities of scaling a startup—from fundraising and cap table management to investor dynamics and exit strategies.

OUTCOME: The 2-day Masterclass delivered transformational results for FI’s team:

• A hands-on understanding of startup challenges, from early-stage funding to IPO readiness.
• Practical skills in cap table math, investor strategy, and board dynamics.
• Improved team cohesion and empathy, enhancing collaboration and client engagement.

Participants highlighted the immersive, real-world simulation as eye-opening, fast-paced, and invaluable in upskilling their ability to navigate and advise on scaling ventures.

WHY IT MADE THE TOP 10 LIST: The Scale Up! Masterclass exceeded expectations for Founders Intelligence, blending team-building with practical, high-impact learning. The simulation energized the team, fostered greater empathy for startup founders, and equipped participants with the tools and confidence to drive client success.

Key highlights included:

• High-pressure pitch simulations, IPO strategies, and late-stage investor decision-making.
• Fast-paced learning that condensed years of startup experience into two days.
• Strengthened team motivation, creativity, and collaboration.

The Masterclass proved a powerful exercise in skill development and team empowerment, positioning Founders Intelligence as even stronger advisor for corporates engaging with startups.

DELIVERY TEAM: Chris Rangen, Scott B. Newton, Nir Melamud, Henrik Amstutz

Read the case study

Scale Up! Bahrain

WHO: Falak Innovation x Tamkeen

WHERE: Bahrain

DURATION: 3 days

WHY THE SIM?: Bahrain’s entrepreneurial ecosystem is growing, but startups face significant challenges in scaling, attracting investment, and navigating complex business strategies. To address this, Falak Innovation, supported by Bahrain’s government agency Tamkeen, partnered with Strategy Tools to deliver Bahrain’s first-ever Scale Up! Masterclass. A big shout-out to Suhail Algosabi, our partner in Bahrain. The program equipped Bahraini entrepreneurs with practical tools, strategic insights, and hands-on learning to tackle real-world growth challenges, from raising funds to developing sustainable exit strategies.

OUTCOME: The 3-day Masterclass delivered tangible outcomes:

• Deep understanding of fundraising processes, cap tables, and investor strategies.
• Immersive learning through simulations, team-based exercises, and pitch development.
• Enhanced networking and collaboration among Bahrain’s entrepreneurial community.

Participants praised the interactive format, with feedback averaging 9.8/10, highlighting the program’s ability to simplify complex concepts while fostering strategic thinking and actionable learning.

WHY IT MADE THE TOP 10 LIST: The Scale Up! Masterclass was a landmark success for Bahrain’s startup ecosystem. By combining local expertise from Falak Innovation and global insights from Strategy Tools, the program empowered participants to scale their ventures confidently.

Key achievements included:

• Strengthening Bahrain’s entrepreneurial capabilities with actionable tools and frameworks.
• Bridging knowledge gaps in scaling strategies, valuation, and investor readiness.
• Facilitating collaboration across diverse participants, from tech founders to traditional business owners.

The success of this inaugural program has laid the groundwork for future editions, with plans to expand the Masterclass regionally, further solidifying Bahrain’s position as a hub for innovation and entrepreneurial growth.

DELIVERY TEAM: Chris Rangen, Suhail Algosabi

Read the case study

Supercluster! Washington State, US

WHO: ICAP – Innovation Cluster Accelerator Program, Washington State Department of Commerce 

WHERE: Seattle, Washington State, United States 

DURATION: 1 day

WHY THE SIM?: Over the past 4 years, Chris Rangen has been advising Washington State’s Cluster Accelerator Program on building out the #1 innovation cluster program in the United States. In February, a series of in-person workshops was held in Washington State, supporting the stakeholders and the ICAP cluster team.

During one of these internal ICAP workshops, the Supercluster! Simulation was used to create more engagement, more interaction and a deeper understanding of how clusters work. Using Supercluster, the participants battled it out using Canada, the US, Norway and China as their national superclusters. For anyone working with or learning how to build clusters and cluster programs, the Supercluster! Is a perfect working tool to experience cluster development in action!

OUTCOME: “Now, we really understand how clusters work”, was the key feedback from the group. 

• What are the key building blocks of a cluster 
• How to run cluster projects 
• What is a cluster business model 
• How to build and scale more clusters in the United States 

WHY IT MADE THE TOP 10 LIST:  The most impactful Supercluster session of the year!
Having 15+ economic development experts collaborating and competing in Supercluster is simply just incredible. 

DELIVERY TEAM: Chris Rangen

We would love to see more countries, states and regions run Supercluster! In 2025!

Scale Up! Cape Town

WHO: 2X Ignite GP Sprint 

WHERE: Cape Town, South Africa 

DURATION: 1 day (high-intensity pace) 

WHY THE SIM?:
In 2024 we ran the 3rd cohort of the 2X GP Sprint, Africa II. VC/PE/SME/Debt funds from all over Africa spent 6+ months going through the GP program. For the closing session, we decided to run the Scale Up! Sim at a record-accelerated pace. Effectively, we were saying, this is your ‘exam’. Hang on and enjoy.

We would never have been able to run this pace with regular founders, but as active investors, the teams here were able to just ‘do it’.  The participants were only experienced, emerging fund managers, investing with VC/PE/SME/debt strategies across Africa. 

OUTCOME: 

Considering this as a closing activity of the 2X GP Sprint, we aimed for a few key things: 

• Strengthened teamwork and collaboration across the cohort 
• Deeper understanding on the venture-backed ‘founder’s journey’
• Increased focus on the importance of ‘matching’ valuation to ARR throughout the journey; never let valuation rise too far from the 10X – 15X ARR valuation (one team did) 
• More attention on the exit side of the journey, and how ‘Valuation to ARR multiples will catch up with you’
• Key insights the fund managers could apply to their own investment work 

WHY IT MADE THE TOP 10 LIST: Running Scale Up! With an incredibly experienced, active team of participants is both a great learning, team building, collaboration and insights experience. The pace, the discussions, and the collaboration all made it a great session.

What really made it excellent, though, was the multiple key takeaway points people had, with ‘this is exactly what I am working on in real life’, or ‘this is sooo useful’ comments.  Overall, for the 2X GP Sprint cohort, we did the Fund Manager! With them in Johannesburg in March, and now the Scale Up! In December, showing how multiple sims can fit into the same program structure in a high-impact way.

DELIVERY TEAM: Chris Rangen & the 2X GP Sprint team

Fund Manager! CVCA online CAD

WHO: Women Venture Forward, Canadian Venture Capital & Private Equity Association (CVCA)

WHERE: Online / Canada

DURATION: 2 days

WHY THE SIM?:  In the competitive world of venture capital, aspiring fund managers face immense pressure to navigate fundraising, portfolio building, and market dynamics effectively. The Fund Manager Masterclass, delivered by Strategy Tools in collaboration with CVCA, provided an intensive and realistic hands-on learning experience to address these challenges. Participants developed key competencies in fund strategy, due diligence, deal structuring, and investment economics under time constraints, mirroring real-world conditions.

OUTCOME: 

• Participants crafted VC fund strategies, secured LP funding scenarios, and optimized portfolio construction.
• Key takeaways included the importance of active team coordination, the power law in fund economics, and the high-pressure dynamics of managing a VC fund.
• Teams delivered outstanding results, with highlights such as achieving a simulated 26.2X MOIC and 52.5% IRR while distributing $2.1B+ back to LPs.
• The experience fostered confidence, collaborative decision-making, and practical fund management skills critical to success in the venture capital landscape.

WHY IT MADE THE TOP 10 LIST: The Fund Manager Masterclass with CVCA earned its spot for its high-impact, real-world application and its ability to simulate the complexities of fund management within a compressed timeframe. It stood out by:

• Providing participants with an unparalleled, immersive experience to develop and test fund strategies.
• Equipping emerging fund managers with critical skills in a high-pressure, collaborative setting.
• Delivering tangible insights into portfolio construction, power law application, and fund economics.

This program exemplified how practical simulations can transform learning outcomes, preparing future VC leaders to excel in a challenging, fast-paced industry.

DELIVERY TEAM: Michal Badham, Stuart Morley, supported by Kyrre Lemvik

La siguiente entrevista se basa en los hallazgos del informe “Programas Nacionales de Clústeres: Una Perspectiva Global ” escrito para Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED). Puede descargar una copia aquí.

También llevaremos a cabo un webinar el 21 de noviembre de 2023 a las 9:00 a.m. México. Regístrese aquí

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Este reporte fue escrito para Departamento de Innovación, Ciencia y Desarrollo Económico (ISED, por sus siglas en inglés) – ¿podría proporcionar un poco de información sobre lo que impulsó esta investigación en programas nacionales de clústeres?

En 2017, se lanzó el Programa Nacional de Superclústeres de Innovación de Canadá con un objetivo ambicioso: establecer cinco superclústeres de innovación que posicionaran a Canadá como una potencia mundial. Estos superclústeres trabajarían en industrias en las que Canadá ya cuenta con ventajas competitivas o que podrían desarrollarlas en el corto y mediano plazo.  La ambición es convertirse en un actor importante en estas industrias a nivel local. El enfoque del programa abarcó tecnologías digitales, inteligencia artificial (IA), manufactura avanzada, economía del océano, y alimentos, con un énfasis específico en las proteínas.

Bajo el liderazgo del ministro de innovación, el gobierno canadiense propició con mucho éxito la colaboración con el sector privado, para crear un modelo de Asociación Público-Privada (APP) que respaldara la creación y el desarrollo de estos cinco superclústeres. A través de este modelo, el gobierno se comprometió a igualar cada dólar invertido por el sector privado en los superclústeres de innovación.

Al cumplir cinco años de haber iniciado el programa de superclústeres, el ISED condujo una evaluación del del mismo. Esta evaluación sería un insumo clave para el diseño de estrategia para un segundo ciclo de implementación. Los resultados de esta evaluación propiciaron esta investigación, ya que el equipo de ISED deseaba trabajar en la estrategia usando como referencia las mejores prácticas y casos de estudio de otros programas nacionales de clústeres.  También deseaban entender cómo programas nacionales de clústeres emergentes estaban abordando su diseño considerando el entorno dinámico en el que operan.

¿Cuáles fueron los descubrimientos más emocionantes de esta investigación de más de 30 programas de clústeres en todo el mundo?

Después de entrevistar a líderes y profesionales clave que trabajan e impulsan más de 30 programas nacionales de clústeres y una extensa investigación, hubo tres hallazgos clave que destacaría:

El primero, no hay una única mejor práctica, pero hay grandes ejemplos como Dinamarca, Noruega, Francia o Corea del Sur. El contexto es muy importante y los países deben entenderlo muy bien a la hora de diseñar su propio programa nacional de clústeres

Segundo. La velocidad del cambio y el contexto general significan que los países se enfrentan a un panorama muy dinámico, lo que también significa que los programas nacionales de clústeres deben tener en cuenta prácticas dinámicas a la hora de diseñar nuevos programas o la próxima iteración de los ya existentes.

Probablemente, el hallazgo más relevante – y la mayor contribución – de este informe es una comprensión clara de las diferentes palancas a nivel de política pública que los países deben tener en cuenta a la hora de diseñar o rediseñar un programa nacional de clústeres. Producto de esta investigación identificamos 16 palancas de política pública y creamos una herramienta, el Lienzo de las Palancas de Política de Clústeres (The Policy Levers Canvas en inglés), que los responsables de la formulación de políticas públicas y los líderes de los programas nacionales de clústeres pueden utilizar como un “panel de navegación”. Esta herramienta les permite crear múltiples configuraciones de programas, visualizarlas individualmente o de manera integrada.

En las entrevistas e investigaciones con más de 30 programas de clústeres en todo el mundo, ¿identificó algún desafío u obstáculo específico que enfrenten comúnmente estos programas? ¿Cómo están abordando estos desafíos?

Su pregunta es excelente, y la profundidad de este tema podría llenar fácilmente un libro o una serie de artículo.

El principal desafío consiste en establecer un entendimiento compartido entre las partes interesadas clave de lo que define a un clúster, en particular un superclúster de innovación, y cómo se distingue de otros programas e iniciativas destinados a fomentar el crecimiento económico, la competitividad nacional y la innovación.

El segundo es entender las diferencias entre un clúster de innovación y un programa de transformación país, que requiere una financiación significativa, una visión de muy largo plazo, y cuando digo muy largo plazo me refiero a décadas, no a años, y por lo general este tipo de programas requiere una vasta infraestructura a lo largo del país. Esperamos que reportes como éste ayuden a lograr este entendimiento común de las características de estos dos tipos de iniciativas.

Otros desafíos que podría mencionar están relacionados con el financiamiento del programa, el mantenimiento del apoyo político más allá de los ciclos electorales de corto plazo, la garantía de una fuerza laboral adecuada, y la realización de evaluaciones exhaustivas del impacto del programa.

Para hacer frente a estos desafíos, los países buscan aprender de los errores del pasado e inspirarse en estudios de casos de éxito como Dinamarca, España, en particular los programas regionales de clústeres, y algunas naciones asiáticas como Corea del Sur y China-También han reconocido la importancia de involucrar a todas las partes interesadas clave en el proceso de diseño del programa.

Los modelos de financiamiento de los superclústeres son un aspecto fundamental de su sostenibilidad. ¿Podría arrojar algo de luz sobre los modelos de financiación más innovadores y efectivos que encontró durante su investigación?

Creemos firmemente que los programas nacionales de clústeres deben ser financiados por los gobiernos con una perspectiva mínima de diez años. Esto le da continuidad al programa. Si se adopta esta perspectiva de largo plazo, entonces la discusión pasa a cómo debería hacerse la asignación de fondos a los superclústeres o clústeres que hacen parte del programa. Las 16 palancas que identificamos proporcionan un marco integral para evaluar diferentes modelos de asignación de fondos. Una vez más, el contexto es importante a la hora de decidir qué podría funcionar mejor.

Dicho esto, en 2021 publicamos otro reporte Modelos de Negocios de Clústeres: Explorando Modelos de Negocio en Clústeres de Innovación Globales, donde exploramos en detalle diferentes modelos de financiamiento que un superclúster podría adoptar. En pocas palabras, encontramos que los clústeres sostenibles tienden a ser financiados, en su mayor parte, con fondos privados, incluyendo fondos generados por el mismo clúster.

Ahora, la pregunta clave para los líderes de los programas nacionales de clústeres es decidir cuánto, si es que lo hace, financiará el programa a los clústeres y en qué condiciones. ¿Por cuánto tiempo? ¿En qué tipo de gastos deberá el clúster utilizar estos fondos? ¿Si el sector privado debe hacer una inversión equivalente y en qué proporción? Estas son algunas preguntas para responder. El Lienzo de las Palancas de Política de Clústeres les ayudará a guiar estas discusiones y a tomar decisiones.

Pero lo más importante es que el programa nacional de clústeres ayude a los clústeres a un modelo de financiamiento basado en fondos públicos a un modelo de financiamiento basado en fondos privados y en fondos generados por el clúster mismo.

¿Podría ofrecer un adelanto de lo que los asistentes pueden esperar aprender o discutir durante el seminario web?

Nuestra ambición con este webinar es visibilizar algunos de los elementos clave que los involucrados en el diseño de programas nacionales de clústeres y la comunidad extendida de clústeres deben considerar a la hora de diseñar o rediseñar un programa nacional de clústeres. Con esto en mente, discutiremos por qué los países necesitan programas nacionales de clústeres, los diferentes modelos de programas nacionales de clústeres y mostraremos estudios de casos globales y mejores prácticas en el diseño de programas nacionales de clústeres. Muy importante, centraremos la discusión en el contexto de América Latina.

¿Qué tipo de audiencia se beneficiaría de unirse a esta conversación?

The interview below is based on the findings in the report “National Cluster Programs: A Global Perspective” written for the Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED). You can download a copy here.

We also have a webinar happening on the 23rd of October, 2023 (Monday) at 13:00 CET. Sign up to join us here.

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This report was written for Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) – could you provide a bit of background on what prompted the research on the global perspective of cluster programs?

In 2017, the Canadian National Innovation Supercluster Program was launched with an ambitious goal: to establish five innovation superclusters that would position Canada as a global powerhouse. These superclusters would operate within industries where Canada already held or had the potential to develop competitive advantages, aiming to become a major player on the international stage. The program’s focus encompassed Digital, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Maritime, and Food, with a specific emphasis on protein.

Under the leadership of the Minister of Innovation, the Canadian government successfully fostered collaboration with the private sector, creating a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model. Through this model, the government pledged to match every dollar invested by the private sector in the innovation superclusters.

As the initial three-year timeline set by the government to achieve program goals drew to a close, the Innovation, Science, and Economic Development (ISED) recognized the need to assess the results and plan for the next iteration of the national innovation supercluster program. This realization led to a profound exploration of how other countries had effectively established and cultivated their own national cluster programs, as well as how emerging programs were approaching this dynamic landscape.

In the research of over 30 cluster programs worldwide for the report – what were the most exciting discoveries you made?

After interviewing key leaders and practitioners working and driving 30+ national cluster programs and an extensive research, there were three key findings I would highlight:

1. There are no single best practices, but there are great examples like Denmark, Norway, France or South Korea. Context is very important and countries should understand it very well when designing their own national cluster program
2. The speed of change and overall context means that countries face a very dynamic landscape, which also means that national cluster programs should look at dynamic practices when designing new programs or the next iteration of the existing program.
3. Probably, the most relevant finding – and contribution – of this report, is a clear understanding of the different policy levers countries should be aware of when designing or re-designing a national cluster program. We identified 16 policy levers and created a tool, the Cluster Policy Levers Canvas, that policy makers and national cluster program leaders can use as a “navigation panel”. It allows them to see multiple program configurations depending on how they move those levers.

In the interviews and research with over 30 cluster programs worldwide, did you identify any specific challenges or obstacles commonly faced by these programs? How are they addressing these challenges?

Your question is excellent, and the depth of this topic could easily fill a book or a series of blog posts.

The primary challenge involves establishing a shared understanding among key stakeholders of what defines a cluster, particularly an innovation supercluster, and how it distinguishes itself from other programs and initiatives aimed at fostering economic growth, national competitiveness, and innovation.

The second one is understanding differentiating an innovation cluster from a nation-shaping program, which requires significant funding, a really long-term view, and I mean decades not years, and usually a vast infrastructure throughout the country. Reports like this one is a very good step to create this common understanding.

Additionally, challenges encompass aspects like securing funding, maintaining political support beyond short-term cycles, ensuring an adequate workforce, and conducting thorough evaluations of program impact. To address these challenges, countries are looking to learn from past mistakes and draw inspiration from successful case studies, such as Denmark, Spain, particularly regional cluster programs, and some Asian nations like South Korea and China. They are also emphasizing the importance of involving all key stakeholders in the program’s design process.

Financing models for superclusters are a critical aspect of their sustainability. Could you shed some light on the most innovative and effective financing models you encountered during your research?

We strongly believe that national cluster programs should be funded by governments with a minimum perspective of ten years. This provides continuity to the program. The key discussion then shifts to the allocation of these funds. The 16 levers we identified provide a comprehensive framework to assess different models. Again, context is important when deciding what could work best.

Having said that, in 2021 we published another report Cluster Business Models: Exploring Business Models in Global Innovation Clusters, where we explored in detail the different financing models out there. In a nutshell, we find that sustainable clusters tend to be more privately funded, including self-generated revenue streams.

Now, the key question for national cluster program leaders is to decide how much, if at all, the program will fund clusters. For how long, for what should the clusters use these funds, if the private sector should make an equivalent investment and in what proportion, among other criteria. But most importantly, it needs to help clusters transition from public-skewed financing models to private and self-generated financing models.

Could you offer a teaser of what attendees can expect to learn or discuss during the webinar?

Our ambition with this webinar is to shed light on some of the key elements that those involved in the design of national cluster programs and the extended cluster community should consider when designing or re-designing a national cluster program. With that in mind, we will discuss why countries need national cluster programs, the different models of national cluster programs, and showcase global case studies and best practices in designing national cluster programs. Super fun!!!

What kind of audience would benefit from joining this conversation?

I was born and raised in Switzerland, and after completing my military service in the Swiss Air Force, I pursued my Bachelor’s degree at the University of Exeter in the UK. Following that, I delved into the world of investment banking in London.

Q: Could you share a bit about the most interesting projects you’ve worked on recently prior to joining Strategy Tools?

One of the most significant projects I had the opportunity to be a part of involved advising our client in acquiring a 50% stake in Hornsea II, the world’s largest offshore wind farm. It was a fast-paced and dynamic project that left a lasting impact, contributing to the positive momentum in our energy transition.

Q: Henrik, tell us a bit more about the work you will be doing at Strategy Tools

At Strategy Tools, I will largely be supporting the team in the wider scope of teaching start-ups, accelerators, founders and early-stage investors on what a successful fundraising looks like through the eyes of the Scale-Up! Sim and many other tools.

Q: ST has a rich number of tools to shape strategy around the world. What have you seen in your first few days of working so far?

The amount of tools, content, canvases, videos, use cases and Miro boards I have seen so far has been impressive (and slightly overwhelming in the best of ways!). It is fantastic to see the thought that has gone behind the work of the Scale-Up! Sim or the fundraising bootcamps. Putting such complex, multi-faceted scenarios and situations in simple terms is vastly difficult and when reading a “Long-term funding roadmap” canvas, it could not be laid out any simpler!

Q: Strategy Tools is developing a rich body of content and tools around VC/PE. Over the next couple of years this will be a growing business area for ST. How do you see yourself working with global fund managers, ecosystems and faculty with the VC materials?

Strategy Tools has excellent tools and content already, from the very first ideas of your start-up or if you are already running an SME to shape your corporate strategy. That, fortunately for me, makes my job significantly easier!

Now it is all about introducing key stakeholders to what ST does, and why it works (and all of our success stories) – whether it is running introduction calls, multi-day sessions across the globe or virtually, or simply acting as a sounding board.

Q: What’s your superpower?

Even in intense situations, I manage to excel at multi-tasking and managing workstreams simultaneously – all while making sure I remain positive and motivating others.

Q: What do you enjoy doing outside of work?

Like many here in Stavanger, I relish spending time outdoors, immersing myself in nature, and engaging in various sports activities, ranging from football to winter sports. Additionally, I enjoy discovering new captivating TV shows and movies.

The Master Trainer is the most advanced program offered by Strategy Tools – a true deep dive into the entire Strategy Tools methodology.
Participants accepted into the Master Trainer program are extremely qualified and already come equipped years of relevant experience to accelerate meaningful learning for the selected group.
By limiting the cohort size to 12 highly-skilled and experienced participants, we were able to design a personalized and effective learning experience around the individual goals of the participants.

In this cohort, we were joined by venture capital ecosystem drivers, expert strategy facilitators, enterprise consultants and business agility experts from the Netherlands, South Africa, Malaysia, Canada, the United States as well as Norway.

They invested in the Master Trainer program to gain a deeper understanding of new business tools, unlock the power of the Strategy Tools’ portfolio, and achieve long-term success for their business and brand.

Dynamic. Relevant. Fast-paced. Welcoming. Great content – Marijn Wiersma, Director of Partnership & Innovation at 2X Global

Getting Out of the Building

Each day of the week revolved around a different theme / topic – kicking off with corporate strategy on Monday and Tuesday and gradually working towards scale-up strategy to fund management strategy and business development towards the end of the week.

Throughout the week, we visited companies, and met with special guests to go behind-the-scenes and get insights from the ground. Here are some of the highlights:

A visit to Equinor, a global energy company, where we got a sneak peek into Equinor’s transformation strategy from Senior Advisor of Corporate Strategy, Kristian Fjelde.

A visit to Nysnø, a government climate investment fund set up as a commercial company that invests in technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Here we met with COO Ingvild Meland, who took us along Nysnø’s journey to becoming one of the most active climate funds in the country.

We met Sophie Bruusgaard Jewett, CEO of MoreScope, a climate Fintech solution for carbon accounting and impact investment – who walked us through how MoreScope planned to change how carbon accounting is done today. The cohort had the opportunity to work on some of MoreScope’s key concerns and strategy ahead – advising Sophie on the next steps she should take.

We also welcomed a visit from National Grid Partners, the venture investment and innovation arm of National Grid plc to understand how their VC fund worked as well as their investment thesis.

 Amazing program, 360 perspective with drone vision as big as a supercluster as laser focused on KPIs. Incredible opportunity to add value on what strategy really is for the next years to come!!! – José Manuel Hernández Páez, Managing Director at Grupo Valor

Hit the Ground Running

In between visits and guests, the Strategy Tools Master Trainer March 2023 cohort also dived into case studies, strategy tools and deep discussions – but it was really in the strategy simulations where everything came together. In three days, they experienced Scale Up!, Transform! & Fund Manager! – stepping into the shoes of a scale-up team, a corporate transformation team, as well as a budding fund management team.

Bringing it All Together

On the final day, the cohort had an opportunity for closing thoughts and business development. It was a time to reflect on the week’s learning and to apply it to their business and brand. The program was fun, educational, and valuable to all participants who attended.

We got to know a great toolbox of visualization tools for strategy from different perspectives – be it a strategy transformer, from a startup’s lens or a venture capital officer. – Tobias Riegger, Director at Quest Consulting AG

Join us for the next Strategy Tools Master Trainer program to gain a deeper understanding of new business tools, unlock the power of the Strategy Tools’ portfolio, and set yourself on a path to achieve long-term success for your business and brand.